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ABSTRACT
Four essays in unemployment, wage dynamics and subjective expectations
by
Pe´ter Hudomiet
Chair: Robert J. Willis
This dissertation contains four essays on unemployment differences between skill groups,
on the effect of non-employment on wages and measurement error, and on subjective expec-
tations of Americans about mortality and the stock market.
Chapter 1 tests how much of the unemployment rate differences between education groups
can be explained by occupational differences in labor adjustment costs. The educational gap
in unemployment is substantial. Recent empirical studies found that the largest component
of labor adjustment costs are adaptation costs: newly hired workers need a few month get
up to speed and reach full productivity. The chapter evaluates the effect of adaptation costs
on unemployment using a calibrated search and matching model.
Chapter 2 tests how short periods of non-employment affect survey reports of annual
earnings. Non-employment has strong and non-standard effects on response error in earnings.
xviii
Persons tend to report the permanent component of their earnings accurately, but transitory
shocks are underreported. Transitory shocks due to career interruptions are very large,
taking up several month of lost earnings, on average, and people only report 60-85% percent
of these earnings losses. The resulting measurement error is non-standard: it has a positive
mean, it is right-skewed, and the bias correlates with predictors of turnover.
Chapter 3 proposes and tests a model, the modal response hypothesis, to explain patterns
in mortality expectations of Americans. The model is a mathematical expression of the idea
that survey responses of 0%, 50%, or 100% to probability questions indicate a high level
of uncertainty about the relevant probability. The chapter shows that subjective survival
expectations in 2002 line up very well with realized mortality of the HRS respondents between
2002 and 2010 and our model performs better than typically used models in the literature
of subjective probabilities.
Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of the stock market crash of 2008 on households’ expecta-
tions about the returns on the stock market index: the population average of expectations,
the average uncertainty, and the cross-sectional heterogeneity in expectations from March
2008 to February 2009.
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CHAPTER I
The Role of Occupation-specific Adaptation
Costs in Explaining the Educational Gap in
Unemployment
1.1 Introduction
Unemployment rates vary in the population both in the observed cross section and over
time.1 Unskilled workers have higher levels of unemployment, and they are more exposed
to aggregate labor market conditions. For example, between 2005 and 2008, the average
unemployment rate was 3.8 percent among 25 − 55 year old males in the US. This average,
however, masked a large cross-sectional heterogeneity. The unemployment rate was around
2 percent among college graduates, 5 percent among high school graduates, and more than
7 percent among high school dropouts. In the great recession, the unemployment rates
approximately doubled in all groups.2 Perhaps less well known is the fact that the duration
of unemployment, however, is surprisingly similar across workers with different levels of
1See, for example, Clark and Summers (1981), Kydland (1984), Keane and Prasad (1993), Hoynes (1999),
Jaimovich and Siu (2009) and Hoynes et al. (2012).
2These numbers are my own estimates from the Monthly Current Population Survey. See Section 1.2 for
details.
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schooling, which was first shown by Mincer (1991) using the PSID. This symmetry in the
unemployment to employment hazards has been confirmed in more recent studies (Elsby
et al., 2010; Dickens and Triest, 2012; Foote and Ryan, 2014; Hudomiet, 2014; Cairo and
Cajner, 2014) using larger samples.
This paper quantifies the role of one key economic mechanism that predicts the ap-
proximate symmetry in hiring rates and large differences in layoff and unemployment rates:
adjustment costs due to the relatively low productivity of newly hired workers who need
time to adapt to their new workplaces. I focus on this explanation because recent studies
have found these costs to be relatively large, and to correlate with the skill level of jobs.
Using a Swiss employer survey, Blatter et al. (2012) report that adaptation takes approxi-
mately 80 workdays, on average, during which workers are about 30 percent less productive
than experienced workers. They find that these adaptation costs are 2 − 3 times larger, on
average, than search costs, typically used in macro-labor models. Moreover, large differences
in adaptation costs by major occupational groups were also noted. They found that it takes
considerably longer to become fully productive in occupations that are considered “higher
skilled.”
By combining data about adaptation costs and occupational characteristics from the
O*NET project, I show that adaptation costs have strong positive correlations with three
occupational work activities: 1) interpreting the meaning of information for others; 2) orga-
nizing, planning, and prioritizing work; and 3) developing objectives and strategies. What
is common in these work activities is that they all have many firm-specific elements. It
makes sense that adapting to a new workplace is harder when workers need to acquire many
firm-specific skills.
Another motivation for analyzing occupational adaptation costs is that, as I shall show,
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occupations, in a regression sense, explain at least two-thirds of the unemployment gap
between workers with different levels of education.3 The occupation of workers is a primary
determinant of employment chances, and mechanisms that operate through occupations are
reasonable candidates for explaining the educational unemployment gap.
The primary question of this paper is what fraction of the educational gap in unem-
ployment can be explained by adaptation cost differences. Given that credible exogenous
variation in adaptation costs is hard to find, and simple occupational averages are likely
endogenous in a simple unemployment regression, I use a calibrated search and matching
model, instead. In the model all parameters except adaptation costs are kept constant across
workers. For the calibration I use empirical estimates of occupation- and education-specific
adaptation costs from a US employer survey, the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality.
In the baseline specification of the model, adaptation costs explain 68 percent of the un-
employment gap between college and high school graduates.4 Adaptation costs also account
for a larger fraction of the unemployment gap between the medium and highly educated.
They explain 65 percent of the unemployment gap between college graduates and college
dropouts; 70 percent of the gap between college dropouts and high school graduates; and
only 11 percent of the gap between high school dropouts and high school graduates. The
model predicts robustly small differences in hiring rates across occupations/education groups
that are evident in the data. The model also predicts an 18 percent wage differential be-
tween newly hired and experienced workers, which is in between estimated causal effects
3Estimates from the Current Population Survey. See Section 1.2.3 for details.
4In an earlier version of this paper that circulated on the web my preferred specification explained consid-
erably less (36%) of this gap. That version only analyzed adaptation cost differences between occupations,
while this version looks at costs by occupations and education jointly. It turns out that adaptations costs
vary by education even within occupations: higher educated workers take more time to adopt even within de-
tailed census occupations. I interpret this as evidence that the census occupations are not detailed enough to
capture the full distribution of adaptation costs. An alternative explanation could be that the high educated
learn firm-specific skills slower, but that seems implausible.
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of tenure on wages reported in Topel (1991) and Altonji and Williams (2005). Moreover,
this literature has noted that seniority appears to affect wages at the beginning of the em-
ployment spells more strongly, which is exactly what a model with firm-specific adaptation
costs predicts. My model also predicts higher separation rates among recently hired workers,
although the predicted differences fall short of empirical estimates. The usual interpretation
of the separation-tenure profile is that match quality is higher among high-tenured workers
(Jovanovic, 1979). My model suggests another contributing factor. Newly hired workers are
less productive on average and idiosyncratic productivity shocks are more likely to make the
match surplus negative.
Even though there are numerous theoretical arguments in the economic literature for why
unemployment rates differ by education, we know very little about the relative importance
of the factors highlighted by the theories. Understanding the mechanism is important for
designing appropriate, welfare maximizing policies. Should the government run large scale
training programs to provide employable skills to the unemployed? Should policymakers
make labor market institutions (minimum wages, UI benefits) education-specific in order
to better balance the costs and benefits of these policies? Should the government increase
(or decrease) employment protection in certain jobs where adjustment costs are too low (or
too high)? To answer these questions, we need to understand first what causes the large
cross-sectional differences in unemployment rates. My paper endeavors to achieve this goal.
There might be unemployment rate differences because: 1) Labor adjustment costs differ
according to the skill level of the jobs5; 2) Productivity fluctuate more in low skilled jobs;
3) Low skilled wages are above market-clearing levels (e.g., due to the minimum wage6);
5This idea was suggested first by Oi (1962). Empirical papers in the last 30 years confirmed that recruit-
ment costs are substantial and they are likely to be larger in skilled jobs. (Manning, 2011; Lerman et al.,
2004; Leuven, 2005; Blatter et al., 2012).
6See Neumark and Wascher (2006) for a review.
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4) The value of being unemployed is comparatively high for low skilled workers (e.g., the
concave UI benefit formula7 or skill mismatch8); 5) Some selection mechanisms favor high
skilled workers compared to low skilled ones (e.g. low skilled employees might work in
volatile industries). The results of the literature on these subjects are controversial.9 For
the majority of the paper I focus only on adaptation cost differences across occupations and
all other mechanisms are shut off. I come back to the discussion of other mechanisms in
the final sections. Economic mechanisms that predict large effects on layoff rates and small
effects on hiring rates should be preferred, given the strong symmetry in hiring rates across
education and occupation groups.
The elasticity of hiring rates with respect to adaptation costs is robustly small. This quasi-
symmetry is remarkable given that most other mechanisms, including other adjustment costs,
have large effects on hiring as discussed in Section 1.5. Adaptation costs have two opposing
effects on the hiring rate that almost cancel out in equilibrium. The direct price effect is
that longer adaptation increases the cost of hiring, which decreases the value of matches,
leading to fewer jobs and longer unemployment duration. The indirect labor hoarding effect
is that adaptation costs decrease layoff rates in experienced matches, leading to longer lasting
employment spells, which then feeds back positively into job creation. In equilibrium, the
direct effect is slightly larger than the indirect effect leading to similar, but moderately lower
hiring rates in occupations with longer adaptation.
Differences in adaptation costs predict robustly small differences in hiring rates by ed-
7See Meyer (1990), Roed et al. (2002), Wolff and Launov (2004) and Bolvig et al. (2007)
8See Lazear and Spletzer (2012) and Sahin et al. (2012).
9Another approach used in the literature is to use cross-country variation in labor market institutions
to identify their employment effects on workers with different levels of skill. Nickell (1997), Siebert (1997),
Iversen and Wren (1998), Esping-Andersen (2000) and Saint-Paul (2004) argue that labor market rigidities
in many European countries led to a dual labor market featuring inefficiently high unskilled unemployment.
Card et al. (1996) and Oesch (2010), however, using more comprehensive analysis, found little evidence for
this labor market rigidity hypothesis.
5
ucation and occupations. The role of adaptation costs in explaining differences in layoff
rates, and consequently, unemployment rates, however, is sensitive to the choice of certain
parameters of the model. The paper, thus, carries out a detailed sensitivity analysis. The
persistence of match-specific productivity plays a very important role in determining the im-
portance of adaptation, because persistence determines the extent of labor hoarding in the
model. When shocks are permanent, adjustment costs matter less for layoff decisions; firms
only care about the instantaneous values of matches, and care less about future adjustment
costs. When negative shocks are relatively short lived, however, firms are willing to main-
tain unproductive matches to save on the cost of adjusting labor. Thus, when persistence
is low, adaptation costs are more predictive of turnover and unemployment. In my base-
line specification the monthly autocorrelation in match-specific productivity is 0.92, based on
empirical estimates of autocorrelation in plant level productivity reported in Abraham and
White (2006). This value implies that, on average, negative productivity shocks disappear
in 12 months. There are reasons to believe that plant level autocorrelation is not a perfect
substitute for the autocorrelation in match-specific productivity. I discuss alternative ways
of proxying autocorrelation in productivity, but I conclude that it is hard to precisely pin
down its value. As Pissarides (2009) also observed, we know very little about the proper-
ties of idiosyncratic productivity shocks.10 I show that by choosing other reasonable values
for the autocorrelation, the explained unemployment gap between college and high school
graduates can be as low as 35 percent or as high as 122 percent.
In this paper I interpret the cost of adaptation as a special type of labor adjustment cost
a` la Oi (1962). One can also think of adaptation as a measure of firm-specific skills, since
adaptation increases the productivity of the workers only at a particular firm. The idea
10Page 1345 in Pissarides (2009).
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that firm-specific skills matter for equilibrium turnover and unemployment rates goes back
to the early work of Becker (1962), but little empirical work has been done to evaluate the
explanatory power of firm-specific skills due to data limitations. One exception is Cairo and
Cajner (2014) who developed their paper independently. They use a very similar model, and
a measure of on-the-job training from the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP)
that is similar to my adaptation cost measures from the MCSUI. They find that the entire
unemployment gap across education groups can be explained by differences in on-the-job
training, together with the volatility of unemployment over the business cycle. The main
difference between their approach and mine is that they use a much lower autocorrelation
in productivity and they only consider educational differences in on-the-job training, while
I discuss occupational differences, too.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces basic patterns in unemployment
and turnover by education and occupations. The model with occupation-specific adaptation
costs is derived and calibrated in Section 3. Section 4 carries out the imputation of explained
unemployment and turnover rates by education. Section 6 discusses other economic mech-
anisms that might explain the rest of the unemployment rate differences across education
groups, and capitulates the findings.
1.2 Data and descriptive analysis
1.2.1 The Current Population Survey
The primary dataset used in this paper is the 1978-2013 waves of the Current Population
Survey (CPS). The main advantage of the CPS is its large size, roughly 60, 000 households
in each month, which makes it possible to include detailed occupations in empirical models
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of unemployment and turnover. The CPS uses a rotating panel survey design which allows
researchers to link around three-fourths of the sample between consecutive months. These
so-called semi-panels (or short panels) have been used by many researchers in the past to
analyze patterns in worker turnover (see e.g. Blanchard and Diamond, 1990 and Shimer,
2012a). The CPS represents the non-institutionalized adult US population cross-sectionally.
The second advantage of the CPS is that it asks detailed questions about the last jobs of
the unemployed. There is information about the last occupations and last industries of the
unemployed, which allows estimating, for example, unemployment to employment transition
probabilities by the last occupation of the unemployed.
I restrict the sample to prime age, 25 to 55 year old, males. The age restriction is applied
to minimize the effect of transitions between employment, schooling and retirement, which
might systematically differ by skills. Females are excluded from the analysis, because they
move considerably more in and out of the labor force and understanding patterns in the
female unemployment rate needs a careful analysis of those movements.
The CPS uses the 3-digit census occupation classifications. In the most recent years
it covered more than 500 different occupations. There have been two major changes in the
classifications in 1983 and 2003 and two minor ones in 1991 and 2011. Available occupational
crosswalks are not suitable for the purposes of this paper. The widely used crosswalks
created by IPUMS,11 for example, are not entirely consistent over time as some occupations
are only available in certain years. Moreover, some of the IPUMS occupations contain
very few workers, and particularly few unemployed persons, which makes the occupation-
specific unemployment rate and transition estimates noisy. To address these issues I created
more aggregated, but consistent occupational crosswalks over time. I use three levels of
11https://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/occ ind.shtml
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aggregation: one with 10, one with 48 and one with 191 occupations.12 The main purpose
was to follow the IPUMS crosswalk as much as possible, while ensuring at least around 100
workers in each occupation and month in the sample. The secondary purpose was to have
a good match between the 1980 census definitions (used between 1983 and 2002) and the
2000 census definitions (used after 2002), as the pre-1982 definitions are significantly less
detailed for skilled occupations. Consequently, the quality of the proposed crosswalk in the
most detailed categorization is slightly lower before 1982.
1.2.2 Basic patterns in unemployment and turnover by education
Panels A and B of Figure 1.1 show the level and the logit transformation of the unemployment
rates by workers’ education: (1) high school dropouts (HSD); (2) high school graduates (HS);
(3) some college (SC) and (4) college graduates (BA) among 25 − 55 year old males. The
unemployment rates are computed from the representative, cross-sectional CPS. There is
large heterogeneity in unemployment rates both in the cross-section and over time. Less
educated workers are more likely to be jobless, and the increase in their unemployment rates
in recessions is larger. The unemployment rate fluctuates between 6 and 16 percent among
HSD workers; between 4 and 12 percent among HS workers; between 3 and 9 percent among
SC workers; and between 1.5 and 4.5 percent among BA workers. Interestingly, the percentage
changes over the business cycle appear to be very similar across education groups. This is
even more apparent on Panel B, which shows fluctuations in the logit of the unemployment
rates. The gap between education groups is roughly constant in this logit metric.
Panels C-F of Figure 1.1 show two turnover probabilities that are the most important
determinants of the unemployment rate. The first is the employment to unemployment
12The crosswalk can be downloaded from https://sites.google.com/site/phudomiet/research.
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transition probability, which is defined as the fraction of workers who are unemployed in
month t+ 1 among those who were employed in month t,
pEUgt = Pr (Uig,t+1|Eigt) . (1.1)
Eigτ and Uigτ indicate that individual i in skill group g at month τ is employed or unemployed.
The second probability considered is the unemployment to employment transition probabil-
ity, which is defined as the fraction of workers who are employed in month t+ 1 among those
who were unemployed in month t ,
pUEgt = Pr (Eig,t+1|Uigt) . (1.2)
These two transition probabilities are not adjusted for time aggregation bias (Shimer, 2012a).
When I calibrate the model, however, I will take time aggregation bias seriously.
Panels C and E show the levels, while D and F show the logarithm of the probabilities.
The log transformation is motivated by the following steady state approximation of the
unemployment rate in group g at time t:
ugt =
pEUgt
pEUgt + p
UE
gt
, (1.3)
logit (ugt) ≡ lnuoddsgt = ln pEUgt − ln pUEgt . (1.4)
where ugt is the level, and uoddsgt = ugt/(1 − ugt) is the odds ratio of the unemployment rate.
The two approximations are equivalent and they are based on the following assumptions:
(1) movements in and out of the labor force do not matter for the unemployment rate; (2)
the system is in steady state; and (3) one can use the turnover estimates from the linked
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CPS to approximate the unemployment rate estimates from the representative cross-sectional
sample. Panels A and B of Figure 1.1 show that these simple approximations work very well.
The imputed and the true unemployment rates are practically the same.13
The advantage of specification (1.4) is its linear representation which allows a simple de-
composition of the unemployment rate differences between group A and B into contributions
of the job loss and job finding probabilities:
lnuoddsAt − lnuoddsBt =
(
ln pEUAt − ln pEUBt
)− (ln pUEAt − ln pUEBt ) . (1.5)
Percentage differences in turnover probabilities translate one-to-one into percentage differ-
ences in the odds ratio of unemployment. By looking at the transformed differences across
groups, we learn whether the unemployment gap is due to differences in hiring or layoffs.
The results of Panels C-F show that the entire educational gap in unemployment is due to
differences in layoffs rather than hiring. Highly educated workers face considerably smaller
chances of job loss, but conditional on being unemployed they face very similar chances of
finding a job compared to less educated workers. In fact, the job finding probability appears
to be slightly higher among less educated workers, particularly after 2000. This is true even
though the job finding probability appears to be strongly cyclical. Recent literature argued
that the job finding probability is the primary source of the business cycle variation in the
aggregate unemployment rate (Davis et al., 2006; Elsby et al., 2009; Fujita and Ramey,
2009; Shimer, 2012a). My results indicate that, instead, the job loss probability is the only
important determinant of the educational gap in unemployment. A model that aims at
explaining cross-skill differences in the unemployment rate should have this property.
13This approximation turns out to work quite poorly for females, which I take as evidence that the female
unemployment rate heavily depends on movements in and out of the labor force. In this paper, however, I
only focus on the unemployment rate among prime age males.
11
1.2.3 Basic patterns in unemployment and turnover by education
and occupation
This paper argues that occupational adaptation costs are important determinants of the ed-
ucational gap in unemployment rates and turnover. A necessary condition for this argument
to hold is that occupations are strong predictors of unemployment and turnover. To test
this condition I ran the following regressions:
ln (yi) = α
y
0 + α
y
1HSDi + α
y
2SCi + α
y
3BAi +
∑
x
βyxI
occ
xi + z
′
iγ
y, (1.6)
where y indicates unemployment or a turnover probability, yi ∈
{
uoddsi , p
EU
i , p
UE
i
}
; HSDi, SCi
and BAi indicate the highest education of the worker (high school dropout, some college or
at least BA) with high school graduates being the reference group; Ioccx indicates the worker’s
occupation (current if employed or the last occupation if unemployed); and zi is a vector of
other control variables. The interesting question is by how much coefficients αy1, α
y
2 and α
y
3
shrink after I control for occupations. The more they shrink, the more occupations explain,
in a regression sense, of the education gap in unemployment/turnover.
Table 1.1 shows the regressions for unemployment. Among the control variables I always
include time dummies for each quarter and I sometimes include age, race and marital status
dummies. Column 1 shows that unemployment rates are considerably smaller among the
educated: the difference is 0.48 log points between HSD and HS workers, 0.31 between HS and
SC workers and 0.96 between HS and BA workers. When one controls for basic demographic
variables, the educational gap in unemployment shrinks only slightly. When I control for
1 digit occupations using 10 dummies, however, the coefficients shrink substantially. The
HS-SC and HS-BA gaps shrink by roughly one half, and the HSD-HS gap shrinks by 20
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percent. A large fraction of the educational gap in unemployment can be explained by the
one digit occupation of the workers. As I include more and more disaggregated occupation
dummies, the differences shrink even further. When I include 191 occupation dummies in
columns 5, I can explain around one third of the HSD-HS gap and around two thirds of the
educational gap in unemployment among workers with at least a high school degree. By
further including sector dummies, the educational gap slightly shrinks further.
Tables 1.2 shows that one gets the same patterns qualitatively using linear probability
models. In this table I restrict the sample to low unemployment periods, i.e. “booms”.
Table 1.17 in the appendix shows the same OLS regressions in other periods, labeled as
“recessions”. Booms indicate years when the aggregate unemployment rate in the 25-55 year
old male sample was below 5 percent and recessions indicate that it was above 5 percent. The
high unemployment periods using this definition are 1980-1986, 1991-1993 and 2009-2013.
These periods are longer and somewhat lag NBER recessions, while the dot-com recession
in 2001 is entirely missing as it was too mild. There are large differences in unemployment
rates across education groups both in booms and in recessions; one digit occupations explain
around half of the gaps among workers with at least a high school degree; and detailed
occupations explain around two thirds of it. The explained HS-HSD gap is somewhat less.
Overall, occupation choice appears to be a primary reason why educated workers are less
likely to be unemployed. The highly educated work in occupations where unemployment is
a rare phenomenon.
Table 1.3 shows logit regressions in the monthly transition probabilities. The patterns in
the employment to unemployment transition probabilities are similar to the unemployment
regressions. We can see large differences between education groups, and occupations explain
a large fraction of the gap between education groups. The coefficients in the job finding
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regressions (unemployment to employment transitions) reveal a distinct pattern. First, the
job finding probability is smaller among higher educated workers. The differences are small,
however, at least compared to the differential in job loss probabilities. The 0.047 differen-
tial between HS and BA workers, for example, means that BA workers should expect 4.7
percent longer unemployment duration than HS workers, on average, which is less than one
week. However, after controlling for occupations, the education coefficients turn positive
and they are usually significant. This means that the educated are working in occupations
where finding jobs is harder, but conditional on their occupations, education is slightly pos-
itively associated with job finding chances. This finding, at least qualitatively, is in line
with the adjustment cost mechanism. Appendix Tables 1.18-1.23 shows more detailed logit
specifications and linear probability models. Those results are qualitatively the same.
1.2.4 Adaptation costs by occupations
Using a Swiss employer survey, Blatter et al. (2012) estimate that during the adaptation
period rookies are approximately 30 percent less productive than experienced workers, and
the length of the adaptation period is roughly 80 workdays on average. They also report that
the 30 percent productivity gap appears to be constant across jobs and employers, while the
length of the adaptation period varies greatly.
I use a US employer survey, the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequalities (MCSUI)14.
These data were collected in 1992-1994, in order to understand why high rates of joblessness
have persisted among minorities living in America’s central cities. One important aspect
of the study was the contacting of more than 3000 employers in four large US cities (Los
Angeles, Boston, Detroit and Atlanta) to ask detailed questions about their hiring practices.
14The study was funded by the Russel Sage Foundation and the Ford Foundation. See Holzer (1996) for
details about the survey.
14
Even though the intent of the study was to understand racial discrimination in hiring, the
exhaustive information about the recruitment process makes this study valuable for broader
purposes. The sampling procedure and the provided weights intend to represent employees
who worked in Los Angeles, Boston, Detroit or Atlanta in 1992. They used the 3-digit 1980
SOC occupation classification to code the position of the workers.
The survey contains a measure of occupational adaptation costs that I use in this paper.
The question reads “How many weeks or months does it take the typical employee in this
position to become fully competent in it?” Unfortunately the survey did not ask questions
about the average productivity difference between rookies and experienced workers, so I rely
on the Blatter et al. (2012) study and assume it is 30 percent in each job.
Table 1.4 provides descriptive statistics about the adaptation period measure. The me-
dian is around 3 months and the mean is around 7 months. The large difference between the
mean and the median is due to quite a few large outliers in the sample. One way of dealing
with these outliers is to apply the log transformation on the reported adaptation periods to
downweight the influence of these outliers. This is the method I applied in this paper.
Table 1.6 shows the coefficients of regressions of log adaptation on various occupational
work activity measures. The coefficients are from simple regressions with only one measure
included at a time. The work activity measures are created from the O*NET data with
a procedure described in Firpo et al. (2011).15 One might expect that adaptation takes
longer when people have to work with others, and when they have to analyze information
and make plans, since these activities are mostly firm-specific. The table supports these
hypotheses. Work activities related to information processing and dealing with people have
15O*NET provides two variables: the “importance” and the “level” of work activities in occupations. Based
on Firpo et al. (2011), I transform the two variables to be between 0 and 1, and then I assign a Cobb-Douglas
weight of 2/3 to importance and 1/3 to level to create my final measures.
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strong positive correlations with adaptation costs, while physical activities and operating
machines are negative predictors of adaptation costs. The three strongest predictors (based
on the t-statistics) are: 1) interpreting the meaning of information for others; 2) organizing,
planning, and prioritizing work; and 3) developing objectives and strategies. Table 1.5 shows
regressions of adaptation on education and various occupational work activity measures. The
three main occupational activities are positive and significant even jointly and the addition of
other work activity measures do not make the fit better. It appears interpreting information
for others, planning and developing strategies are the primary determinants of how long
it takes to get fully productive in occupations. Table 1.5 also shows that adaptation is
significantly and substantially longer in jobs where the highly educated work. Compared to
high school graduates, the average adaptation period is 35 percent shorter for high school
dropouts, 34 percent longer for college dropouts and 73 percent longer for BA workers. When
I include both education and occupational activity measures, the coefficients on education
drop by about half, but remain statistically significant. In some ways it is puzzling that
education remained significant. MCSUI asks employers about the average adaptation in the
given position. If the positions employers have in mind are the same as the occupations
I use, no variable other than occupations should matter. It appears that employers use a
more detailed occupation-specification when answering these questions, and the education
dummies pick up these differences.
Table 1.25 shows the average imputed length of adaptation in 46 detailed occupations:
23 with the shortest and 23 with the longest adaption out of the 191 occupations.16 The
table shows the fitted values of Models 2 and 3 from Table 1.5 and the raw averages by
occupations. My preferred measure is in the first column, which is based on only the three
16The entire table is available on my website at https://sites.google.com/site/phudomiet/research.
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main work activity measures. The addition of the other activity measures hardly changes
the imputed values, and the raw averages in column 3 are very noisy, since they are based on
very few observations. My preferred measure shows that the distribution of the adaptation
period runs from 1.2 month (waiter’s assistants) to 8.6 month (clergy and religious workers).
This is a very wide distribution. Adaptation is shortest in occupations such as waiters,
laundry workers, food preparation workers, janitors, machine operators, and interviewers.
Adaptation is longest for managers, management support occupations, teachers, scientists,
financial workers, etc. These are in line with expectations.
Table 1.7 shows logit regressions of unemployment and turnover probabilities on imputed
adaptation cost measures. The imputed values are the predicted values from a regression of
log adaptation costs on the three occupational work activity measures, education dummies
(less than high school, high school, some college, and college) and their interactions. Model
1 of Table 1.7 includes no control variables other than year dummies, and model 2 includes
education, age, race, marital status and industry dummies. In model 1 adaptation costs
are significantly and strongly negatively related to unemployment and layoff rates, while the
effect on hiring rates is smaller, but still negative and significant. These are qualitatively in
line with the predictions of a labor hoarding model: turnover costs negatively affect both
job creation and job destruction. In model 2, after controlling for education, age, race and
industries, the elasticities of unemployment and job loss with respect to adaptation decrease
by about 20%, but remain very large and significant; and the elasticity of job finding remains
negative, but turns insignificant. These estimates are suggestive that adaptations costs are
important determinants of turnover and unemployment. They are, however, likely suffer from
omitted variable bias. Occupations differ in many dimensions beyond the cost of adaptation.
To overcome this endogeneity problem the next section turns to a model of turnover and
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unemployment. In the model I allow occupations to differ only in the average length of
adaptation, and all other differences are shut off.
1.3 The model
The purpose of this model is to analyze how adaptation costs affect turnover and unemploy-
ment rates in equilibrium. I use a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) (MP) type search and
matching model with endogenous job creation and job destruction as the modeling frame-
work. In this model, unemployment is purely frictional in the sense that all unemployed
persons are searching for jobs. Workers are job-less because it takes time to find new jobs
after separations, not because their reservations wages are too high. In fact, in the standard
setup of the model, used in this paper, workers do not even have a reservation wage: they ac-
cept any job offered to them and wages are determined by a bargaining process in which firms
and workers make an agreement about how to split up the surplus of the match. The rate
at which separations occur and the duration of unemployment are endogenously determined
in the model. Separations occur when idiosyncratic, match-specific shocks make the value
of the match (the surplus) negative. The rate at which the unemployed find jobs depends
on how many vacant jobs are posted by firms and how many individuals are competing for
these positions. In the standard MP model, the probability of finding a job is assumed to
be the same for all workers.
The traditional adjustment cost literature (see e.g. Oi, 1962; Fair, 1985; Shapiro, 1986;
Lazear, 1990) uses a neoclassical framework to analyze the effect of adjustment costs on
unemployment rates. In that framework, job loss and job finding probabilities cannot be
analyzed and job-less workers do not want to work. The MP modeling framework is more
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suitable to analyze the effect of various parameters on turnover rates, since unemployment
is frictional and turnover is endogenously determined in the model.
My model closely follows the original Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model, with a few
exceptions. First, as I aim at explaining cross-sectional variation in turnover and unemploy-
ment, I only consider the steady state equilibrium of the model. Second, the labor force in
my model is heterogeneous: workers can work in one of many occupations. Within occupa-
tions, however, workers are homogeneous apart from random shocks to their match-specific
productivity. To keep the model simple and tractable I assume that workers are permanently
assigned to their occupation and they never change their careers. When they lose their jobs,
they only search in their original occupation. This assumption allows for segmenting the
economy into submarkets and applying the standard solution methods on each of them. It
would be interesting to consider a more general model with the possibility of switching occu-
pations. For at least two reasons, however, the general model should behave similarly to the
restricted model that is considered in this paper. First, the size of each occupation should be
stable in steady state. Second, the job finding probabilities are very similar across education
groups and occupations, and thus, cross-occupation flows are unlikely to contribute much to
equilibrium unemployment rates.
The main deviation I introduce to the MP model is the presence of an adaptation period
during which newly hired rookies are less productive than experienced workers. Occupations
only differ in the expected length of the adaptation period, and all other parameters of the
model are kept constant across occupations. I assume that the adaptation period in occu-
pations is exogenous. It reflects how complex the jobs are, and how difficult it is to gain full
competency in them. In reality, the adaptation period might be partly endogenous: Employ-
ers might choose to assign harder and harder tasks for newly hired workers gradually. There
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might be a production function of experience and employers might be able to manipulate
the speed of gaining experience. In such cases one might think of my simplistic model as the
second step of a two step model. In the first step firms optimize over all possible values of
adaptation. Once they find the optimal production function of experience in each occupa-
tion, they can take the optimal values of adaption from the first step as a given to discover
the optimal turnover decisions in the second step. In this case, my model does not reveal
why adaptation costs are larger in certain occupations, but it still discerns the equilibrium
turnover and unemployment rates given the observed equilibrium values of adaptation.
This is not the first paper to add an adaptation period to a search and matching model.
Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) and Silva and Toledo (2009) use similar models to analyze the
effect of adaptation costs on the business cycle variation of the aggregate unemployment rate.
Some papers discussed the implications of training costs for unemployment rates (Pissarides,
2009; Cheremukhin, 2010; Miyamoto, 2011 and Cheron and Rouland, 2011). These papers
model the cost of training as a onetime cost at the time of hiring, and they do not use
empirical measures of training costs. The recent working paper of Cairo and Cajner (2014)
also uses a similar model to mine.
1.3.1 The setup of the model
In what follows, subscript x refers to occupation x ∈ {1, ..., NX}, and I ignore time subscripts
to simplify notation. I use a continuous time version of the model. Firms can employ one
worker, either a rookie or an experienced one, or zero workers. When they are matched with
an experienced worker in occupation x the match produces flow profit
pix (ε) = sxε, (1.7)
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where sx is average productivity in occupation x and ε is the idiosyncratic, match-specific
productivity term. The c.d.f of ε is denoted by F (ε) which is assumed to follow a log-normal
distribution,
ln ε ∼ N (0, σ2) . (1.8)
The idiosyncratic shock is temporary and its value is redrawn from this distribution in an
i.i.d. fashion when a new shock arrives with Poisson arrival rate λ. One can think of λ as the
inverse autocorrelation in productivity: when λ is large, new shocks occur more frequently
and present productivity has a smaller predictive power for future productivity. Formally, if
λ is calibrated to be a monthly rate, then a t month autocorrelation in productivity is ρ (t) =
exp (−λt). If the productivity shock is smaller than an endogenously determined productivity
threshold ε, so that the surplus falls below zero, matches get destroyed endogenously. The
endogenous separation rate, fL,enx in the model, is
fL,enx = λF (εx) . (1.9)
Matches can also be destroyed with an additional exogenous rate, fL,ex. Hence, the total job
loss rate is
fLx = λF (εx) + f
L,ex. (1.10)
Rookies’ productivity is lower than experienced workers’ productivity by a factor 1− δ,
piRx (ε) = δsxε. (1.11)
Rookies endogenously separate from their employers if the match-specific productivity shock
falls below an endogenously determined productivity threshold εR. Furthermore, I assume
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that the additional exogenous separation rate is the same for rookies and experienced workers.
The total job loss rate of rookies is
fL,Rx = λF
(
εRx
)
+ fL,ex. (1.12)
We should expect that, in equilibrium, ε < εR so that rookies are more likely to lose their
jobs than experienced workers. Rookies become experienced randomly with a Poisson arrival
rate ϕx. This arrival rate is assumed to be occupation-specific, but the productivity loss,
1− δ, is not. This is in line with the findings of Blatter et al. (2012).
Firms without workers can post a vacancy if they are willing to pay the instantaneous
search cost cx = csx. The search cost is a constant fraction of occupational productivity, sx.
This is a neutrality condition which assures that occupational productivity does not have a
direct effect on turnover. One justification for this assumption is that higher skilled workers
have to be interviewed (the largest component of search costs, see Blatter et al., 2012) by
higher skilled workers.
If there are vx posted vacancies (unfilled jobs) in the economy and nx persons are searching
for them, then matches are formed at rate
mx = ηv
α
xn
1−α
x . (1.13)
This function is called the matching function which determines how fast workers can find
jobs and firms can fill their vacancies. The matching function has constant return to scale
(CRS) and it is increasing in both arguments because 0 < α < 1. The job finding rate, fFx ,
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can be computed by dividing the match rate by the number of searching workers,
fFx =
mx
nx
= η
(
vx
nx
)α
≡ ηθαx , (1.14)
where θx = vx/nx is called labor market tightness. In a tight labor market with a lot of
unfilled jobs it is easier to find jobs and fF is relatively large. The rate at which vacancies
are filled, qx, can be computed similarly:
qx =
mx
vx
= ηθα−1x . (1.15)
The vacancy filling rate is decreasing in labor market tightness, because α < 1. In a tight
labor market with a lot of unfilled jobs it is harder to find workers and q is relatively small.
Free entry of firms assures that the value of posting vacancies is zero in equilibrium. The
value of being an unemployed worker, however, is positive. Unemployed workers enjoy a flow
value of bx = bsx and they expect a positive continuation value as well. Similarly to search
costs, the flow value of unemployment is also normalized with occupational productivity, sx.
Wages are determined through Nash wage bargaining, and workers’ bargaining power is
γ. At the time of hiring and at any time when the productivity of the match changes, wages
get renegotiated. It is possible to allow for wage rigidity without changing any predictions
of the model. Wage rigidity does not affect turnover under the following two conditions: 1)
Newly hired workers’ wages are flexible and set by Nash wage bargaining; 2) Workers and
firms never leave surplus on the table. This second condition implies that if, for example, a
negative shock occurs and the firm is not interested in the match at the given level of rigid
wage, workers are willing to renegotiate the wage to save their jobs. Both of these conditions
are reasonable.
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Finally, the interest rate is r and the initial value of the idiosyncratic shock is fixed at its
mean, εinitial = ε0 = exp
(
σ2
2
)
.
1.3.2 The solution
The model can be solved analytically. The Appendix shows how to write the value functions
of the firm and the workers, and then how to solve for all the endogenous parameters.
The equilibrium wages of rookies and experienced workers are
wRx (ε) = (1− γ) b+ γ (δε+ θxc) , (1.16)
wx (ε) = (1− γ) b+ γ (ε+ θxc) . (1.17)
Rookies make less money, because they are less productive than experienced workers. Thus,
the model predicts a wage-tenure profile. Wages increase in the bargaining power of workers
(γ), in productivity (δ and ε), in the flow value of unemployment (b), in search costs (c) and
in labor market tightness (θx). Apart from search costs, these results are intuitive. When
search costs (paid by the firms) are large, the initial surplus needs to be larger so that
firms are compensated for them. A larger initial surplus increases the workers’ share of the
initial surplus, and, consequently, workers demand higher wages. This is a classical hold-up
problem17. Investments made before the first wage negotiation, in this case paying search
costs, have to be shared with the other party. Using similar arguments, one can show that
search costs that are paid by workers, as opposed to firms, decrease, rather than increase,
wages. The effect of search costs on wages is similar to the wage effects of firm-specific skills
described in Becker (1994). In his model, the costs and benefits of acquiring firm-specific
17See Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) for a more detailed discussion of the hold-up problem in search models.
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skills have to be shared by workers and firms so that neither has an incentive to end the
relationship too early.
Now consider equilibrium turnover. The job loss and job finding rates depend on the
three endogenous parameters (θ, εx and ε
R
x ) as described in (1.10), (1.12) and (1.14). To
characterize the equilibrium we need three conditions. The first one is called the job creation
condition:
c
η
θ1−αx = (1− γ)
δ + ϕx
r+λ+fL,ex
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
(
ε0 − εRx
)
. (1.18)
The left-hand side of (1.18) is the expected total search costs firms pay to fill a vacancy
and the right-hand side is the firms’ share of the initial surplus. The job creation condition
says that new vacancies are posted until labor market tightness reaches a point at which the
expected value of an additional vacancy is zero.
The second equilibrium condition of the model is the job destruction condition of expe-
rienced workers:
b+
γ
1− γ θxc = εx +
λ
r + λ+ fL,ex
ˆ ∞
εx
(ε′ − εx) dF (ε′) . (1.19)
The left-hand side of (1.19) is the outside option of workers and the right-hand side is the
total value of the match. The job destruction condition says that matches are destroyed
when the surplus is below zero, or in other words, when the workers’ outside option exceeds
the total value of the match. The right-hand side has two terms. The first (εx) is the flow
productivity and the second, involving the integral, is the expected continuation value of the
match. One can think of the second term as a labor hoarding term: matches can survive large
negative shocks as long as the surplus is expected to increase soon. In fact, the only incentive
to hoard labor is that the cost of adjustment is smaller than the expected cost associated
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with a temporary negative shock. When λ is small, and shocks are very permanent, hoarding
labor is not rational, and flow productivity should be the only factor determining turnover
decisions. When λ is large, and productivity shocks are short lived, hoarding labor becomes
more appealing.
The last equilibrium condition is the job destruction condition of rookies, which is
b+
γ
1− γ θxc = δε
R
x + λ
δ + ϕx
r+λ+fL,ex
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
ˆ ∞
εRx
(
ε′ − εRx
)
dF (ε′) +
ϕx
r + λ+ fL,ex
(
εRx − εx
)
.(1.20)
The left-hand side of (1.20) is the outside option of workers, which is the same for rookies and
experienced workers. The right-hand side consists of the flow productivity of the match and
two labor hoarding terms. The first one, involving the integral, is the expected continuation
value of the match if the worker remains a rookie, and the second one is the expected gain if
he becomes experienced. Rookies might be hoarded not only because a temporary negative
shock is expected to disappear, but also because they might become experienced soon.
Equations (1.18)-(1.20) implicitly determine the three endogenous parameters and, con-
sequently, the job finding and job loss rates. The equilibrium conditions in the standard MP
model are similar, and they can be obtained as limiting cases of my model. For example, if
rookies are as productive as experienced workers (δ → 1 ) or if rookies become experienced
immediately ( ϕx → ∞), the equilibrium conditions collapse to the ones in the standard
model. If rookies never become experienced (ϕx → 0), the equilibrium conditions collapse to
the standard model with average productivity normalized to δ, rather than 1.
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1.3.3 Calibration of the model
In this section I calibrate the model to fit aggregate turnover and unemployment. The
calibrated parameters might be thought of as estimates for an average or “representative”
occupation. The next sections discuss how turnover and unemployment vary with adaptation
costs.
The model aims at matching empirical average turnover in the CPS between 1994 and
2008. In 1994, the CPS introduced a question about employer change: workers who are
employed both in month t and t + 1 are asked in t + 1 whether they still work for the same
employer as in t. Years before 1994 are dropped, because employer switching, an important
separation margin, cannot be identified in those years. Years after 2008 are dropped because
of the great recession. In each year between 1994 and 2008, the aggregate unemployment
rate in the prime age male sample was below 5 percent.18
Some parameters of the model are calibrated externally, using regular values from the
literature. The first eight rows of Table 1.9 shows the choice of these parameters. The
Cobb-Douglas share of vacancies in the matching function is 0.4, based on a large number of
empirical estimates summarized in Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001). Workers’ bargaining
power is set to 0.6 so that the Hosios condition is satisfied and the market equilibrium is
socially efficient. Aggregate labor market tightness is set to 0.72. This value is based on
empirical estimates from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey and used in most
macro labor papers. One might argue that in my more restricted sample (prime age males)
a different value should be used. It, however, plays no role for the estimates; the model
is entirely indifferent to the choice of aggregate θ. For a formal proof, see Appendix 1.5.2.
18The calibration results are basically equivalent if the years of the mild dot-com recession are dropped,
too.
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Intuitively, the other internally calibrated parameters absorb any mismeasurement in θ. The
interest rate is set to 0.004 which corresponds to ∼ 5 percent annually. The average total
search cost firms pay, which is c/q in the model, is set to 50 percent of the average monthly
wage of an experienced worker. The average wage is computed endogenously from the model.
Blatter et al. (2012) found that total search costs in Switzerland take up roughly 60 percent
of the average monthly wage, while other papers (such as Pissarides, 2009; Ratner, 2013) use
values around 40 percent. I use the middle point between 40 and 60 but I shall investigate
the sensitivity of the model’s predictions to the choice of this parameter.
The productivity of rookies is set to 30 percent lower than that of experienced workers
based on Blatter et al. (2012). The rate of turning experienced is set to ϕ = 0.31, which
corresponds to becoming experienced in about three months, on average. The value of ϕ
was computed from the MCSUI with the following procedure. I assume that true adaptation
costs only depend on the occupation of workers:
ln taix = ln t
a
x +mi. (1.21)
The log reported adaptation period in occupation x by employer i, ln taix, is the sum of an
occupation-specific term, ln tax, and a mean zero measurement error term, mi. Equation (1.21)
is estimated by OLS using 48 occupation dummies. I use the provided sample weights that
intend to make the MCSUI sample represent employees who worked in Los Angeles, Boston,
Detroit or Atlanta in 1992. After that I take the sample average of the occupational log
adaptation periods using the occupational distribution of workers in the CPS sample. The
average rate of turning experienced, then, is the inverse of the exponent of this number,
ϕ = exp (− ln ta) = 1/ta. I run a sensitivity analysis on both δ and ϕ in the next section.
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The final parameter that is externally calibrated is the autocorrelation in match-specific
productivity. Empirical estimates of this parameter are hard to obtain, because we do not ob-
serve productivity in individual matches. In the baseline calibration I, instead, use measures
of autocorrelation in plant level productivity, but in Section 1.4.1 I shall discuss alterna-
tive strategies. Abraham and White (2006) provides high quality estimates of plant-level
productivity in the manufacturing sector. They find yearly autocorrelation to be relatively
low, between 0.37 and 0.41. The corresponding monthly values are 0.92 and 0.93. I choose
the value of ρ = 0.92. This value implies that the rate at which new i.i.d. shocks arrive is
λ = − ln (0.92) ≈ 0.083, and productivity shocks get redrawn every 1/0.083 ≈ 12 months, on
average. There are reasons to believe that plant level autocorrelation is not a perfect substi-
tute for the autocorrelation in match-specific productivity. For example, as aforementioned,
workers productivity might fluctuate for personal reasons such as sickness, a loss in the
family, interpersonal issues with coworkers, etc. One might think that such negative shocks
disappear quicker than demand shocks. Given that the plant level estimates in Abraham and
White (2006) are already relatively low, I use those numbers in my baseline specification. I
run a sensitivity analysis on this parameter as well.
The model has three equilibrium conditions: the job loss condition of rookies, the job
loss condition of experienced workers and the job finding condition. The three conditions,
together with the job loss and job finding probabilities from the CPS enable calibrating five
parameters internally. These are the productivity thresholds of experienced workers (ε) and
rookies (εR); the dispersion of productivity shocks (σ); the efficiency of the matching function
(η); and the flow value of unemployment (b).
The next issue is the choice of turnover probabilities to match from the CPS. Table 1.8
shows different types of transition probabilities in the CPS. The average E → U transition
29
probability is a little over 1 percent, similar to the employment to non-participation (E → N)
probability. The fraction of employer switchers is even larger, above 2 percent monthly.
Altogether 4.4 percent of matches are destroyed in an average month in the US. It has to
be determined which separations to model as endogenous and as exogenous. In the model,
endogenous separations occur when the surplus falls below zero after a large negative shock
to productivity. In reality, separations can occur even without productivity shocks and even
in cases when the match is still productive. For example, when a worker decides to go back
to school, he decides to retire, or he accepts a better job offer, arguably he would still be
productive in his old match. The total monthly separations (4.4 percent) is large, and it
seems unlikely that all of them involved the disappearance of the surplus. For that, one
would need implausibly large and frequent productivity shocks. I, instead, assume that
E → U transitions are endogenous separations while all other separations are exogenous. As
a robustness check, I shall consider cases where a fraction kEN of E → N transitions are
endogenous, too. E → E transitions, however, are always assumed to be exogenous.
The next question is how to determine the unemployment rate in the model. The model
has predictions for the different types of job loss rates and the labor market tightness, θ.
Labor market tightness determines the job finding rate among searching workers, who can
come either from unemployment, non-participation or employment. Because unemployed
persons are all searching for jobs, the U → E transition rate equals the job finding rate:
fUE = fF . The transition rates from other labor market statuses can be different, because,
for example, not all persons in non-participation are searching. I propose to employ a simple
shortcut here. In Section 1.2.2 we already saw that the unemployment rate can be very well
approximated by the steady state formula, u = pEU/
(
pEU + pUE
)
. The two panels of Figure
1.2 show that this approximation works well even in detailed occupations in the CPS. I,
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thus, assume that this formula works in the model, too. Because the U → E transition rate
equals the job finding rate, the unemployment rate can be written as a function of the labor
market tightness and the E → U transition rate. As described in the previous paragraph,
in the baseline specification I assume that the E → U transition rate equals the endogenous
separations in the model. Thus, the unemployment rate can be written as
ux =
λF (εx)
λF (εx) + ηθ
α
x
. (1.22)
The formula ignores the effect of rookies on the unemployment rate, but given that they take
up a tiny fraction of the employed sample, the bias is negligible.
In the more general case, when some of the endogenous separations are E → N transitions,
the unemployment rate is
ux =
kλF (εx)
kλF (εx) + ηθ
α
x
, (1.23)
where k is assumed to be the same in each occupation and is a function of kEN .
Rows 9− 11 of Table 1.9 show the most interesting internally calibrated parameters and
rows 12+ show a few other interesting implied values for the representative occupation.
The flow value of unemployment is around 66 percent of the average wage of experienced
workers. There is a large disagreement about the true value of this parameter in the literature.
There are papers using values as low as 40 percent (Shimer, 2005) and as high as 95 percent
(Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008) of the average wage. My estimated value is roughly in the
middle of the used interval. The standard deviation of match-specific productivity shocks is
0.26, which is reasonable, but is somewhat on the high side of calibrations in other papers.
The scalar of the matching function, sometimes called matching efficiency, is 0.4.
The model predicts that rookies are more likely to be laid off than experienced workers.
31
While the continuous employment to unemployment transition rate is only 0.014 for experi-
enced workers, it is 0.020 for rookies. The last two rows of the table show the average wages
of rookies and experienced workers using formulas (1.16) and (1.17):
E
(
wR
)
= (1− γ) b+ γ (δE (ε|ε > εR)+ θc) , (1.24)
E (w) = (1− γ) b+ γ (E (ε|ε > ε) + θc) . (1.25)
The model predicts that rookies earn roughly 18 percent less than experienced workers. This
estimate is a pure effect of seniority and it should be comparable to causal estimates of tenure
on wages. Simple OLS estimates of wage differential between newly hired and experienced
workers is around 30 percent, but causal estimates are anywhere between 5 and 25 percent
(Topel, 1991; Altonji and Williams, 2005). Taking this into account, my 18 percent is a
reasonable number.
1.3.4 Turnover elasticities with respect to adaptation costs
The only occupation-specific exogenous parameter in the model is ϕx, the rate at which
rookies turn experienced. To get a sense of the effect of adaptation, I calibrate the elasticities
of turnover and unemployment rates with respect to the length of the adaptation period. As
ϕx is a Poisson process, the expected length of adaptation is
tax =
1
ϕx
. (1.26)
Table 1.10 shows the elasticities of various endogenous variables with respect to the adapta-
tion period evaluated at the aggregate solution. I use the following numerical approximations
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to compute the elasticity of any variable y
εyta =
∂ ln y
∂ ln ta
≈ y (t¯
a + h)− y (t¯a − h)
2h
t¯a
y (t¯a)
, (1.27)
where t¯a is the average length of the adaptation period (∼ 3 months in the baseline calibration
of the model); y (t) is the equilibrium value of the variable of interest when the adaptation
period is t, but all other parameters are kept constant at the aggregate value; and h is a
small number. In practice I use h = 10−4.
The model predicts that longer adaptation leads to both less layoff and less hiring, but
the response on the layoff margin is more than ten times larger. The steady state assumption
implies that
εu
odds
ta = ε
fEU
ta − εf
UE
ta . (1.28)
As the layoff elasticity is much larger than the hiring elasticity, the model predicts that the
equilibrium unemployment rate is decreasing with the length of the adaption period. The
estimated elasticity of unemployment is −0.541. To get a sense of the magnitude of this
coefficient, let us consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculation. In Section 1.2.2 we
saw that the unemployment gap between BA and HS workers in the logit metric was 0.962.
In order to explain the entire BA-HS gap, thus, we need ln taBA − ln taHS = 0.962/0.541 ≈ 1.78,
the log difference in the adaptation periods between the two groups should be around 1.78.
Alternatively, the ratio taBA/t
a
HS should be around exp (1.78) ≈ 5.9, adaptation in jobs in which
college graduates work should be 6 times longer than in jobs in which high school graduates
work. This would happen, for example, if the average adaptation costs for high school and
college graduates were 4 and 24 weeks, respectively. This differential is not implausible,
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but it seems somewhat large. In Section 1.2.4 we saw that the log difference in adaptation
between the two groups was around 0.73 rather than 1.78. Based on this simple calculation,
we can expect to explain around 40 percent of the educational gap in unemployment between
BA and HS workers with adaptation costs. This back-of-the envelope calculation, however,
might not be precise due to non-linearities in the model.
The implied close to zero hiring elasticity of adaptation costs is remarkable, given that
most parameters of the model, including other adjustment costs, have large effects on hiring
as shown in Hudomiet (2014). Adaptation costs have two opposing effects on the hiring
rate. The direct effect is that longer adaptation makes turnover more costly, decreasing
the value of the initial surplus, which lowers vacancy creation and, consequently, makes it
harder to find jobs. I call this the price effect : when turnover is costly, there is less of it
in equilibrium. The indirect effect, which I call labor hoarding effect, is that adaptation
makes matches more stable through a decrease in layoffs. Longer lasting matches increase
the value of the initial surplus, since both the firm and the worker expect to enjoy their
share of the match rent for a longer time. Both the price and the labor hoarding effects are
large, but they appear to almost cancel out in equilibrium. Mathematically, one can show
that any reasonably calibrated job destruction condition is steep, and as adaptation costs
only shift the job creation condition, labor market tightness and the job finding probabilities
are not affected strongly by adaptation costs. It is worth noting that the symmetry in the
hiring rates only holds if the model features endogenous job destruction. If job destruction
is exogenous, that is, the labor hoarding effect is shut down, adaptation costs do not have
an indirect positive effect on hiring, and there is nothing to balance out the large negative
price effect of adaptation.
Adaptation costs are also different from other adjustment costs. Beyond the already
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mentioned price and labor hoarding effects, most adjustment costs affect turnover through
a third channel as well, which I call the bargaining effect. Adjustment costs can change
the bargaining position of workers or firms depending on who pays these costs and when.
Costs that are sunk at the time of hiring, such as search costs, for example, decrease the
bargaining position of the party that paid them. Adaptation costs, however, do not change
the bargaining position of the parties. These costs are not sunk at hiring, and they are
also firm-specific, implying that they cannot be used as a threat in wage negotiations. In
equilibrium, workers and firms split up the cost of adaptation based on their fixed bargaining
power. Rookies are less productive, but they also make less money.
The model predicts that E → N movements are not responsive to adaptation, because in
the baseline specification they are exogenous. The job loss probabilities of rookies are not
changing with the adaptation period either; the elasticity is close to zero, because of the
assumption that becoming experienced is a memoryless Poisson process.
Equation (1.28) can be rewritten as
1 =
εf
EU
ta
εu
odds
ta
− ε
fUE
ta
εu
odds
ta
. (1.29)
The first term shows the ratio of the job loss and the unemployment elasticities. The term
can be interpreted as the ratio of the unemployment elasticity that is due to changes in
layoffs. Similarly, the negative of the second term can be interpreted as the ratio of the
unemployment elasticity due to changes in hiring. The last two lines of Table 1.10 show
the two ratios. Layoffs explain around 110 percent of the unemployment elasticity, while
hiring explains −10 percent of it. Hiring explains a negative fraction of the unemployment
elasticity, because the model predicts that in occupations where adaptation costs are large,
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both equilibrium unemployment and hiring will be below average, that is, hiring goes in the
wrong direction to explain differences in unemployment.
In order to see how robust my predictions are, I run sensitivity analyses on five externally
calibrated parameters. In each dimension I use relatively wide bounds. Tables 1.11 and 1.12
show the results. Throughout all specifications, the hiring elasticity remains close to zero. It’s
largest absolute value is only −0.079. The layoff and unemployment elasticities are always
substantially larger than the hiring elasticity. Interestingly, the ratios in (1.29) are quite
robustly estimated: Layoffs explain around 110 percent of the unemployment elasticity, and
hiring explains −10 percent of it. The elasticities vary with parameters in the expected way.
When more E → N transitions are endogenous (kNE is larger), the model predicts a lower
elasticity in E → U , but the sum of εfEUta and εf
EN
ta is roughly a constant. Because I assume
E → N transitions do not contribute to the unemployment rate, larger kNE translates into
a somewhat smaller unemployment elasticity. When adaptation is quicker (ϕ is larger), not
surprisingly, the layoff and unemployment elasticities are less responsive to adaptation costs.
Similarly, when rookies’ productivity (δ) is closer to that of experienced workers, adaptation
costs are less predictive of layoffs and unemployment. Search costs also affect the layoff
elasticity, but the effect is not large.
The parameter with the largest effect on my estimates is the autocorrelation in match-
specific productivity. The more persistent the productivity shocks are, the less predictive
adaptation costs are for layoffs and unemployment. Why is that? The autocorrelation in
productivity is the primary determinant of the extent of labor hoarding in the economy.
When a bad shock hits the match, the parties can choose from two strategies: 1) They either
decide to split up and search for a better match; or 2) they decide to stay together and
persevere. This second strategy is called labor hoarding. Hoarding labor is more profitable
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when the cost of turnover is high (in order to save on these costs) and when shocks are
relatively short lived (because bad times do not last long and it is worth waiting). When the
autocorrelation is low, negative productivity shocks are expected to go away soon, and thus,
firms are more likely to hoard their workers. And when the autocorrelation is low and labor
hoarding is widespread, as Table 1.12 shows, adaptation costs are more important determi-
nants of equilibrium layoff and unemployment rates. Conversely, when the autocorrelation
is high, there is less incentive to hoard labor and adaptation costs become less predictive
of turnover. At the end of the next section I return to the discussion of which values of
autocorrelation might be reasonable.
1.4 Calibration of the explained educational gap in un-
employment
I use a three step procedure to quantitatively evaluate how much of the unemployment gap
between education groups can be explained by adaptation costs:
1. I estimate average adaptation costs by occupations and education groups from the
MCSUI data.
2. I plug the estimates from step 1 into my model to impute explained turnover and
unemployment rates for each occupation-education cell.
3. I aggregate estimates from step 2 to the four education groups using the observed
distribution of workers in the CPS.
In the first step I estimate adaptation costs by occupational work activities and education
using the empirical model in (1.21). On the right-hand side, I use the three occupational
37
activity measures identified as the best predictors in Section 1.2.4 (interpreting the mean-
ing of information for others; organizing, planning, and prioritizing work; and developing
objectives and strategies) and their full interaction with the four education dummies.
In the second step, I use my model to compute implied unemployment and turnover rates
for a detailed grid of adaptation costs. The grid is wide enough to cover the entire range of
possible cost values from step 1. Once I have a grid of implied turnover and unemployment
rates, I approximate them with fourth order polynomials:
y (ta) ≈ αy0 + αy1ta + αy2 (ta)2 + αy3 (ta)3 + αy4 (ta)4 . (1.30)
This approximation, in practice, fits the unemployment and turnover estimates perfectly.
Figure 1.3 shows the model’s predictions and the approximations using the baseline calibra-
tion of the model. The model predicts a smooth effect of adaptation costs, and thus, the
approximation works very well. It works similarly well for other calibrations of the model.
In step 3, I compute average imputed unemployment rates and turnover probabilities for
each education group, where I average the estimates from step 2. The standard errors in
step 3 take into account the imprecision of the estimates in step 1 using the delta method.
The entire procedure can be implemented using the margins post-estimation command in
Stata after fitting model (1.21) and using out-of-sample predictions of functions (1.30) by
education groups in the CPS.
The results using the baseline specification of the model are in Figure 1.4 and appendix
Table 1.24. Adaptation costs, using this specification, explain 11 percent of the unemploy-
ment gap between high school dropouts and high school graduates; 71 percent of gap be-
tween high school graduates and college dropouts; and 65 percent of the gap between college
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dropouts and college graduates. It appears that adaptation costs are better at explaining
the differences between high and medium skilled workers’ unemployment rates. It is also
possible, however, that this differential reflects measurement error in the adaptation cost
estimates. Employers, when asked about the length of adaptation in a given occupation,
might use a positive anchor to answer the question. In this case the responses would have
a mean-reverting property, and the adaptation cost estimates would be upward biased at
low values. There is some evidence that employers use a positive anchor. Out of the 48
occupations considered, the lowest median adaptation period is still one month, which seems
a little high.
The explained unemployment gaps depend quite substantially on the assumed autocor-
relation in match-specific productivity. This is not surprising, as I showed in the previous
section the turnover elasticities varied with the assumed autocorrelation, too. Figure 1.5 and
appendix Tables 1.26-1.27 show the results using lower and higher autocorrelation. If I use a
value of 0.85 for the autocorrelation, which implies that negative shocks disappear in about
half a year on average, I can explain 25 percent of the HSD-HS gap, 141 percent of the HS-SC
and 106 percent of the SC-BA differential. When I use a value of 0.95, implying that shocks
disappear in about 1.6 years, I can only explain 5 percent of the HSD-HS gap, 35 percent of
the HS-SC and 35 percent of the SC-BA differential.
The explained gaps in employment to unemployment transition probabilities are very
similar to the ones in unemployment. The model, similar to the data, consistently predicts
a small negative effect of adaptation costs on job finding probabilities, independent of the
choice of autocorrelation. The monthly job finding probabilities are predicted to be around
29.5 percent in all education groups.
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1.4.1 Autocorrelation in match-specific productivity
The explained unemployment gap varies quite substantially with the assumed autocorrela-
tion in match-specific productivity. Figure 1.6 visualizes this sensitivity in another way. The
figure shows the model’s predicted equilibrium unemployment rates as a function of adapta-
tion costs using different values of the autocorrelation. The four lines intersect at the average
adaptation period, because the model is calibrated to match the average unemployment rate
for the average value of adaptation. The three larger values (0.85, 0.92 and 0.95) are the same
as used earlier, with 0.92 being my preferred value. The smallest value (0.71) is the one that
would approximately explain the entire educational gap even between high school dropouts
and high school graduates. A value of 0.71 for the monthly autocorrelation corresponds to
yearly autocorrelation below 0.02 (!), which seems inconceivably small. Another reason why
the 0.71 is unlikely to be appropriate is that, using this value, the model predicts zero un-
employment rates in every occupation where adaptation takes longer than 5.5 months. This
happens because the autocorrelation is so low, and negative shocks disappear so quickly,
that it is even worth keeping matches that produce zero value contemporaneously. In the
MCSUI data there are many occupations with adaptation longer than 5.5 months. The value
of 0.85 is approximately the smallest value that predicts positive unemployment rates in the
entire 0-12 month range. Hence, I consider 0.85 as the lower bar for a reasonable value of
autocorrelation.
What empirical evidence do we have about the autocorrelation in match-specific produc-
tivity? My baseline specification is based on Abraham and White (2006) who found yearly
autocorrelation in plant level TFP to be around 0.37-0.41 using yearly observations on a large
sample of establishments in the manufacturing sector. My preferred 0.92 value is the monthly
equivalent of this number. Foster et al. (2008) estimates plant level productivity dynamics
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in traditional TFP, as well as revenue and physical TFP. The data they use is available once
every five years. They find the 5-year autocorrelation to be around 0.25-0.3. The monthly
equivalent of this number is around 0.98, considerably higher than in the Abraham and White
(2006) study. Arguably the autocorrelation in match-specific productivity is lower than in
plant level productivity because individuals might also experience shorter lived shocks, such
as individual emotional issues, sickness, etc., which are missing from plant level estimates, as
other co-workers can substitute for temporarily unproductive individuals. For this reason I
prefer using the estimates in Abraham and White (2006) that are on the low end of estimates
in this literature.
An alternative strategy to proxy autocorrelation is to look at wage dynamics. The main
advantage of wage data is that it is based on individual or “match” level information. One
disadvantage, however, is that wages might be more rigid than productivity. Another dis-
advantage is that estimates of autocorrelation are quite sensitive to the wage model used.
For example, as Lillard and Willis (1978) showed, by adding a time-invariant person-specific
random effect to the wage model, the autocorrelation in wages substantially falls. Their pre-
ferred yearly autocorrelation in the residual wages is around 0.35-0.4, which is close to value
used in my baseline specification. Other papers, such as MaCurdy (1982) and Abowd and
Card (1989), however, prefer models with high autocorrelation, close to a unit-root. It seems
intuitive that there is a component of earnings that follows a random walk, for example, due
to promotions and wage renegotiations after workers receive outside wage offers. Such wage
changes, however, are not due to productivity shocks and are not relevant to this paper.
Overall, there is a wide range of estimates in the literature for the autocorrelation depending
on how the wage equation is specified. There are estimates as low as 0.10 (Hospido, 2014;
monthly value is ∼ 0.82), as large as a unit root, and many estimates in between (Lillard,
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1999; Geweke and Keane, 2000; Alvarez and Arellano, 2004; Hospido, 2012; Altonji et al.,
2013; Lemieux et al., 2014; Guvenen et al., 2015).
Yet another strategy to proxy autocorrelation is to use calibrated values from the macro-
labor literature that fit certain empirical moments. Depending on the model used and the
particular moment that is fit, these calibrated values, however, are different. Fujita and
Ramey (2012) use a value of 0.72 for the monthly autocorrelation to fit the serial correlation
in the aggregate job-loss probabilities over the business cycle. Ratner (2013) uses a value of
0.95 to fit the size of layoffs in firms. Krolikowski (2014) uses a value of 0.88 to fit the rate at
which job loss probabilities fall by tenure.
The recent working paper of Cairo and Cajner (2014) has been developed in parallel with
my paper. They provided estimates of the educational gap in unemployment that can be
explained by educational differences in on-the-job training. The main difference between
their approach and mine is that they use the Fujita and Ramey (2012) calibration of 0.72 for
the monthly autocorrelation, while my preferred number is 0.92. There are other differences
such as: 1) the adaptation period measure is asked in a more consistent way in the MCSUI
and it is available for a markedly larger sample than in the EOPP19; 2) Cairo and Cajner
19Adaptation costs were asked in the EOPP in the following way. First, employers were asked about the
current productivity of the last hired worker on a scale of 0 to 100 with 50 being the perceived average of
an experienced worker in the position. Second, they asked about the productivity of the last hired worker
at the time of hiring on the same scale. Third, if the initial productivity of the workers was below 50, they
asked the employers about the time it took for the last hire to reach average productivity. No question
about adaptation was asked if the initial productivity of the last hire was at least 50, not even if his current
productivity was above his initial one. For example, if a worker’s productivity was 50 to begin with and
it went up to 70 over time, the survey did not ask about the length of adaptation. This approach might
be particularly problematic if employers are overly optimistic about the productivity of their workers, for
which there is evidence in the EOPP. The sample average of the current productivity of workers was 71 (s.e.
0.38) instead of 50 and only 14 percent of employers reported a value below 50. The average employer in
the EOPP thought he employed above average workers. Moreover, two third of the employers reported that
the initial productivity of their last hire was at least 50. Adaptation period estimates are only available for
the rest of the sample, around 650 observations. The MCSUI data does not suffer from this inconsistency,
and adaptation cost information is available for more than 3200 workers.
42
(2014) focus on educational differences in on-the-job training directly, without calibrating
turnover for individual occupations; 3) they analyze educational unemployment rates in the
entire labor force, while I use only prime age males.
Overall, the evidence is quite contradictory about which is the true value of autocorrela-
tion in productivity.
1.5 Discussion and conclusion
Unemployment rates are systematically and substantially larger among less educated versus
highly educated workers. This paper tested how much of this differential can be explained
by a particular form of labor adjustment cost: occupational differences in the average time
it takes for newly hired, inexperienced workers to become fully productive at their firms.
The main message is that occupational differences in adaptation costs are important de-
terminants of turnover and unemployment rate differences. Altogether, according to my
estimates, adaptation costs explain around two thirds of the unemployment differences be-
tween college and high school graduates. The role of adaptation costs, however, is closely
linked to productivity dynamics. In order to pin down the effect of adaptation, we need
to get a better understanding of how productivity shocks hit matches. In the meantime, it
would be advantageous to collect more detailed and more systematic data on adjustment
costs by occupations in general, and adaptation costs, in particular. The type of questions
about adaptation costs analyzed in Blatter et al. (2012) and in this paper are very predictive
of turnover. Collecting such data in more detailed occupations and larger samples could
improve our understanding of labor turnover and unemployment.
A natural question arising from my results is which economic mechanism is possibly
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responsible for the rest of the gap not explained by adaptation cost differences. A good
explanation should have the property of predicting relatively small differences in hiring rates.
1.5.1 Economic mechanisms with large effects on hiring
One mechanism to explain skill differences in unemployment is that low skilled wages are
above market clearing levels leading to an over-supply of unskilled workers. This could
happen due to the minimum wage, unions’ bargaining practices, mandatory health insur-
ance policies, or any other labor market institutions that compress wage dispersion in the
workforce. Minimum wages, at least in the US, are not indexed to occupational produc-
tivity, and thus, they are more likely to bind for low skilled workers. The minimum wage
literature is rather inconclusive about whether the minimum wage affects employment, but
most economists think the minimum wage does have a small negative effect on employment,
particularly among the lowest skilled workers, such as teens (Neumark and Wascher, 2006).
Collective bargaining might also lead to less dispersed wages20, which might push low skilled
wages above equilibrium levels. It can be shown, however, that this mechanism predicts
comparatively low hiring rates among low skilled workers.
Another candidate mechanism that has been suggested in the literature is that the value
of being unemployed is relatively high for low skilled workers. This could happen because of
the unemployment insurance (UI) system, lack of adequate skills in some worker groups, or
any other factors that influence the utility of working and the utility of not working. The
value of unemployment is a primary factor determining the search effort of the unemployed.
The generosity of the UI system, for example, has been found to be an important determinant
of the unemployment rate (Roed and Zhang, 2003; Schmieder et al., 2010; Hagedorn et al.,
20See, for example, Freeman (1980), Card (2001), Card et al. (2004) and Frandsen (2012).
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2013). The strong concavity of the UI benefit formula might create a disincentive for low
skilled workers to search for, and firms to create, low skilled jobs. The most credible evidence
we have about the negative employment effects of the UI system, however, is about the effect
of the duration of the UI benefit as opposed to the replacement rate. Benefit duration, how-
ever, does not vary across occupations/education groups. Skill shortage (or skill mismatch)
is another factor that might influence the ratio of workers’ productivity to the value of not
working. Technological change in the last thirty years might have made the skill set of some
workers obsolete (Autor et al., 2003; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Jaimovich and Siu, 2012;
Lazear and Spletzer, 2012). If the productivity of these workers fell faster than their outside
option, skill mismatch could have led to excess unemployment. This mechanism, however,
also predicts large differences in hiring rates by skill groups, which is inconsistent with the
empirical evidence. In recent papers, Lazear and Spletzer (2012) and Sahin et al. (2012)
analyzed occupational skill mismatch using occupation-specific online job-vacancy data, the
Help Wanted OnLine Index. They found that occupation-specific labor market tightness
(the ratio of job vacancies and unemployment) shows a large cross-sectional heterogeneity.
As Lazear and Spletzer (2012) observes, this either indicates a shortage of high skilled and
an abundance of low skilled workers, or measurement error. Many low skilled jobs might be
advertised offline, and thus, the lack of enough low skilled vacancies in the online dataset
might be irrelevant for understanding unemployment rate differences by skill. The results
of my paper support the latter measurement error argument, as high skilled workers do not
seem to find jobs quicker than low skilled ones.
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1.5.2 Economic mechanisms with small effects on hiring
Perhaps the simplest idea to fit the entire unemployment gap is to use different values of
adaptation costs. It is possible that the survey measures of occupational adaptation costs
in the MCSUI data are biased. How large should adaptation cost differences be to explain
the entire unemployment gap by education groups? In Table 1.13 I assume that the average
length of adaptation (∼ 3 months) in the MCSUI is unbiased, and I use my model to find the
average length of adaptation that is needed to fit unemployment rates in the four education
groups. First of all, I cannot fit the unemployment rate among high school dropouts using the
baseline calibration of the model, because the implied unemployment rate is too small even
when adaptation costs are zero. The imputed adaptation costs for the other three education
groups are approximately 2, 4 and 7 months for high school graduates, college dropouts and
college graduates respectively. These numbers are not unrealistic, but they are much more
dispersed than in the MCSUI data. In Table 1.14 I repeat the same exercise using the lower
value of autocorrelation (0.85). In this specification I can fit the unemployment rates in all
four groups. The imputed value for high school dropouts is substantially lower than in the
MCSUI data (0.8 compared to 2.5 months), but it is plausible. Moreover, the imputed values
for the other three groups are actually quite similar to the data.
The variance of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is another parameter that, similarly
to adaptation costs, also has a small hiring and a large layoff elasticity (Hudomiet, 2014).
There are good reasons to believe that the variance of productivity shocks is larger in low
skilled jobs, an example of which being capital-skill complementarity. As Griliches (1969)
and other recent studies (Krusell et al., 2000; Duffy et al., 2004; Parro, 2013) argued, the
elasticity of substitution is larger between capital and unskilled labor than between capital
and high skilled labor. In this case the marginal product of unskilled workers is expected
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to fluctuate more with demand conditions, since unskilled work is more substitutable with
a relatively fixed production factor, capital (Oi, 1962). Another economic mechanism that
predicts larger productivity fluctuations in low skilled jobs is differences in inventory costs.
One way firms can deal with temporary demand shocks is to increase inventories in bad
times, and sell out these inventories in later periods when the demand conditions improve.
This strategy is more profitable if storing the goods is relatively cheap. One can argue that
high skilled work, such as idea generation, research, innovation, etc., is cheaper to store than
low skilled work, which takes up physical space or is more linked to dealing with customers
(Wen, 2005; Platt and Platt, 2011). It is, however, not trivial to quantify inventory costs
and capital-skill complementarity by occupations.
Tables 1.15 and 1.16 show the values of standard deviation of the shocks that would be
needed to explain the rest of the unemployment gaps, not explained by adaptation costs.
Using the baseline calibration of the model, the standard deviation of shocks in the four
education groups should be 0.78, 0.29, 0.25 and 0.22. The value for high school dropouts is
a little large, but not implausible. The imputed values for the three more educated groups
are actually quite close to each other and they are entirely plausible. The table also shows
the equilibrium values of monthly turnover probabilities. The job finding probability of high
school dropouts is upward biased, but the other probabilities are close to empirical estimates.
When I use lower autocorrelation in Table 1.16, the imputed values are even closer to each
other and all unemployment rates and turnover probabilities are close to empirical estimates.
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Tables and figures
Table 1.1: Logit regressions of unemployment
Logit of the unemployment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High school dropout 0.481** 0.496** 0.397** 0.344** 0.290** 0.269** 0.267**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
High school reference category
Some college -0.307** -0.305** -0.147** -0.106** -0.088** -0.079** -0.078**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
BA or more -0.962** -0.901** -0.445** -0.400** -0.333** -0.320** -0.313**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Age 25-29 reference category
Age 30-34 -0.109** -0.100** -0.086** -0.074** -0.069** -0.069**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Age 35-39 -0.170** -0.159** -0.134** -0.111** -0.100** -0.100**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age 40-44 -0.233** -0.214** -0.181** -0.150** -0.131** -0.131**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age 45-49 -0.264** -0.240** -0.201** -0.160** -0.137** -0.137**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Age 50-55 -0.265** -0.238** -0.195** -0.145** -0.115** -0.115**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Whites reference category
Non whites 0.525** 0.512** 0.516** 0.501** 0.517** 0.518**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Not married reference category
Married -0.749** -0.735** -0.704** -0.675** -0.668** -0.666**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Quarter dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupations, 10 categ/s Y
Occupations, 48 categ/s Y
Occupations, 191 categ/s Y Y Y
Industries, 12 categ/s Y
Industries, 38 categ/s Y
Log likelihood -1,679,795 -1,634,500 -1,618,626 -1,599,715 -1,586,857 -1,579,408 -1,577,514
Observations 8,899,239 8,899,239 8,899,239 8,899,239 8,899,239 8,899,239 8,899,239
The table shows the raw coefficients of the logistic model. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are in
parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS 1978-2013
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Table 1.2: OLS regressions of unemployment in booms
Unemployment rate
U¯ = 0.038 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High school dropout 0.028** 0.028** 0.024** 0.021** 0.017** 0.017** 0.016**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High school reference category
Some college -0.011** -0.011** -0.005** -0.004** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BA or more -0.026** -0.023** -0.010** -0.009** -0.008** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 25-29 reference category
Age 30-34 -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 35-39 -0.007** -0.006** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 40-44 -0.008** -0.007** -0.006** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 45-49 -0.009** -0.008** -0.006** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 50-55 -0.008** -0.007** -0.006** -0.004** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Whites reference category
Non whites 0.025** 0.024** 0.025** 0.024** 0.025** 0.025**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Not married reference category
Married -0.033** -0.032** -0.030** -0.029** -0.029** -0.029**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Quarter dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupations, 10 categ/s Y
Occupations, 48 categ/s Y
Occupations, 191 categ/s Y Y Y
Industries, 12 categ/s Y
Industries, 38 categ/s Y
Observations 5,000,633 5,000,633 5,000,633 5,000,633 5,000,633 5,000,633 5,000,633
Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Sample: 25-55 year old males,
CPS 1978-2013. Boom indicates years when the aggregate unemployment rate was below 5 percent in the sample: 1978-1979,
1987-1990 and 1994-2008.
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Table 1.3: Logit regressions of monthly transition probabilities
E → U probability U → E probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High school dropout 0.537** 0.268** 0.236** 0.034** 0.005 0.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
High school reference category
Some college -0.319** -0.062** -0.050** 0.004 0.046** 0.049**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
BA or more -0.967** -0.332** -0.311** -0.047** 0.054** 0.064**
(0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Age 25-29 reference category
Age 30-34 -0.129** -0.095** -0.090** -0.039** -0.049** -0.051**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Age 35-39 -0.228** -0.165** -0.153** -0.088** -0.101** -0.102**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Age 40-44 -0.311** -0.217** -0.194** -0.119** -0.128** -0.129**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Age 45-49 -0.385** -0.267** -0.238** -0.169** -0.175** -0.175**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Age 50-55 -0.465** -0.326** -0.287** -0.255** -0.256** -0.256**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Whites reference category
Non whites 0.325** 0.331** 0.355** -0.245** -0.220** -0.218**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Not married reference category
Married -0.545** -0.466** -0.453** 0.197** 0.193** 0.195**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Quarter dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupations, 191 categ/s Y Y Y Y
Industries, 38 categ/s Y Y
Log likelihood -411,862 -397,659 -393,962 -173,168 -171,819 -171,459
Observations 6,064,820 6,064,820 6,064,820 295,045 295,045 295,045
Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS 1978-2013. The table shows average log differences in the implied proba-
bilities relative to the baseline. For example, the coefficient on BA in the E → U regressions is βimpliedBA =
1
N
∑
i
[
ln Pr
(
PEUi = 1|educ = BA,Xi
)− ln Pr (PEUi = 1|educ = HS,Xi)]. More generally, in dimension j and category k the
coefficient is βimpliedjk =
1
N
∑
i
[
ln Pr
(
PEUi = 1|Ij = k,Xi
)− ln Pr (PEUi = 1|Ij = 0, Xi)]. Robust standard errors clustered
on the individual level are in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 1.4: Length of adaptation periods, MCSUI
Adaptation period in weeks Adaptation period in month
Mean(ta) 29.32 6.90
Median(ta) 12.00 2.82
Mean(ln ta) 2.55 1.10
exp(mean(ln ta)) 12.80 3.01
Observations 3243 3243
Adaptation period is the employers’ estimate of the time it takes to become fully competent for an average employee in the
position. The second column is created by dividing the first by 4.25.
Table 1.5: OLS regression of log adaptation period by education and occupational
work activities, MCSUI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Education
Less than high school -0.336** -0.242* -0.240* -0.252*
(0.108) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106)
High school reference
Some college 0.353** 0.230** 0.218** 0.222**
(0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
At least BA 0.744** 0.349** 0.341** 0.301**
(0.053) (0.060) (0.060) (0.065)
Occupational work activities
Developing Objectives and Strategies 0.970** 1.346** 0.749** 1.001**
(0.280) (0.323) [0.281] (0.326)
Organizing, Planning, and Prioritizing Work 1.505** 1.680** 1.306** 1.621**
(0.310) (0.403) [0.310] (0.400)
Interpreting the Meaning of Information for Others 1.200** 1.316** 0.906** 1.144**
(0.325) (0.398) [0.327] (0.399)
Getting Information -1.258* -1.216*
(0.522) (0.519)
Interacting With Computers 0.439* 0.251
(0.189) (0.190)
Documenting/Recording Information 0.469 0.438
(0.324) (0.323)
Communicating with Supervisors, Peers, Subordinates -1.021* -0.883
(0.495) (0.493)
Constant 2.246** 0.634** 1.381** 0.835** 1.492** 3.552**
(0.035) (0.126) (0.243) (0.130) (0.243) (0.972)
Occupation dummies, 191 categ/s YES
Observations 3,243 3,243 3,243 3,243 3,243 3,243
R-squared 0.069 0.104 0.108 0.118 0.121 0.223
The regression coefficients are from regressions of log adaptation period on occupational work activity measures. Adaptation
period is the employer’s estimate of the time it takes to become fully competent for an average employee in the position. The
occupational skill measures are continuous variables between 0-1, and they are created from the generalized work activities
measures in the O*NET. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 1.6: Predictive power of occupation work activities on log adaptation costs,
MCSUI and O*NET
# Generalized work activities Coefficients* t-statistics
Information input
1 Getting Information 3.409** 15.130
2 Monitor Processes, Materials, or Surroundings 1.664** 7.361
3 Identifying Objects, Actions, and Events 2.976** 11.821
4 Inspecting Equipment, Structures, or Material -0.439** 3.052
5 Estimating the Quantifiable Characteristics of Products, Events, or Information 1.140** 5.096
Mental processes
6 Judging the Qualities of Things, Services, or People 2.088** 9.967
7 Processing Information 2.470** 14.278
8 Evaluating Information to Determine Compliance with Standards 2.445** 12.618
9 Analyzing Data or Information 2.536** 16.988
10 Making Decisions and Solving Problems 2.608*** 14.653
11 Thinking Creatively 2.486** 16.009
12 Updating and Using Relevant Knowledge 3.031** 16.888
13 Developing Objectives and Strategies 2.755** 17.488
14 Scheduling Work and Activities 2.953** 16.917
15 Organizing, Planning, and Prioritizing Work 3.402** 17.610
Work output
16 Performing General Physical Activities -1.198** 10.035
17 Handling and Moving Objects -1.366** 11.703
18 Controlling Machines and Processes -0.834** 6.773
19 Operating Vehicles, Mechanized Devices, or Equipment -0.614** 5.073
20 Interacting With Computers 1.496** 12.485
21 Drafting, Laying Out, and Specifying Technical Devices, Parts, and Equipment 0.599*** 3.978
22 Repairing and Maintaining Mechanical Equipment -0.541** 4.102
23 Repairing and Maintaining Electronic Equipment -0.216 1.107
24 Documenting/Recording Information 2.265** 13.660
Interacting with others
25 Interpreting the Meaning of Information for Others 3.089** 17.971
26 Communicating with Supervisors, Peers, or Subordinates 3.719** 14.216
27 Communicating with Persons Outside Organization 1.396** 9.208
28 Establishing and Maintaining Interpersonal Relationships 2.912** 12.200
29 Assisting and Caring for Others 0.304 1.936
30 Selling or Influencing Others 0.155 1.359
31 Resolving Conflicts and Negotiating with Others 1.541** 8.834
32 Performing for or Working Directly with the Public -0.263* 2.008
33 Coordinating the Work and Activities of Others 2.501** 12.487
34 Developing and Building Teams 2.208** 11.642
35 Training and Teaching Others 2.164** 12.370
36 Guiding, Directing, and Motivating Subordinates 1.867** 11.637
37 Coaching and Developing Others 2.184** 13.009
38 Provide Consultation and Advice to Others 2.181** 13.819
39 Performing Administrative Activities 1.681** 11.153
40 Staffing Organizational Units 1.793** 10.361
41 Monitoring and Controlling Resources 1.635** 8.909
The regression coefficients are from simple regressions of log adaptation period on occupational work activity measures. Adap-
tation period is the employer’s estimate of the time it takes to become fully competent for an average employee in the position.
The occupational skill measures are continuous variables between 0-1, and they are created from the generalized work activities
measures in the O*NET. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 1.7: Logit regressions of unemployment and turnover on imputed adapta-
tion costs
(1) (2)
logit(u) logit
(
pEU
)
logit
(
pUE
)
logit(u) logit
(
pEU
)
logit
(
pUE
)
Imputed log adaptation period -1.051** -1.147** -0.119** -0.825** -0.967** -0.063
(0.007) (0.016) (0.019) (0.011) (0.025) (0.032)
High school dropouts 0.238** 0.223** -0.004
(0.010) (0.021) (0.024)
High school reference category
Some college 0.131** 0.224** 0.049
(0.010) (0.020) (0.025)
BA or more -0.059** -0.003 0.030
(0.012) (0.026) (0.035)
Age 25-29 reference category
Age 30-34 -0.108** -0.087** -0.073**
(0.011) (0.024) (0.028)
Age 35-39 -0.110** -0.154** -0.151**
(0.011) (0.024) (0.028)
Age 40-44 -0.128** -0.172** -0.185**
(0.011) (0.024) (0.028)
Age 45-49 -0.126** -0.229** -0.257**
(0.012) (0.025) (0.029)
Age 50-55 -0.080** -0.257** -0.420**
(0.012) (0.025) (0.030)
Whites reference category
Non whites 0.566** 0.392** -0.323**
(0.008) (0.019) (0.022)
Not married reference category
Married -0.751** -0.525** 0.282**
(0.007) (0.015) (0.017)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industries, 38 categ/s Y Y Y
Observations 3,503,304 2,439,158 91,414 3,503,304 2,439,158 91,414
Sample: CPS 1994-2008, 25-55 year old males. The imputed adaptation cost values are the predicted values from a regression of
log adaptation on the three occupational work activity measures (interpreting the meaning of information for others; organizing,
planning, and prioritizing work; and developing objectives and strategies), education dummies (less than high school, high school,
scome college, and college) and their interactions. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are in parentheses.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 1.8: Average monthly transition probabilities
Transition type Description Values
E → U transition Separating into unemployment 0.0114
E → N transition Separating into non-participation 0.0105
E → E transition with separation Employer switching 0.0216
All separations 0.0435
U → E transitions Job finding from unemployment 0.2935
N → E transitions Job finding from non-participation 0.0907
Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS 1994-2008
Table 1.9: Calibrated parameters of the model and other implied values
Calibrated parameters Symbol Value Source
Cobb-Douglas share of vacancies α 0.4 Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001)
Workers’ bargaining power γ 0.6 Hosios condition
Labor market tightness θ 0.72 Everyone
Interest rate r 0.004 5% annually
Total search costs* c/q 0.5× E (w) Blatter et al. (2012), Ratner (2013)
Productivity of rookies* δ 0.7 Blatter et al. (2012)
Autocorrelation in ε* exp (−λ) 0.92 Abraham and White (2006)
Rate of turning experienced* ϕ 0.31 own estimates, MCSUI
Flow value of unemployment in avg(wage) b/E (w) 0.659 job creation condition
Sd of match-specific productivity shocks σ 0.261 job loss probability
Scalar in the matching function η 0.399 job finding probability
Implied other values
E → U rate, experienced fEU 0.014
E → N rate, experienced fEN 0.011
E → U rate, rookies fEU,R 0.020
Vacancy filling rate q 0.486
Job finding rate pF 0.350
Mean wage, experienced workers E(w) 1.049
Mean wage, rookies E(wR) 0.862
Sensitivity analyses are carried out on parameters with an asterisk
Table 1.10: Elasticities of turnover rates with respect to the length of the adap-
tation period, baseline calibration
Variables Description Values
εu
odds
ta Unemployment, odds ratio -0.541
εf
EU
ta E → U rate, experienced -0.588
εf
EN
ta E → N rate, experienced 0.000
εf
EU,R
ta E → U rate, rookies 0.006
εqta Vacancy filling rate 0.071
εf
F
ta Job finding rate -0.048
εf
EU
ta /ε
uodds
ta Loss ratio 1.088
εf
F
ta /ε
uodds
ta Finding ratio 0.088
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Table 1.11: Elasticities of turnover rates with respect to the length of the adap-
tation period, sensitivity analysis
Effect of kEN Effect of ϕ Effect of δ
Elasticities of var’s Description 0.2 0.4 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.9
εu
odds
a Unemployment, odds ratio -0.463 -0.398 -0.593 -0.419 -0.763 -0.231
εf
EU
a E → U rate, experienced -0.511 -0.445 -0.649 -0.452 -0.843 -0.247
εf
EN
a E → N rate, experienced -0.102 -0.178 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
εf
EU,R
a E → U rate, rookies 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.000 0.002 0.005
εqa Vacancy filling rate 0.071 0.070 0.083 0.049 0.119 0.024
εf
F
a Job finding rate -0.047 -0.047 -0.055 -0.033 -0.079 -0.016
εf
EU
a /ε
uodds
a Loss ratio 1.102 1.118 1.093 1.079 1.104 1.069
εf
F
a /ε
uodds
a Finding ratio 0.102 0.118 0.093 0.079 0.104 0.069
Calibrated values for agg’
b/E (w) Flow value of unemployment in avg(wage) 0.655 0.651 0.653 0.669 0.639 0.679
σ Sd of match-specific productivity shocks 0.280 0.300 0.282 0.224 0.334 0.190
fEU,R E → U rate, rookies 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.018 0.022 0.015
E(w) Mean wage, experienced workers 1.066 1.086 1.056 1.038 1.074 1.030
E(wR) Mean wage, rookies 0.875 0.889 0.870 0.850 0.746 0.968
Table 1.12: Elasticities of turnover rates with respect to the length of the adap-
tation period, sensitivity analysis
Effect of c/q Effect of exp (−λ)
Elasticities of var’s Description 0.4 0.6 0.85 0.95
εu
odds
a Unemployment, odds ratio -0.584 -0.506 -1.098 -0.266
εf
EU
a E → U rate, experienced -0.644 -0.546 -1.146 -0.312
εf
EN
a E → N rate, experienced 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
εf
EU,R
a E → U rate, rookies 0.020 -0.007 -0.017 0.009
εqa Vacancy filling rate 0.089 0.060 0.072 0.070
εf
F
a Job finding rate -0.059 -0.040 -0.048 -0.047
εf
EU
a /ε
uodds
a Loss ratio 1.102 1.079 1.044 1.175
εf
F
a /ε
uodds
a Finding ratio 0.102 0.079 0.044 0.175
Calibrated values for agg’
b/E (w) Flow value of unemployment in avg(wage) 0.721 0.597 0.668 0.640
σ Sd of match-specific productivity shocks 0.228 0.294 0.343 0.272
fEU,R E → U rate, rookies 0.022 0.018 0.025 0.016
E(w) Mean wage, experienced workers 1.039 1.059 1.060 1.082
E(wR) Mean wage, rookies 0.858 0.867 0.875 0.882
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Table 1.13: Adaptation cost values needed to fit unemployment rates by educa-
tion groups, baseline calibration
Adaptation period, months Unemployment rate E → U probability U → E probability
Empirical Imputed Empirical Model Empirical Model Empirical Model
High school dropout 2.5160 0.0000 0.0749 0.0605 0.0244 0.0197 0.3054 0.3064
High school 2.9481 2.0640 0.0449 0.0449 0.0139 0.0140 0.3037 0.2975
Some college 3.5531 3.9160 0.0334 0.0334 0.0102 0.0101 0.2963 0.2913
BA or more 4.6848 6.9719 0.0196 0.0196 0.0053 0.0057 0.2732 0.2828
The table shows imputed adaptation cost values that would be needed to fit the unemployment rates in the education groups
using the baseline calibration of the model. The first column shows the average length of the adaptation period by education;
the second shows the imputed values; and the other columns show the success of the model to fit the empirical unemployment
rates and turnover probabilities using these imputed values.
Table 1.14: Adaptation cost values needed to fit unemployment rates by educa-
tion groups, calibration with lower autocorrelation
Adaptation period, months Unemployment rate E → U probability U → E probability
Empirical Imputed Empirical Model Empirical Model Empirical Model
High school dropout 2.5160 0.7794 0.0749 0.0749 0.0244 0.0244 0.3054 0.3020
High school 2.9481 2.6480 0.0449 0.0449 0.0139 0.0139 0.3037 0.2953
Some college 3.5531 3.5634 0.0334 0.0334 0.0102 0.0101 0.2963 0.2925
BA or more 4.6848 5.0044 0.0196 0.0196 0.0053 0.0058 0.2732 0.2885
The table shows imputed adaptation cost values that would be needed to fit the unemployment rates in the education groups
using the calibration with lower monthly autocorrelation in productivity, exp (−λ) = 0.85. The first column shows the average
length of the adaptation period by education; the second shows the imputed values; and the other columns show the success of
the model to fit the empirical unemployment rates and turnover probabilities using these imputed values.
Table 1.15: Standard deviation of productivity shock needed to fit unemployment
rates by education groups, baseline calibration
Standard deviation Unemployment rate E → U probability U → E probability
Imputed Empirical Model Empirical Model Empirical Model
High school dropout 0.7777 0.0749 0.0748 0.0244 0.0314 0.3054 0.3881
High school 0.2890 0.0449 0.0449 0.0139 0.0140 0.3037 0.2979
Some college 0.2517 0.0334 0.0334 0.0102 0.0101 0.2963 0.2914
BA or more 0.2201 0.0196 0.0196 0.0053 0.0057 0.2732 0.2848
The table shows the imputed standard deviation of match-specific productivity shocks that would be needed, beyond the
observed adaptation cost differences, to fit the unemployment rates in the education groups using the baseline calibration of the
model. The first column shows the imputed values; and the other columns show the success of the model to fit the empirical
unemployment rates and turnover probabilities using these imputed values.
Table 1.16: Standard deviation of productivity shock needed to fit unemployment
rates by education groups, calibration with lower autocorrelation
Standard deviation Unemployment rate E → U probability U → E probability
Imputed Empirical Model Empirical Model Empirical Model
High school dropout 0.4597 0.0749 0.0749 0.0244 0.0253 0.3054 0.3122
High school 0.3575 0.0449 0.0449 0.0139 0.0139 0.3037 0.2961
Some college 0.3429 0.0334 0.0334 0.0102 0.0101 0.2963 0.2925
BA or more 0.3322 0.0196 0.0196 0.0053 0.0058 0.2732 0.2881
The table shows the imputed standard deviation of match-specific productivity shocks that would be needed, beyond the
observed adaptation cost differences, to fit the unemployment rates in the education groups using the calibration with lower
monthly autocorrelation in productivity, exp (−λ) = 0.85. The first column shows the imputed values; and the other columns
show the success of the model to fit the empirical unemployment rates and turnover probabilities using these imputed values.
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Figure 1.1: Unemployment rates and basic turnover probabilities by education
Panel A: Unemployment rates Panel B: Logit of unemployment rates
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Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS 1978-2013. All series are yearly moving averages of the monthly values. The logit of the
unemployment rate is the log odds ratio, logit (u) = ln
(
u
1−u
)
. The E → U transition probability is the probability that one
is unemployed at month t+ 1 conditional on being employed at month t. The U → E transition probability is the probability
that one is employed at month t + 1 conditional on being unemployed at month t. The approximations in Panel A and B are
uapproxgt = p
EU/(pEU + pUE). The gray shaded areas indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 1.2: Occupational unemployment and its approximation with turnover
rates
Panel A: Using 48 occupations
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Panel B: Using 191 occupations
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Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS 1994-2008. Occupational unemployment is defined as ux = Ux/(Ex +Ux), where Ex is the
number of employed persons with a primary job in occupation x; and Ux is the number of unemployed whose last occupation was
in x. The approximations use the steady state formula uapproxx = p
EU
x /(p
EU
x + p
UE
x ), where p
EU
x is the monthly employment
to unemployment transition probability in occupation x and pUEx is the monthly unemployment to employment transition
probability for persons with the last occupation in x.
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Figure 1.3: The effect of adaptation costs on unemployment rates and turnover
probabilities, baseline specification
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Figure 1.4: Observed and predicted unemployment rates and monthly transition
probabilities by education, baseline specification
Panel A: Unemployment rates Panel B: Unemployment rate gap
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Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS 1994-2008. The graph shows unemployment rates and monthly turnover probabilities by
education from the CPS; and the model’s predicted values. The model’s predicted continuous transition rates are converted into
monthly transition probabilities by assuming transitions follow a Markov process. The error bars indicate the 95% confidence
intervals.
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Figure 1.5: Observed and predicted unemployment rates by education, alterna-
tive values of autocorrelation
Panel A: Unemployment rates, exp (−λ) = 0.85 Panel B: Unemployment rate gap, exp (−λ) = 0.85
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Panel C: Unemployment rates, exp (−λ) = 0.95 Panel D: Unemployment rate gap, exp (−λ) = 0.95
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Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS 1994-2008. The graph shows unemployment rates and monthly turnover probabilities by
education from the CPS; and the model’s predicted values. The model’s predicted continuous transition rates are converted into
monthly transition probabilities by assuming transitions follow a Markov process. The error bars indicate the 95% confidence
intervals.
Figure 1.6: The effect of adaptation costs on unemployment rates for various
values of monthly autocorrelation in match-specific productivity
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APPENDIX A
The value functions in the basic model
Let us consider the value functions of firms. I normalize all values with occupational
productivity, sx. Let sxVx, sxJRx (ε) and sxJx (ε) denote the value of an unfilled job, being
matched with a rookie and with an experienced worker with productivity ε, respectively.
The Bellman equation for the value of vacancies (V ) is
rsxVx = −sxc+ qxsx
(
JRx
(
ε0
)− Vx) = 0. (1.31)
The flow value of a vacant job is the instantaneous search cost with a negative sign plus the
expected capital gain, which is the value difference between employing a rookie with initial
productivity ε0 and having no worker, multiplied by the vacancy filling rate. Free entry of
firms assures that the asset value of a vacant job is zero. The Bellman equation for the value
of employing an experiences worker (J) is
rsxJx (ε) = sxε− sxwx (ε) + λsx
ˆ ∞
εx
Jx (ε
′) dF (ε′)− (λ+ fL,ex) sxJx (ε) . (1.32)
The employer gets the flow profit minus the wage, plus the expected capital gains. Whenever
a productivity shock or exogenous separation shock occurs, the firm loses the value of the
current state and gains the value of the new state. If the productivity shock is larger than
the productivity threshold εx, the firm receives the value evaluated at the new productivity.
If the shock is smaller than the reservation productivity or an exogenous separation occurs
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the firms’ new value is sxVx = 0. The Bellman equation for employing a rookie (JR) is
rsxJ
R
x (ε) = sxδε− sxwRx (ε) + λsx
ˆ ∞
εRx
JRx (ε
′) dF (ε′)
− (λ+ fL,ex) sxJRx (ε) + ϕxsx (Jx (ε)− JRx (ε)) . (1.33)
Apart from the last term, the Bellman equation for rookies is similar to that of experi-
enced workers, but the flow productivity is smaller (δ < 1 fraction of experienced workers’
productivity) and the endogenous parameters (the wage, the value of the match and the
productivity threshold) might differ, too. The last term describes the capital gain from ex-
perience as the difference in the values of being matched with an experienced worker and a
rookie, multiplied by the rate at which rookies become experienced (ϕx).
Now let’s consider the value functions of workers. Let sxUx, sxWRx (ε) and sxWx (ε) denote
the value of being unemployed, being a rookie and being an experienced worker, respectively.
The Bellman equation for being unemployed (U ) is
rsxUx = sxb+ f
F
x sx
(
WRx
(
ε0
)− Ux) . (1.34)
The flow value of being unemployed is the instantaneous value sxb, plus the capital gain from
finding a job and becoming a rookie. The Bellman equation for being an experienced worker
(W ) is
rsxWx (ε) = sxwx (ε) + λsx
ˆ ∞
εx
Wx (ε
′) dF (ε′) +
(
λF (εx) + f
L,ex
)
sxUx −
(
λ+ fL,ex
)
sxWx (ε) . (1.35)
Workers receive the flow wage and the expected capital gain from shocks. If the productivity
shock is larger than the threshold value εx, they gain the value of the new state and lose the
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value of the current state. If the productivity shock is smaller than the reservation threshold
or an exogenous separation occurs, workers gain the value of being unemployed and lose the
value of the current state. Finally, the Bellman equation for being a rookie (WR) is
rsxW
R
x (ε) = sxw
R
x (ε) + λsx
ˆ ∞
εRx
WRx (ε
′) dF (ε′) +
(
λF
(
εRx
)
+ fL,ex
)
sxUx
− (λ+ fL,ex) sxWRx (ε) + ϕxsx (Wx (ε)−WRx (ε)) . (1.36)
The value of being a rookie is similar to the value of being an experienced worker, but there
is an extra term at the end that describes the capital gain from gaining experience.
Next, I normalize all equations by occupational productivity, sx, and rearrange the value
functions (1.31)-(1.36):
0 = −c+ qxJRx
(
ε0
)
, (1.37)
(
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
)
JRx (ε) = δε− wRx (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εRx
JRx (ε
′) dF (ε′) + ϕxJx (ε) , (1.38)
(
r + λ+ fL,ex
)
Jx (ε) = ε− wx (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εx
Jx (ε
′) dF (ε′) , (1.39)
rUx = b+ f
F
x
(
WRx
(
ε0
)− Ux) , (1.40)(
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
)
WRx (ε) = w
R
x (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εRx
WRx (ε
′) dF (ε′) +
(
λF
(
εRx
)
+ fL,ex
)
Ux
+ϕxWx (ε) , (1.41)(
r + λ+ fL,ex
)
Wx (ε) = wx (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εx
Wx (ε
′) dF (ε′) +
(
λF (εx) + f
L,ex
)
Ux. (1.42)
Finally, to close the model, wages are continuously renegotiated and are set by generalized
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Nash bargaining,
wRx (ε) = arg max
{(
WRx (ε)− URx (ε)
)γ
JRx (ε)
1−γ
}
, (1.43)
wx (ε) = arg max
{
(Wx (ε)− Ux (ε))γ Jx (ε)1−γ
}
. (1.44)
The normalized value functions (1.37)-(1.42) together with the wage equations (1.43)-(1.44)
and the matching function (1.13) fully characterize the model.
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APPENDIX B
Derivation of the equilibrium conditions in the basic
model
The surpluses from the matches can be written as
(
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
)
SRx (ε) =
(
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
) (
JRx (ε) +W
R
x (ε)− Ux
)
= δε+ λ
ˆ ∞
εRx
SNx (ε
′) dF (ε′) + ϕxSx (ε)− rUx, (1.45)(
r + λ+ fL,ex
)
Sx (ε) =
(
r + λ+ fL,ex
)
(Jx (ε) +Wx (ε)− Ux)
= ε+ λ
ˆ ∞
εx
Sx (ε
′) dF (ε′)− rUx. (1.46)
By taking the derivatives of both sides with respect to the idiosyncratic productivity ε we
get
∂Sx (ε)
∂ε
=
1
r + λ+ fL,ex
, (1.47)
∂SRx (ε)
∂ε
=
δ + ϕx
∂Sx(ε)
∂ε
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
=
δ + ϕx
r+λ+fL,ex
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
. (1.48)
The surpluses are linear functions of the the match-specific productivity. Moreover, the
surpluses equal to zero at the reservation productivity values (εx and ε
R
x ) . Thus, the surpluses
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can be written as
Sx (ε) =
1
r + λ+ fL,ex
(ε− εx) , (1.49)
SRx (ε) =
δ + ϕx
r+λ+fL,ex
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
(
ε− εRx
)
. (1.50)
By combining equation (1.15), (1.37) and (1.50) we get the job creation condition:
c
η
θ1−αx = J
R
x
(
ε0
)
= (1− γ)SRx
(
ε0
)
= (1− γ)
δ + ϕx
r+λ+fL,ex
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
(
ε0 − εRx
)
. (1.51)
In the first line I used the Nash formula to rewrite the firms’ value in terms of the surplus:
workers and firms split the surplus according to their bargaining power.
In order to derive the job-destruction condition we need to write rU as a function of the
surplus. I use equation (1.40), (1.14) and (1.15) to get:
rUx = b+ f
F
x
(
WRx
(
ε0
)− Ux) = b+ fFx γSRx (ε0)
= b+
γ
1− γ
fFx
qx
c = b+
γ
1− γ θxc. (1.52)
To find the reservation productivity below which matches are endogenously destroyed, we
need to find the productivity values at which the surplus becomes zero. By plugging (1.52)
into (1.45) and (1.46) we get the job destruction conditions:
b+
γ
1− γ θxc = εx + λ
ˆ ∞
εx
Sx (ε
′) dF (ε′) , (1.53)
b+
γ
1− γ θxc = δε
R
x + λ
ˆ ∞
εRx
SRx (ε
′) dF (ε′) + ϕxSx
(
εRx
)
. (1.54)
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By substituting in for the surplus formulas in (1.49) and (1.50) we get
b+
γ
1− γ θxc = εx +
λ
r + λ+ fL,ex
ˆ ∞
εx
(ε′ − εx) dF (ε′) , (1.55)
b+
γ
1− γ θxc = δε
R
x + λ
δ + ϕx
r+λ+fL,ex
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
ˆ ∞
εRx
(
ε′ − εRx
)
dF (ε′) +
ϕx
r + λ+ fL,ex
(
εRx − εx
)
.(1.56)
Now let us see the wages. I start with the wages of experienced workers. From (1.39)
and the Nash rule we get
(
r + λ+ fL,ex
)
Jx (ε) = ε− wx (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εx
Jx (ε
′) dF (ε′) , (1.57)
(
r + λ+ fL,ex
)
(1− γ)Sx (ε) = ε− wx (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εx
(1− γ)Sx (ε′) dF (ε′) , (1.58)
(
r + λ+ fL,ex
)
Sx (ε) =
ε− wx (ε)
1− γ + λ
ˆ ∞
εx
Sx (ε
′) dF (ε′) . (1.59)
Similarly from (1.35), (1.52) and the Nash rule we get
(
r + λ+ fL,ex
)
Wx (ε) = wx (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εx
Wx (ε
′) dF (ε′) +
(
λF (εx) + f
L,ex
)
Ux, (1.60)
(
r + λ+ fL,ex
)
(Wx (ε)− Ux) = wx (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εx
(Wx (ε
′)− Ux) dF (ε′)− rUx, (1.61)
(
r + λ+ fL,ex
)
γSx (ε) = wx (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εx
γSx (ε) dF (ε
′)− b− γ
1− γ θxc, (1.62)(
r + λ+ fL,ex
)
Sx (ε) =
wx (ε)− b
γ
− 1
1− γ θxc+ λ
ˆ ∞
εx
Sx (ε
′) dF (ε′) . (1.63)
By combining (1.59) and (1.63) we get
ε− wx (ε)
1− γ =
wx (ε)− b
γ
− 1
1− γ θxc, (1.64)
γ (ε− wx (ε)) = (1− γ) (wx (ε)− b)− γθxc, (1.65)
wx (ε) = (1− γ) b+ γ (ε+ θxc) . (1.66)
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The last equation shows the equilibrium wage of experienced workers. The wages of rookies
can be derived similarly. From (1.38) and the Nash rule
(
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
)
JRx (ε) = δε− wRx (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εRx
JRx (ε
′) dF (ε′) + ϕxJx (ε) , (1.67)
(
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
)
(1− γ)SRx (ε) = δε− wRx (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εRx
(1− γ)SRx (ε′) dF (ε′)
+ϕx (1− γ)Sx (ε) , (1.68)(
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
)
SRx (ε) =
δε− wRx (ε)
1− γ + λ
ˆ ∞
εRx
SRx (ε
′) dF (ε′) + ϕxSx (ε) . (1.69)
From (1.38), (1.52) and the Nash rule we get
(
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
)
WRx (ε) = w
R
x (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εRx
WRx (ε
′) dF (ε′) +
(
λF
(
εRx
)
+ fL,ex
)
Ux
+ϕxWx (ε) , (1.70)(
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
) (
WRx (ε)− Ux
)
= wRx (ε) + λ
ˆ ∞
εRx
(
WRx (ε
′)− Ux
)
dF (ε′)
+ϕx (Wx (ε)− Ux)− rUx, (1.71)(
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
)
γSRx (ε) = w
R
x (ε)− b−
γ
1− γ θxc+ λ
ˆ ∞
εRx
γSRx (ε
′) dF (ε′) (1.72)
+ϕxγSx (ε) , (1.73)(
r + λ+ fL,ex + ϕx
)
SRx (ε) =
wRx (ε)− b
γ
− 1
1− γ θxc+ λ
ˆ ∞
εRx
SRx (ε
′) dF (ε′) (1.74)
+ϕxSx (ε) . (1.75)
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By combining (1.69) and (1.74) we get
δε− wRx (ε)
1− γ =
wRx (ε)− b
γ
− 1
1− γ θxc, (1.76)
γ
(
δε− wRx (ε)
)
= (1− γ) (wRx (ε)− b)− γθxc, (1.77)
wRx (ε) = (1− γ) b+ γ (δε+ θxc) . (1.78)
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APPENDIX C
Proof that the model is invariant to the choice of
aggregate θ in Chapter I
θ appears at three places in the equilibrium conditions. The first is the job finding rate
fF = ηθα. As the constant term of the matching function, η, is calibrated to fit the job finding
rate, any change in θ is sucked up by η. The second place where θ appears is the job creation
condition, where the left-hand side is the total expected cost of filling a vacancy:
C =
c
η
θ1−α. (1.79)
The total cost of filling a vacancy, however, is one of the moments I am matching. Therefore,
c sucks up any variation in θ1−α/η to fit the total cost C. The third place where θ appears is
the outside option of workers in the job loss conditions:
o =
γ
1− γ θc =
γ
1− γ
C
fF
. (1.80)
The outside option of workers can be rewritten in terms of only the total search costs (C)
and the job finding rate (fF ), which are targeted moments. Therefore the outside option of
workers is also indifferent to the choice of θ.
Overall, any mismeasurement of θ is sucked up by η and c, and the equilibrium turnover
probabilities are unaffected by it.
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APPENDIX D
Additional tables
Table 1.17: OLS regressions of unemployment in recessions
Unemployment rate
U¯ = 0.065 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High school dropout 0.038** 0.038** 0.031** 0.026** 0.022** 0.021** 0.020**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High school reference category
Some college -0.020** -0.021** -0.010** -0.007** -0.006** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BA or more -0.051** -0.048** -0.023** -0.020** -0.017** -0.016** -0.016**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 25-29 reference category
Age 30-34 -0.008** -0.007** -0.006** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 35-39 -0.012** -0.011** -0.009** -0.008** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 40-44 -0.017** -0.015** -0.013** -0.011** -0.010** -0.010**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 45-49 -0.019** -0.017** -0.014** -0.012** -0.010** -0.011**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 50-55 -0.020** -0.017** -0.014** -0.011** -0.010** -0.010**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Whites reference category
Non whites 0.037** 0.036** 0.036** 0.035** 0.036** 0.036**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Not married reference category
Married -0.047** -0.047** -0.045** -0.043** -0.043** -0.042**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Quarter dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupations, 10 categ/s Y
Occupations, 48 categ/s Y
Occupations, 191 categ/s Y Y Y
Industries, 12 categ/s Y
Industries, 38 categ/s Y
Observations 3,898,606 3,898,606 3,898,606 3,898,606 3,898,606 3,898,606 3,898,606
Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are in parentheses. ** p<0.01,
* p<0.05. Recession indicates years when the aggregate unemployment rate was above 5 percent in the sample: 1980-1986,
1991-1993 and 2009-2013.
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Table 1.18: Logit regressions of monthly employment to unemployment transi-
tion probability
Log monthly E → U transition probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High school dropout 0.516** 0.537** 0.421** 0.338** 0.268** 0.240** 0.236**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
High school reference category
Some college -0.316** -0.319** -0.129** -0.081** -0.062** -0.054** -0.050**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
BA or more -1.011** -0.967** -0.458** -0.420** -0.332** -0.321** -0.311**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Age 25-29 reference category
Age 30-34 -0.129** -0.123** -0.108** -0.095** -0.088** -0.090**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Age 35-39 -0.228** -0.218** -0.192** -0.165** -0.151** -0.153**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Age 40-44 -0.311** -0.292** -0.255** -0.217** -0.193** -0.194**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Age 45-49 -0.385** -0.360** -0.316** -0.267** -0.235** -0.238**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Age 50-55 -0.465** -0.436** -0.385** -0.326** -0.284** -0.287**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Whites reference category
Non whites 0.325** 0.325** 0.350** 0.331** 0.351** 0.355**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Not married reference category
Married -0.545** -0.540** -0.504** -0.466** -0.454** -0.453**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Quarter dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupations, 10 categ/s Y
Occupations, 48 categ/s Y
Occupations, 191 categ/s Y Y Y
Industries, 12 categ/s Y
Industries, 38 categ/s Y
Log likelihood -417,334 -411,862 -407,189 -401,047 -397,659 -394,664 -393,962
Observations 6,064,820 6,064,820 6,064,820 6,064,820 6,064,820 6,064,820 6,064,820
Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS 1978-2013. The table shows average log differences in
the implied probabilities from baseline. For example, the coefficient on BA is βimpliedBA =
1
N
∑
i
[
ln Pr
(
PEUi = 1|educ = BA,Xi
)− ln Pr (PEUi = 1|educ = HS,Xi)]. More generally, in dimension j and cate-
gory k the coefficient is βimpliedjk =
1
N
∑
i
[
ln Pr
(
PEUi = 1|Ij = k,Xi
)− ln Pr (PEUi = 1|Ij = 0, Xi)]. Robust standard errors
clustered on the individual level are in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 1.19: OLS regressions of monthly employment to unemployment transition
probability in booms
Monthly E → U transition probability
¯pEU = 0.013 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High school dropout 0.010** 0.010** 0.009** 0.007** 0.006** 0.005** 0.005**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High school reference category
Some college -0.004** -0.004** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BA or more -0.009** -0.008** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 25-29 reference category
Age 30-34 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 35-39 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 40-44 -0.004** -0.004** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 45-49 -0.005** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 50-55 -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Whites reference category
Non whites 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Not married reference category
Married -0.008** -0.007** -0.007** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Quarter dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupations, 10 categ/s Y
Occupations, 48 categ/s Y
Occupations, 191 categ/s Y Y Y
Industries, 12 categ/s Y
Industries, 38 categ/s Y
Observations 3,469,345 3,469,345 3,469,345 3,469,345 3,469,345 3,469,345 3,469,345
Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are in parentheses. ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05. Boom indicates years when the aggregate unemployment rate was below 5 percent in the sample: 1978-1979, 1987-1990
and 1994-2008.
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Table 1.20: OLS regressions of monthly employment to unemployment transition
probability in recessions
Monthly E → U transition probability
¯pEU = 0.018 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High school dropout 0.012** 0.012** 0.010** 0.008** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High school reference category
Some college -0.006** -0.006** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BA or more -0.013** -0.012** -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 25-29 reference category
Age 30-34 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 35-39 -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 40-44 -0.006** -0.006** -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 45-49 -0.007** -0.007** -0.006** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 50-55 -0.009** -0.008** -0.007** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Whites reference category
Non whites 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Not married reference category
Married -0.009** -0.009** -0.008** -0.008** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Quarter dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupations, 10 categ/s Y
Occupations, 48 categ/s Y
Occupations, 191 categ/s Y Y Y
Industries, 12 categ/s Y
Industries, 38 categ/s Y
Observations 2,595,475 2,595,475 2,595,475 2,595,475 2,595,475 2,595,475 2,595,475
Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are in parentheses. ** p<0.01,
* p<0.05. Recession indicates years when the aggregate unemployment rate was above 5 percent in the sample: 1980-1986,
1991-1993 and 2009-2013.
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Table 1.21: Logit regressions of monthly unemployment to employment transi-
tion probability
Log monthly U → E transition probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High school dropout 0.038** 0.034** 0.024* 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
High school reference category
Some college -0.001 0.004 0.037** 0.045** 0.046** 0.048** 0.049**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
BA or more -0.047** -0.047** 0.036** 0.044** 0.054** 0.059** 0.064**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Age 25-29 reference category
Age 30-34 -0.039** -0.045** -0.046** -0.049** -0.050** -0.051**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Age 35-39 -0.088** -0.096** -0.098** -0.101** -0.101** -0.102**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Age 40-44 -0.119** -0.126** -0.125** -0.128** -0.128** -0.129**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Age 45-49 -0.169** -0.174** -0.171** -0.175** -0.174** -0.175**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Age 50-55 -0.255** -0.258** -0.254** -0.256** -0.255** -0.256**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Whites reference category
Non whites -0.245** -0.232** -0.223** -0.220** -0.218** -0.218**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Not married reference category
Married 0.197** 0.191** 0.195** 0.193** 0.195** 0.195**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Quarter dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupations, 10 categ/s Y
Occupations, 48 categ/s Y
Occupations, 191 categ/s Y Y Y
Industries, 12 categ/s Y
Industries, 38 categ/s Y
Log likelihood -174,504 -173,168 -172,751 -172,100 -171,819 -171,628 -171,459
Observations 295,045 295,045 295,045 295,045 295,045 295,045 295,045
Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS 1978-2013. The table shows average log differences in
the implied probabilities from baseline. For example, the coefficient on BA is βimpliedBA =
1
N
∑
i
[
ln Pr
(
PUEi = 1|educ = BA,Xi
)− ln Pr (PUEi = 1|educ = HS,Xi)]. More generally, in dimension j and cate-
gory k the coefficient is βimpliedjk =
1
N
∑
i
[
ln Pr
(
PEUi = 1|Ij = k,Xi
)− ln Pr (PEUi = 1|Ij = 0, Xi)]. Robust standard errors
clustered on the individual level are in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Table 1.22: OLS regressions of monthly unemployment to employment transition
probability in booms
Monthly U → E transition probability
¯pUE = 0.33 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High school dropout 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
High school reference category
Some college -0.005 -0.003 0.007 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
BA or more -0.027** -0.027** -0.000 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 25-29 reference category
Age 30-34 -0.015** -0.017** -0.017** -0.018** -0.018** -0.018**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 35-39 -0.030** -0.033** -0.033** -0.033** -0.033** -0.033**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 40-44 -0.040** -0.042** -0.041** -0.042** -0.042** -0.042**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 45-49 -0.056** -0.058** -0.056** -0.056** -0.055** -0.055**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 50-55 -0.086** -0.087** -0.084** -0.084** -0.083** -0.083**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Whites reference category
Non whites -0.070** -0.067** -0.064** -0.062** -0.062** -0.062**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Not married reference category
Married 0.058** 0.057** 0.058** 0.057** 0.057** 0.057**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Quarter dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupations, 10 categ/s Y
Occupations, 48 categ/s Y
Occupations, 191 categ/s Y Y Y
Industries, 12 categ/s Y
Industries, 38 categ/s Y
Observations 129,968 129,968 129,968 129,968 129,968 129,968 129,968
Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are in parentheses. ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05. Boom indicates years when the aggregate unemployment rate was below 5 percent in the sample: 1978-1979, 1987-1990
and 1994-2008.
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Table 1.23: OLS regressions of monthly unemployment to employment transition
probability in recessions
Monthly U → E transition probability
¯pUE = 0.26 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High school dropout 0.015** 0.015** 0.013** 0.008* 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
High school reference category
Some college 0.003 0.005 0.012** 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 0.013**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
BA or more 0.002 0.002 0.018** 0.019** 0.021** 0.022** 0.022**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 25-29 reference category
Age 30-34 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008* -0.008* -0.009*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age 35-39 -0.018** -0.019** -0.020** -0.021** -0.021** -0.021**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age 40-44 -0.025** -0.026** -0.025** -0.026** -0.026** -0.026**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age 45-49 -0.034** -0.035** -0.035** -0.036** -0.036** -0.036**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age 50-55 -0.048** -0.049** -0.047** -0.048** -0.048** -0.048**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Whites reference category
Non whites -0.053** -0.049** -0.046** -0.046** -0.045** -0.044**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Not married reference category
Married 0.046** 0.043** 0.044** 0.044** 0.044** 0.044**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Quarter dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Occupations, 10 categ/s Y
Occupations, 48 categ/s Y
Occupations, 191 categ/s Y Y Y
Industries, 12 categ/s Y
Industries, 38 categ/s Y
Observations 165,077 165,077 165,077 165,077 165,077 165,077 165,077
Sample: 25-55 year old males, CPS. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual level are in parentheses. ** p<0.01,
* p<0.05. Recession indicates years when the aggregate unemployment rate was above 5 percent in the sample: 1980-1986,
1991-1993 and 2009-2013.
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Table 1.24: Observed and predicted unemployment rates and turnover probabil-
ities by education, baseline specification
Unemployment rate E → U probability U → E probability
Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
High school dropout, HSD 0.0749** 0.0469** 0.0244** 0.0147** 0.3054** 0.2987**
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0040) (0.0009)
High school, HS 0.0449** 0.0435** 0.0139** 0.0135** 0.3037** 0.2973**
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0026) (0.0004)
Some college, SC 0.0334** 0.0354** 0.0102** 0.0107** 0.2963** 0.2932**
(0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0033) (0.0007)
BA or more, BA 0.0196** 0.0265** 0.0053** 0.0078** 0.2732** 0.2885**
(0.0002) (0.0021) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0039) (0.0013)
Differences
HSD-HS 0.0300** 0.0034 0.0105** 0.0012 0.0017 0.0015
(0.0009) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0047) (0.001)
HS-SC 0.0115** 0.0082** 0.0037** 0.0028** 0.0074 0.0041**
(0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0042) (0.0008)
HS-BA 0.0253** 0.017** 0.0086** 0.0056** 0.0305** 0.0087**
(0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0047) (0.0014)
SC-BA 0.0138** 0.0089** 0.0049** 0.0029** 0.0231** 0.0047**
(0.0004) (0.0026) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0051) (0.0015)
Fraction of explained gap
HSD-HS 0.1126 0.1136 0.8774
HS-SC 0.7067 0.7522 0.5475
HS-BA 0.6733 0.6559 0.2868
SC-BA 0.6454 0.5840 0.2032
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Sample: 1994-2008, 25-55 year old males. The odd columns show unemployment rates and monthly
turnover probabilities by education from the CPS with robust standard errors clustered on the individual level. The even
columns show the model’s predicted values and the fraction of the gap between education groups explained by adaptation costs.
The model’s predicted continuous transition rates are converted into monthly transition probabilities by assuming transitions
follow a Markov process.
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Table 1.25: Imputed adaptation period by detailed occupations, in months
# Occupation Imputation 1 Imputation 2 MCSUI avg # in MCSUI
1 Waiter’s assistant 1.154 1.086 1.654 8
2 Laundry workers 1.177 0.937 1.482 12
3 Metal and plastic processing machine operators 1.275 1.255 2.811 3
4 Crane, derrick, winch, and hoist operators 1.284 1.125 - 0
5 Waiter/waitress, food counter and fountain workers 1.348 1.339 1.342 64
6 Interviewers, enumerators, and surveyors 1.361 1.398 0.941 1
7 Recreation facility attendants 1.362 1.139 2.409 3
8 Vehicle washers and equipment cleaners 1.376 1.352 0.670 2
9 Misc food prep workers 1.380 1.645 1.197 33
10 Textile sewing machine operators 1.410 1.331 1.664 2
11 Janitors 1.428 1.225 1.713 52
12 Mail carriers for postal service 1.448 1.375 1.258 12
13 Cashiers 1.479 1.317 0.863 72
14 Stock and inventory clerks 1.518 1.717 1.544 48
15 Precision woodworking occupations 1.588 1.659 8.327 4
16 Woodworking machine operators 1.620 1.496 10.784 4
17 Auto body repairers 1.627 1.773 6.041 2
18 Other textile, apparel, and furnishings operators 1.653 1.656 3.796 4
19 Postal clerks, excluding mail carriers 1.663 1.649 0.471 1
20 Photographers 1.690 2.309 12.405 2
21 Kitchen workers 1.699 1.480 1.514 5
22 Butchers and meat cutters 1.705 1.719 15.278 2
23 Fishers, hunters, and kindred 1.718 2.156 1.548 3
...
169 Farm operators and managers 5.388 5.197 5.647 2
170 Registered nurses 5.393 5.038 4.874 29
171 Physical scientists 5.416 6.011 12.235 1
172 Vocational and educational counselors 5.538 5.965 4.893 10
173 Human resource, marketing, advertising managers 5.558 4.841 4.593 16
174 Managers of properties and real estate 5.646 6.170 2.612 3
175 Other managers 5.679 5.468 3.668 68
176 Secondary school teachers 5.750 6.632 12.144 2
177 Social workers 5.815 5.647 6.943 16
178 Managers in education and related fields 6.040 5.997 15.436 7
179 Financial services sales occupations 6.044 6.435 3.747 3
180 Special education teachers 6.120 6.911 4.440 3
181 Management support occupations 6.140 6.023 2.779 33
182 Postsecondary teachers 6.190 6.441 10.948 26
183 Primary school teachers 6.205 7.832 14.146 17
184 Life scientists 6.378 6.475 - 0
185 Psychologists 6.381 5.937 - 0
186 Financial managers 6.566 6.457 10.261 3
187 Other social scientists and urban planners 6.566 6.500 2.847 2
188 Lawyers and Judges 6.697 5.669 10.786 3
189 Managers of medicine and health occupations 6.858 6.468 6.340 2
190 Management analysts 7.287 6.642 2.824 1
191 Clergy and religious workers 8.683 9.189 14.454 8
All models are based on a fitted regression of log adaptation period on occupational skills or occupation dummies. The table
shows the exponent of the predicted values of those regressions. Imputation 1 and 2 are based occupational work activity
measures reported as Model 2 and 3 of Table 1.5 respectively. The MCSUI average uses occupation dummies. The table only
shows occupations with the 23 shortest and 23 longest adaptation periods based on Imputation 1 out of 191 occupations. The
rest of the table is available on my wedsite at https://sites.google.com/site/phudomiet/research.
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Table 1.26: Observed and predicted unemployment rates and turnover probabil-
ities by education, specification with lower autocorrelation
Unemployment rate E → U probability U → E probability
Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
High school dropout, HSD 0.0749** 0.0577** 0.0244** 0.0183** 0.3054** 0.2984**
(0.0008) (0.0039) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0040) (0.0008)
High school, HS 0.0449** 0.0504** 0.0139** 0.0157** 0.3037** 0.297**
(0.0003) (0.0019) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0026) (0.0004)
Some college, SC 0.0334** 0.034** 0.0102** 0.0103** 0.2963** 0.2933**
(0.0003) (0.0026) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0033) (0.0007)
BA or more, BA 0.0196** 0.0194** 0.0053** 0.0058** 0.2732** 0.289**
(0.0002) (0.0031) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0039) (0.0012)
Differences
HSD-HS 0.0300** 0.0074 0.0105** 0.0026 0.0017 0.0014
(0.0009) (0.0043) (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0047) (0.0009)
HS-SC 0.0115** 0.0163** 0.0037** 0.0054** 0.0074 0.0037**
(0.0004) (0.0032) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0042) (0.0008)
HS-BA 0.0253** 0.031** 0.0086** 0.0099** 0.0305** 0.008**
(0.0004) (0.0036) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0047) (0.0013)
SC-BA 0.0138** 0.0146** 0.0049** 0.0046** 0.0231** 0.0043**
(0.0004) (0.004) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0051) (0.0014)
Fraction of explained gap
HSD-HS 0.2459 0.2436 0.8233
HS-SC 1.4137 1.4628 0.5055
HS-BA 1.2228 1.1547 0.2639
SC-BA 1.0628 0.9243 0.1865
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Sample: 1994-2008, 25-55 year old males. The odd columns show unemployment rates and monthly
turnover probabilities by education from the CPS with robust standard errors clustered on the individual level. The even
columns show the model’s predicted values and the fraction of the gap between education groups explained by adaptation costs.
The model’s predicted continuous transition rates are converted into monthly transition probabilities by assuming transitions
follow a Markov process. In these specifications the monthly autocorrelation in match-specific productivity shocks is assumed
to be exp (−λ) = 0.85.
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Table 1.27: Observed and predicted unemployment rates and turnover probabil-
ities by education, specification with higher autocorrelation
Unemployment rate E → U probability U → E probability
Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
High school dropout, HSD 0.0749** 0.0419** 0.0244** 0.0131** 0.3054** 0.2988**
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0040) (0.0009)
High school, HS 0.0449** 0.0403** 0.0139** 0.0125** 0.3037** 0.2973**
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0026) (0.0004)
Some college, SC 0.0334** 0.0363** 0.0102** 0.011** 0.2963** 0.2932**
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0033) (0.0008)
BA or more, BA 0.0196** 0.0315** 0.0053** 0.0093** 0.2732** 0.2883**
(0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0039) (0.0013)
Differences
HSD-HS 0.0300** 0.0016 0.0105** 0.0006 0.0017 0.0015
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0047) (0.001)
HS-SC 0.0115** 0.004** 0.0037** 0.0015** 0.0074 0.0041**
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0042) (0.0009)
HS-BA 0.0253** 0.0089** 0.0086** 0.0031** 0.0305** 0.009**
(0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0047) (0.0014)
SC-BA 0.0138** 0.0048** 0.0049** 0.0017** 0.0231** 0.0049**
(0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0051) (0.0015)
Fraction of explained gap
HSD-HS 0.0528 0.0565 0.8822
HS-SC 0.3487 0.3955 0.5575
HS-BA 0.3498 0.3638 0.2947
SC-BA 0.3507 0.3401 0.2104
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Sample: 1994-2008, 25-55 year old males. The odd columns show unemployment rates and monthly
turnover probabilities by education from the CPS with robust standard errors clustered on the individual level. The even
columns show the model’s predicted values and the fraction of the gap between education groups explained by adaptation costs.
The model’s predicted continuous transition rates are converted into monthly transition probabilities by assuming transitions
follow a Markov process. In these specifications the monthly autocorrelation in match-specific productivity shocks is assumed
to be exp (−λ) = 0.95.
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CHAPTER II
Career Interruptions and Measurement Error in
Annual Earnings
2.1 Introduction
Even though it is long known that survey data are prone to measurement error, there is an
equally long tradition in applied economics to use survey data as if it were exactly measured.
With better models of survey response error, researchers should be able to use survey data in
ways that take into account potential biases in applied work. Validation studies comparing
survey reports to highly accurate records are helpful in achieving this goal. In the classical
measurement error (CME) model, for example, only an estimate of the noise to total variance
ratio is required to adjust for the attenuation bias. Validation studies can provide estimates
of this ratio, and applied researchers can use them to correct bias even when highly accurate
records are not readily available. Validation studies can also be used to test the assumptions
of the CME model, and if needed, suggest more appropriate models.
This paper aims at characterizing different sources of measurement error in survey re-
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ports of annual earnings of employees using a long biannual panel dataset, the Health and
Retirement Study, which is linked to the Master Earnings File of the Social Security Adminis-
tration. This administrative data are based on information from the W2 forms of individuals.
The main novelty of this paper is to scrutinize the reporting of partial year earnings in the
survey. Partial year earnings are identified from the administrative data by making use of
employer identifiers. I create a complete labor history of each employee by tracking newly
appearing and disappearing employers. I then compare recorded and reported earnings in
years people experienced career interruptions.
I show that partial year earnings have a strong and non-standard effect on survey re-
sponse error. When people report their annual earnings in surveys, they tend to report the
permanent component of their earnings relatively accurately, but systematically under-report
transitory shocks (Pischke, 1995). People might under-report transitory shocks because it
is cognitively demanding to recall their exact values, or some might prefer reporting their
usual earnings in surveys rather than their actual earnings. Transitory earnings shocks,
however, are typically small. The fact that people do not report their unusual tips, bonuses
or compensations for overtime work accurately makes little difference. Transitory earnings
shocks due to career interruptions, however, are large, equivalent to several months of lost
earnings, on average. In my preferred 50-60-year-old sample around 12.5 percent of person-
years involve either a job loss or a job finding, and respondents only report 60 − 85% of the
earnings losses, on average. In years with job loss, many people report zero earnings in HRS.
Those who report a positive value report around 85% of the earnings losses. In years with
a new job, persons report even less accurately: around 40% of these earnings shocks remain
unreported. It appears that many individuals report their annualized earnings after finding
a new job and forget to report the earnings loss due to not working the entire year. Career
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interruptions have a strong effect on the variance of measurement error, too. Interviewees
have less problem recalling their annual earnings when nothing interesting happens to their
employment relationship, but the task becomes substantially harder after such large shocks.
Measurement error due to non-employment is not only substantial, but it has non-
standard properties. Researchers typically think of measurement error as pure noise: sup-
posedly it has zero mean, perhaps it is symmetric, perhaps even normally distributed, and
it does not correlate with other variables. None of these properties hold for measurement
error due to career interruptions. First, the error has a small positive mean, because persons
under-report shocks that are negative. Second, the error is asymmetric and skewed to the
right, because persons under-report shocks with negative skewness. Third and most impor-
tantly, the error correlates with predictors of turnover. Higher turnover decreases annual
earnings, because individuals spend less time working. The negative effect of turnover on
earnings, however, is muted in the survey data, as it is under-reported on average.
To identify under-reporting of transitory shocks I use two alternative estimation strate-
gies. My preferred method is a fully specified dynamic earnings and measurement error model
that is estimated by Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). This model incorporates perma-
nent and transitory earnings, permanent and transitory measurement error, labor histories,
and it deals with missing values and interval earnings responses in a multiple imputation fash-
ion. Permanent earnings follow a random walk (similarly to MaCurdy, 1982), but the mean
and the variance of the random walk innovation are allowed to depend on labor histories.
Transitory earnings on-the-job follow a low order moving average process. The transitory
earnings loss due to career interruptions follows an exponential distribution, which will be
shown to approximate these shocks well. The data includes many missing values that exist
due to non-response in the HRS, non-consent in the administrative data, or because earnings
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self-reports are not available in the off years of the survey. Moreover, a large fraction of the
earnings data is only available in intervals. Dealing with missing and interval data in panel
models is difficult using standard techniques, such as maximum likelihood or GMM. As a
methodological contribution, I show that it is quite straightforward to model and estimate
them with MCMC. However, MCMC not yet being a standard tool in economics, I shall
provide simple descriptive evidence to support the main claims of the paper.
This paper is most closely related to the literature on measurement error in earnings. A
handbook chapter on the subject by John Bound, Charles Brown and Nancy Mathiowetz
(2001) provides a thorough overview of early developments in this literature. Researchers
consistently found that the mean of the error is small, its variance is large, and the estimated
reliability ratio in log earnings, within the framework of the CME model, is between 0.6 and
0.9.21 The second robust finding was that there is a substantial negative correlation between
measurement error and true earnings, and thus the CME model does not appear to be a
suitable model of measurement error in earnings.22 This property is known as the ”mean
reverting property of the error,” as the negative correlation implies that low income people
tend to report too high and high income people tend to report too low earnings in surveys.
The drive behind this mean reverting property has yet to be identified. It might be that
persons under-report transitory shocks in earnings (Pischke, 1995); it is possible that there
are false matches between the survey and administrative data (Kapteyn and Ypma, 2007); or
there might be error in the administrative data, which can create a spurious mean reversion
(Abowd and Stinson, 2013). My paper is a simple extension of the Pischke (1995) mechanism
with career interruptions. I shall briefly discuss other mechanisms in Section 2.2.
There is another property of measurement error that has received much less attention in the
21Attenuation bias is even larger in log changes in earnings, as earnings are more persistent than the error.
22The classical measurement error model assumes that the error is independent of the true value.
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literature. Using a non-parametric estimation strategy Bollinger (1998) found that mean-
reversion is mostly driven by low earning values in the Current Population Survey: mean
measurement error is significantly and substantially positive at the low end of the earnings
distribution, but at medium and high earnings measurement error becomes mean-zero. In
other words, it becomes more classical. Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen (2006) found
the same result using Danish data. In my sample of 50-60-year-old employees, I confirm
the Bollinger result: below $10, 000 per year measurement error is strongly upward biased,
but above this threshold the error is basically mean zero, and there is practically no mean
reversion.23 I also show that these problematic low earnings values are usually associated
with career interruptions. My model, thus, is able to explain all the documented properties
of measurement error: under-reporting transitory earnings shocks leads to mean reversion,
and mean-reversion is strongest at the low end of the earnings distribution because those
values are typically associated with large negative shocks due to non-employment.
My paper is also related to the literature on earnings dynamics. Guvenen et al. (2015), using
earnings data on millions of US workers, found that earnings growth has substantial excess
kurtosis compared to a simple log-normal model. Career interruptions naturally predict
excess kurtosis, as persons receive large negative earnings shocks with a small probability
when they lose their jobs, and they receive a large positive shock after they find a new one.
This paper also has implications for the literature on displaced workers’ earnings. Papers
using survey based measures of earnings, such as the Displaced Worker Supplement of the
Current Population Survey or the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, typically find that
the initial earnings loss after displacement averages 10 − 20% (Ruhm, 1991; Carrington and
Zaman, 1994; Fallick, 1996; Stevens, 1997; Kletzer, 1998). Papers using administrative
23Earnings are adjusted by the CPI to 2000 dollars.
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earnings records, however, usually find much larger negative effects (Jacobson et al., 1993;
Couch and Placzek, 2010). One explanation for these differences is that displacement is
defined differently in surveys and in administrative data (Flaaen et al., 2013). My paper
suggests an alternative explanation: people might under-report earnings losses in surveys.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple model that features career
interruptions and measurement error. Section 3 describes the data and basic properties
of measurement error. Section 4 carries out the estimation of the dynamic earnings and
error model by MCMC. Section 5 discusses implications for bias correction and Section 6
concludes.
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2.2 Earnings and measurement error models
2.2.1 A simple model with labor histories
Imagine that earnings have a permanent and a transitory component.
Y ∗i = Y
∗,perm
i × Y ∗,transi . (2.1)
After taking the natural logarithm of both sides, log earnings are
y∗i = y
∗,perm
i + y
∗,trans
i . (2.2)
Transitory earnings are the sum of a pure noise and a shock term due to non-employment:
y∗,transi = εi − Iiki, (2.3)
where Ii indicates if person i does not work the entire year, and ki > 0 is earnings loss
due to non-employment. Let us assume that all random variables are uncorrelated and their
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first and second moments are
E
(
y∗,permi
)
= µy, (2.4)
V ar
(
y∗,permi
)
= Vp, (2.5)
E (εi) = 0, (2.6)
V ar (εi) = Vε, (2.7)
E (Ii) = pI , (2.8)
E (ki) = µk > 0, (2.9)
V ar (ki) = Vk. (2.10)
Let us assume that the administrative data measures earnings accurately, but persons under-
report transitory earnings shocks in the survey.
yai = y
∗
i , (2.11)
ysi = y
∗,perm
i + τy
∗,trans
i + ξi, (2.12)
where yai is earnings in the administrative data; y
s
i is earnings in the survey; τ is a measure of
under-reporting (0 ≤ τ ≤ 1); and ξi is a classical measurement error component independent
of everything with first and second moments
E (ξi) = 0, (2.13)
V ar (ξi) = Vξ. (2.14)
Measurement error is simply the difference between the survey and the administrative mea-
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sures
mi = − (1− τ) y∗,transi + ξi. (2.15)
The first and second moments of measurement error are
E (mi) = (1− τ) pIµk ≥ 0, (2.16)
V ar (mi) = (1− τ)2 (Vε + pIVk) + Vξ. (2.17)
Unlike in the classical measurement error (CME) model, the mean of the measurement error
is weakly positive as τ ≤ 1 and µk > 0. The mean error is expected to be close to zero when
career interruptions are rare (pI is small), when persons recall transitory shocks accurately
(τ ≈ 1), or when the average earnings loss from career interruptions is small (µk ≈ 0).
The covariance between the error and the administrative data is
Cov (mi, y
a
i ) = − (1− τ) (Vε + pIVk) ≤ 0. (2.18)
In the CME model this covariance is assumed to be zero as the error is independent of
true earnings. The empirical literature, however, has found that there is a strong negative
correlation between the error and administrative earnings. As (2.18) shows, this simple model
is able to predict a negative dependence between the error and the true value. The correlation
decreases in under-reporting (1− τ) and the variance of transitory earnings (Vε + pIVk).
Bound et al. (2001) discuss error correction formulas when there is a negative relationship
between the error and the truth. Bollinger (1998) and Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen
(2006) found that this relationship, however, is not linear, but it is mostly driven by low
earnings values. The mean of the error is substantially positive at the low end of the earnings
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distribution, while it is close to zero at medium and high levels of earnings. In order to derive
the conditional distribution of the error given true earnings (E (mi|yai )) I make distributional
assumptions: y∗,permi and εi are distributed normally, and ki is a constant, ki = k.
24 Using
straightforward algebra (see Appendix B.1) the conditional expectation is
E (mi|yai ) = (1− τ)
[
− Vε
Vε + Vp
(yai − µ) +
Vp
Vε + Vp
kPr (Ii = 1|yai )
]
, (2.19)
Pr (Ii = 1|yai ) =
p exp
(
k
Vε+Vp
(
µ− yi − k2
))
(1− p) + p exp
(
k
Vε+Vp
(
µ− yi − k2
)) , (2.20)
where Pr (Ii = 1|yai ) is the probability that person i experienced career interruption conditional
on earning yai .
The first term in the square bracket of (2.19) is linear in earnings (yai ), but the second is
not. In fact it is easy to show that:
lim
yai→−∞
Pr (Ii = 1|yai ) = 1, (2.21)
lim
yai→∞
Pr (Ii = 1|yai ) = 0. (2.22)
At the low end of the earnings distribution everyone is a partial year earner, while at the
high end everyone works the entire year. By further assuming that there are no transitory
earnings shocks on the job, Vε = 0, the error mean converges to
lim
yai→−∞
E (mi|yai ) = (1− τ) k, (2.23)
lim
yai→∞
E (mi|yai ) = 0. (2.24)
24Assuming stochastic ki makes the derivation substantially more complicated. One can show that the
qualitative results are very similar to the simple model discussed here when one uses stochastic k and
simulates the conditional error distribution.
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The model predicts the Bollinger result. At the low end of the earnings distribution the
mean error is large and positive (equation 2.23), because everyone is a job loser (equation
2.21), and persons only report τ fraction of their earnings losses, k. At the high end of the
earnings distribution, however, the mean of the error is zero (equation 2.24), because no one
is a job loser, and the only source of error is the classical component, ξi, which has a zero
mean.
To sum up, career interruptions can compellingly explain the documented properties of
measurement error. The model predicts mean reversion, as persons under-report transitory
earnings shocks, and predicts that mean reversion is driven by low earnings values where
most of the sample is a partial year earner.
2.2.2 Alternative models to explain mean reversion
There have been extensive discussions in the literature about what might explain the mean-
reverting property of measurement error. The first idea is described in Pischke (1995), who
hypothesized that people under-report transitory shocks in earnings. My model in 2.2.1 is
an extension of the Pischke (1995) mechanism with career interruptions.
Kapteyn and Ypma (2007) proposed another mechanism to explain mean reversion: false
matches between the administrative and survey data. False matches lead to an apparent
mean reversion in survey error, because every mismatched person is linked to an average
earner, on average. False matches might be important in many contexts, especially when
probabilistic matching is used instead of exact identifiers. In the context of HRS, however,
mismatch is unlikely to play an important role. HRS and the Social Security Administration
actively try to avoid false matching by using several variables (Social Security number, name
and birth date) for matching. Moreover, false matches would lead to mean reversion at all
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earnings levels, not just at the low end. It is hard to argue that only the lowest earners are
mismatched.
Abowd and Stinson (2013) proposed yet another mechanism to explain mean-reversion in the
error: measurement error in the administrative data. The literature almost always assumes
that the administrative earnings records (of employees) are accurate and therefore we can
directly observe the measurement error by subtracting the records from the survey reports.
Imagine, instead, that the administrative and the survey earnings both contain classical
measurement error:
yai = y
∗
i + ξ
a
i , (2.25)
ysi = y
∗
i + ξ
s
i , (2.26)
E (y∗i ) = µy, (2.27)
V (y∗i ) = Vy, (2.28)
E
(
ξji
)
= 0, (2.29)
V
(
ξji
)
= V jξ , (2.30)
with j ∈ {a, s}. Within the Abowd and Stinson framework the difference between the survey
and administrative measures is the difference between the two measurement error compo-
nents:
mi ≡ ysi − yai = ξsi − ξai . (2.31)
The covariance between mi and the administrative data is negative as
Cov (mi, y
a
i ) = −V aξ . (2.32)
94
There are many reasons to believe that the administrative data contains at least some error:
unofficial income might be missing from it25, there might be coding errors, and the legal
definitions of annual earnings might be different from actual earnings.26 Bound et al. (1994)
report that some outliers in their data seem to indicate problems with the administrative
data.
Measurement error in the administrative data can explain the mean reverting property of
the error, but it is less obvious why only low earnings values are biased. In this paper I
shall maintain the standard assumption that the administrative data are accurate. I believe,
however, it would be an interesting extension to develop a technique to identify measurement
error in the administrative data, which has proven elusive. See Abowd and Stinson (2013)
for more discussion about identification problems.
Lastly, a model of selective memory can also explain the Bollinger finding. This model
assumes that people are more likely to under-report negative than positive earnings shocks.
In the psychology literature Wagenaar (1986), Thompson et al. (1996) and Tourangeau
et al. (2000) discuss that people tend to remember more emotionally intense events better,
but pleasant events are better stored in memory. Moreover, psychologists observed that
people, when faced with a survey question about sensitive topics, tend to bias their answers
toward more favorable outcomes. Some people might think of their earnings as a gauge of
25One might expect that survey reports for this population are more accurate as surveys are collected
anonymously. Unfortunately we know very little on how people with unofficial income respond to questions
about their earnings in surveys. Hurst et al. (2014) finds strong evidence that the self-employed, who are
expected to have the most unofficial income due to tax incentives, seriously under-report their income in
surveys as well.
26The regulations concerning earnings on the W2 forms are quite complex and are not solely based on
economic considerations. By looking at the instructions we can find, for example, the following list of earnings
components: ”The cost of accident and health insurance premiums for 2%-or-more shareholder-employees paid
by an S corporation”; ”Taxable cost of group-term life insurance in excess of $50,000”, ”Unless excludable
under Educational assistance programs (see page 5), payments for non-job-related education expenses or for
payments under a nonaccountable plan”, etc. It is hard to argue that there are no arbitrary elements in these
instructions.
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personal success and they might find it embarrassing to report too low values. It is possible,
for example, that people are more likely to report their usual earnings when they received
a big negative transitory income shock, but they report their total earnings after a positive
shock. Appendix B.2 shows that this mechanism is able to predict the asymmetric behavior
of the error discussed above. I shall show, however, that transitory earnings shocks on the
job are very small. Thus, the selective memory model is unlikely to explain much of the
mean reversion. Consequently, I shall not build this mechanism into my model.
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2.3 Data and descriptive results
2.3.1 The Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
The survey data used in this project is the HRS, which is a biannual panel survey launched
in 1992. The original sample represented the 51-62-year-old US population, but in 1998 older
cohorts were added to cover everyone 51 and older. Every six years after 1998 the current
51-57-year-old cohort is added to maintain the 51+ age coverage. In this paper I use the
1992 − 2012 waves of the HRS that cover annual earnings between 1991 and 2011. The HRS
is a moderately large panel dataset (∼ 18, 000 observations per wave), allowing me to look at
the earnings history of persons for a relatively long time. The SIPP panels that were used
in recent validation studies cover only 2.5 to 4 years.
The HRS developed a so-called unfolding bracket question sequence to reduce item non-
response. People who answer ”Don’t know” to any of the earnings questions get a series
of follow-up questions about whether their earnings are smaller or higher than some pre-
determined threshold values. Table 2.1 shows that the non-response rate about wage and
salary income fell below 5 percent using this method. The HRS asks about annual gross
earnings in the last calendar year in five categories in the following order: 1. income from
self-employment; 2 wage and salary income; 3 other income from professional practice or
trade; 4 other income from tips, bonuses, commissions; 5 other income e.g. from second jobs
or military reserves. After each question the interviewer says “Other than what you have
already told me about, did you have any income from [Component X]”. If the answer is yes,
persons are asked about its value. In this paper I concentrate on earnings from employment,
so I disregard self-employment income and the sum of components 2-5 is my measure of
survey reported earnings. Table 2.2 shows that wage and salary income is by far the largest
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component of earnings.
For most of the paper I restrict the sample to the 50-60-year-old grouping. I shall show in
Section 2.3.5 that above age 60, as people approach retirement, their earnings paths become
quite complex: average earnings start falling sharply, and cross-personal variation starts
increasing heavily. My preferred sample uses the relatively stable age range. I also drop
the self-employed from the analysis: All person-year observations are dropped in which the
person reported to be self-employed, or reported any self-employment income or in which
there is any self-employment income in the administrative data.
2.3.2 Earnings in the administrative data
The source of the administrative data is the Detailed and Summary Earnings Records derived
from the Master Earnings File of the Social Security Administration (SSA). For details about
this data, see Olsen and Hudson (2009) and the documents on the SSA27 and HRS websites.28
The data are derived from the W2 forms filed by employers to the Internal Revenue Service
each year. The higher quality Detailed Earnings Records (DER) is available from 1978
onward, and the less detailed Summary Earnings Records (SER) is available from 1951. My
preferred sample uses years between 1991 and 2011.
The data contains employer-employee-year level information and several earnings variables.
To define administrative earnings I consider total compensation and Medicare earnings. The
maximum of total compensation and Medicare earnings is my measure of W2 earnings at
a particular employer, and the sum over all employers is my measure of total annual W2
earnings for an individual in a given year. Total compensation amounts to the Box 1 values
27See http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v69n3/v69n3p29.html for details.
28There are two relatively detailed documents under the data section at hrsonline.isr.umich.edu that can
be accessed after free registration. Note, however, that the Social Security data are restricted and cannot be
accessed online. The website provides information about how to get permission to use the restricted data.
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of the W2s and it includes wages, bonuses, non-cash payments and tips29. It typically does
not include deferred payments such as contributions to 401k plans, but certain plans are
included. Medicare earnings are based on the Box 5 values of the W2 forms. As opposed
to total compensation, Medicare earnings include most deferred payments. Before 1994,
however, Medicare earnings were capped at the taxable maximum. Before 1991, the Medicare
caps were equal to the Social Security caps (around $50, 000). Since 1994, there has been no
limit on the taxable earnings for Medicare, and between 1991 and 1993 the Medicare and
the Social Security taxable maximums began rapidly diverging.
Zero earnings are typically not recorded in the HRS version of the DER, but they are
available in the SER. I identify zero earnings as either zero records in DER or a missing
information in DER and zero records in SER.
The administrative data also contains self-employment income derived from the Form
1040 Schedule SE reported by the self-employed to the IRS. As discussed earlier, I drop all
person-year observations with any self-employment income.
The administrative data are only available in intervals, although most intervals are narrow. In
the descriptive part of the paper I impute values from these intervals with a simple procedure
outlined in Section 2.3.3, but in the structural estimation I model interval responses in an
interval regression fashion. The first type of interval response is top-coded Medicare earnings,
where Medicare earnings exceed total compensation, but are at the taxable maximum. For
confidentiality reasons the HRS also top-codes earnings above $250, 000 in a given year: When
earnings are above this threshold, researchers only see if they are in one of the following
intervals: [$250, 000, $299, 999]; [$300, 000, $499, 999]; [$500, 000,∞]. This top-coding only affects a
handful of cases. The HRS also rounded earnings below $250, 000 to the closest multiple of
29Only tips that the employee reported to the employer. Allocated tips are not part of Box 1.
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$100, with the exception of $0−$49, where we can differentiate between a true $0 and a $1−$49
value.
2.3.3 Linking the HRS and administrative data
In order to match the HRS to the SSA data consent is required from the interviewees. Prior
to 2006, consent only covered current and past years, but since 2006, consent covers all future
years as well. For example, if the last consent from individual i was in wave 2000, we can
see his SSA earnings from 1951 to 2000, but if the last consent was in wave 2008, we see his
earnings from 1951 until today. Earnings histories, thus, are sometimes right-censored, but
never left-censored. The coverage, however, is expected to improve over time, as more and
more forward looking consent will be available.
The HRS made a lot of effort to increase the participation rate, but it remained below 100
percent. Generally the HRS has a relatively good coverage rate for earnings before 1992
and a moderately good coverage rate for earnings afterwards. Table 2.3 shows the fraction
successfully matched in a few subgroups. The average match rate among 50-60-year-old
employees between 1991 and 2011 is a little over 60%. The match rate is above 66% among
those who reported positive earnings in the HRS. It appears that persons who do not work
are less likely to consent. The match rate is almost 90% in the first 1992 wave of the survey,
it is between 60% and 70% between 1994 and 2008, and it is around 50% in 2010 and 2012.
Table 2.4 estimates linear probability models of successful matches on basic covariates. The
strongest predictors are interview years, race and marital status. Minorities and singles
are less likely to consent, but education and earnings do not predict the match rate. The
somewhat selective nature of the matched sample might bias some of the estimates. In the
descriptive part of the paper I shall ignore this problem, but in the structural part missing
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values are imputed with multiple imputation. These imputations assume that the missing
values are conditionally ignorable (Little and Rubin, 2002).
Both HRS and W2 earnings contain quite a few interval responses. In the structural estima-
tion I model them in an interval regression fashion. For the descriptive part of the paper I use
a simple imputation that minimizes the error. When the reported interval (or value) and the
recorded interval overlap, I define measurement error as zero and I assign the middle point
of the overlapping interval to both earnings variables. If the two intervals do not overlap,
I assign the values on the edge of the intervals that minimize the measurement error. The
final (rare) case is when both the HRS report and the W2 record are right-open intervals.
In such cases, I assign 110 percent of the maximum of the two left points of the intervals to
both earnings variables. Finally, I deflated all earnings values with the CPI to 2000 dollars.
2.3.4 Labor histories
The administrative data provides employer-employee-year level information, and it contains
scrambled employer IDs that identify changes of employers for the same person over time,
but do not identify the same employer across individuals. I define job loss in year t as the
disappearance of an employer ID from year t to year t+1, and job finding as the appearance of
a new employer ID from year t−1 to year t. Employer IDs might change due to administrative
reasons, which biases turnover upward, but the extent of it should be negligible compared to
real turnover. Moreover, I am interested in how persons report earnings losses in years when
there is evidence for a career interruption and their administrative earnings fall substantially.
Table 2.7 shows the distribution of detailed labor histories between 1991 and 2011. Col-
umn 1 and 2 use only the matched HRS-SSA sample, and column 3 and 4 add the off years
when HRS responses are not available. In the latter sample, 49% of person-year observations
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correspond to full year earnings in a single job, when the person held one job, and he also
worked for that employer in year t − 1 and year t + 1. The second largest category is zero
earnings (24%), when the person did not work for any employer in a particular year. Around
6% of person-years involved a job loss without job finding. The majority (4.3%) correspond
to the loss of a single job, and 1.8% involved the loss of at least one of multiple jobs. The
table differentiates between major and minor job losses. Major job loss is the loss of a job
that was the highest paying in year t or t− 1, and minor job loss is the loss of a secondary or
supplemental job that is not the highest paying neither in year t nor in t−1. The table shows
that minor job losses are far more common than major, but not single job losses. Around
4.5% of person-years involved a job finding without a job loss. The majority (2.9%) found
and held a single job. Around 10% of person-year observations involved both a job loss and
a job finding. The majority (5.9%) corresponds to losing and then finding a major job; 1.9%
correspond to losing and finding minor jobs; and around 1− 1% correspond to years when a
major job loss and a minor job finding, or vice versa, occurred.
Overall, there is evidence for quite high turnover in the HRS. Moreover, my procedure
might actually miss some job losses. Persons who lose their jobs but return to the same
employer within a year are mistakenly identified as full year earners. The administrative data,
under current limitations, cannot identify such cases, and there is some evidence that the
extent of this problem is non-negligible. My structural earnings model, thus, shall incorporate
latent job losses as well.
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show the distribution of earnings by labor histories. As expected,
career interruptions substantially increase the likelihood of making relatively little. Around
44% of annual earnings are below $10, 000 (in 2000 dollars) when persons lose their single
jobs. The number is 24% after losing a major job and only 10% after losing a minor one.
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The fraction of earnings below $10, 000 is very similar in years with a single, major, or minor
job finding (47%, 27% and 10% respectively). When persons work for the entire year, their
earnings are larger, but still around 9% of the observations are below the $10, 000 threshold.
The distribution of earnings after a minor job loss and a minor job finding is similar to
the distribution of full year earnings. Thus, I aggregate labor histories in the following way:
1. Stable years are observations with positive earnings without any indication of a major
or single job loss or job finding. Stable years include full year earnings, minor job losses
and minor job findings.
2. Major job losses are observations with major or single job losses and either no or only
minor job findings.
3. Major job findings are observations with major or single job findings and either no or
only minor job losses.
4. Major job loss and job findings are observations with both a major job loss and a major
job finding. This category, among others, contains employer-to-employer switches.
5. Zero earnings are observations without any earnings.
Finally, I drop W2 earnings corresponding to the last consented year, since it is not possible
to determine if persons managed to keep their jobs the entire year or not.
2.3.5 Descriptive properties of measurement error
From now on Y ait and y
a
it denote the level and log of annual W2 earnings; Y
s
it and y
s
it denote
the level and log annual HRS earnings; and mit denotes the measurement error: mit = ysit−yait.
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Table 2.6 shows basic moments of earnings and measurement error. The first row is the
classical reliability ratio defined as:
rclassical =
V ar (yait)
V ar (yait) + V ar (mit)
. (2.33)
Under the assumptions of the classical measurement error model, rclassical characterizes the
attenuation bias in simple regressions with the error ridden variable on the right hand side:
βˆ = rclassical × β + op (1) . (2.34)
According to Table 2.6 the reliability ratio is 0.82, which means that, if the CME model
holds, in regressions with earnings on the right hand side, one should divide the coefficient
on earnings by 0.82 to correct for the attenuation bias. Column 5 shows that when earnings
growth (log changes in earnings) is on the right hand side, one should divide the coefficient
by 0.50. Earnings growth is less reliable as earnings are more persistent than measurement
error.
The second row of Table 2.6 shows a more general reliability ratio, rcorrelated, which, as
opposed to the CME model, allows for a non-negative correlation between measurement
error and earnings (Bound et al., 2001):
rcorrelated =
V ar (yait)
V ar (yait) + V ar (mit) + 2Cov (y
a
it,mit)
. (2.35)
The literature consistently finds a strong negative correlation between error and earnings.
The HRS is no exception. The negative correlation decreases the denominator of (2.35), or
in other words, it makes the attenuation bias less strong. As Table 2.6 shows, the correlated
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reliability ratio is close to one, implying that under the assumptions of the Correlated Mea-
surement Error (CorrME) model, there is no attenuation bias in regressions with earnings on
the right hand side. The negative correlation also increases the reliability ratio in earnings
growth, but it is still well short of one (0.68).
The third row of Table 2.6 shows the regression coefficient of error on earnings:
mit = γm,yay
a
it + υit. (2.36)
As Bound et al. (2001) discuss, regression coefficients are biased even when earnings appear
on the left hand side of regression in the CorrME model, and γm,y∗ is a measure of the bias:
αˆ = γm,ya × α+ op (1) . (2.37)
Similarly to the literature, the γm,ya coefficient is estimated to be around −0.1, meaning that
predictors of earnings are downward biased by about 10% according to the CorrME model.
Columns 2-4 of Table 2.6 show a potential problem with the CorrME model. The basic
model assumes that the negative relationship between the error and earnings is linear as in
(2.36). As the table shows, the relationship is far from linear as seen when the lowest earnings
values are discarded and the negative relationship approaches zero. When I discard earnings
below $10, 000 (in 2000 dollars), γm,ya shrinks from −0.099 to only −0.025, although it is still
statistically significant. Measurement error above $10, 000 appears to be less correlated and
is almost classical. In the case, when the relationship between the error and true earnings is
not linear, rcorrelated and γm,ya still correctly accounts for the bias, as long as total earnings
(as opposed to permanent earnings) are in the regression.
Figure 2.2 visualizes the nonparametric relationship between the error and earnings. The
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top left panel shows the predicted value of the nonparametric regression between the 1st
and 99th percentile of earnings together with the predicted values of the CME and the basic
CorrME models. The top right panel shows average measurement error in 20 equal sized
quantiles of earnings together with 95% confidence intervals. The lowest earnings are severely
upward biased, but the error appears almost classical above the 15th or 20th percentile of
earnings. Neither the CME nor the CorrME model accurately characterizes measurement
error in earnings. Very similar results were found by Bollinger (1998) using the Current
Population Survey and Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen (2006) using a Danish household
survey. The bottom panels of Figure 2.2 show that the CorrME model works much better
for earnings growth. It seems the relationship between error and earnings growth is close to
linear, with perhaps some acceleration at the extremes.
The main claim of my paper is that transitory earnings shocks due to career interruptions
are under-reported in surveys. This mechanism exactly predicts the type of non-parametric
relationship between the error and earnings as in Figure 2.2. Career interruptions lead to
large earnings losses and large positive measurement error at the low end of the earnings
distribution if they are systematically under-reported. Figure 2.1 shows histograms of mea-
surement error together with fitted normal densities. All histograms show excess kurtosis
and right skew compared to the normal plots. The right skew appears strongest in the sam-
ple with partial year earnings. This is additional evidence that negative earnings shocks due
to partial year earnings are under-reported in surveys.
Table 2.11 shows the means of measurement error by labor histories and earnings. Av-
erage error is large and positive below $10, 000, and sharply decreases with earnings. The
averages are very similar across the three types of career interruption (job loss, job finding or
both). Average measurement error is substantially smaller in stable years, but still positive
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at the low end of the earnings distribution. Table 2.12 further investigates measurement
error in stable years. I restrict the sample to stable years in both year t and t − 1, and I
divide the sample based on whether earnings fell or increased between t − 1 and t. Average
measurement error is close to zero when earnings increased, except in the rare cases they in-
creased but remained under $1, 000. Average error is positive and substantial, however, when
earnings fall. This might indicate that some observations identified as stable actually involve
large negative transitory shocks as well. It is possible that these observations correspond to
person-years with a job loss and a subsequent return to the same employer.
Finally, I fit a simple descriptive earnings and measurement error model a` la Pischke
(1995). The model assumes earnings are the sum of a permanent and a transitory component:
yit = µ+ y
perm
i + y
tran
it , (2.38)
where ypermi and y
trans
it are mean zero. Permanent earnings are fixed within person and
transitory earnings follow an MA(1) process:
ytranit = εit − θεi,t−1. (2.39)
The survey reports are
ysit = µ+ δ + τ
pypermi + τ
tytranit +mi + nit, (2.40)
where δ indicates mean error, τp and τ t are the average fraction of permanent and transitory
earnings reported, mi is the permanent measurement error and nit is the transitory measure-
ment error. All error terms are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other and with the
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other variables of the model.
I estimate this system by GMM using all the first and second moments of earnings in
year t and t+ 2. Apart from the MA(1) coefficient, θ, all parameters are identified, including
the total variance of transitory earnings.
Table 2.21 in Appendix C estimates the model by 2-year age groups between the ages of
50 and 70. It shows that the mean and the variance of earnings is relatively stable between
the ages of 50 and 60, the mean rapidly decreases after age 60, while the variance increases
sharply. From now on I only use the relatively stable 50-60-year-old sample.
The main results are in Table 2.13. Column 1 uses all observations and column 2 restricts
the sample to cases with no indication of career interruption in years t, t + 1 or t + 2. Note
that the model in column 1 is biased because career interruptions lead to non-zero (negative)
mean transitory earnings. Nevertheless, I estimate this model due to its similarities with the
model Pischke (1995) used, and because I believe comparing it to column 2 is worthwhile.
The average measurement error is positive in both cases, but it is close to zero in stable
years. The (inter-personal) variance of permanent earnings is substantial in both models.
The variance of transitory earnings is large in model 1, but it is close to zero when only
stable years are used. Transitory earnings shocks on the job, thus, are small, but transitory
earnings shocks due to career interruptions are large. The main parameters of interest are in
the last two rows. Persons report close to 100% of their permanent earnings, but substantially
less of their transitory earnings: 68% for all observations and 76% when only stable years are
considered. The standard error in the latter case, though, is quite large, perhaps because it
is hard to identify the under-reported component of earnings that are so small.
Overall, the descriptive evidence favors the main claims of the paper that under-reporting
of earnings losses due to career interruptions has a substantial and non-standard effect on
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measurement error.
2.4 Structural estimation
This section introduces and estimates a dynamic earnings and measurement error model that
features career interruptions and deals with missing values and interval responses.
2.4.1 The earnings and measurement error model
The W2 and HRS earnings are provided in intervals. I assume that there are latent earnings
yait and y
s
it that are somewhere in the provided intervals:
yjit ∈
[
yj
it
, y¯jit
]
, (2.41)
where j ∈ {a, s}, and only the lower and upper bar earnings values are observed in the
HRS and SSA data. When the HRS earnings reports are continuous values, I use the trivial
intervals. When the HRS or the SSA earnings are missing, I use the [−∞,∞] intervals.
I assume that the W2 earnings are accurate. Earnings of person i in year t depend
on some potentially time-varying covariates, and they have a permanent and a transitory
component:
yait = β
′xit + y
perm
it + y
tran
it , (2.42)
ypermit = y
perm
i,t−1 + νit, (2.43)
ytranit = y
MA(q)
it −
L∑
l=1
Iitlkitl, (2.44)
y
MA(k)
it = εit −
k∑
j=1
θjεi,t−j (2.45)
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Permanent earnings follow a random walk with innovation term νit. Transitory earnings
on-the-job follow a moving average process with q lags. My preferred model features q = 0
lags.30 Iitl indicates a career interruption of type l ∈ {1, ...;L}, such as a major job loss or a
job finding. Career interruptions affect both permanent and transitory earnings. Transitory
earnings loss due to an l type interruption is denoted by kitl. Career interruptions also affect
the mean and the variance of the random walk innovation term of permanent earnings:
E (υit) =
L∑
l=1
λml Iitl, (2.46)
V ar (υit) =
L∑
l=1
λVl Iitl. (2.47)
The mean of the innovation term is normalized to zero on-the-job, but it is free in other
cases. Among other things, this specification allows for the human capital of individuals to
depreciate when they are not working. The variance of the innovation term can be non-zero
even on-the-job to capture promotions and demotions.
Even though my notations involve summations over labor histories in (2.44)-(2.47),a
maximum of one indicator is one in a particular year for a given individual. In the previous
section, we saw that there are large negative earnings shocks even in stable years, so I allow
for latent job losses on-the-job with probability p. Latent job loss behaves similarly to other
career interruptions: It can change the mean and the variance of permanent earnings and
it can lead to a transitory earnings loss, too. The probability p shall be estimated together
with the other parameters.
30The variance of on-the-job transitory earnings is very small, so it makes little difference how much
structure one puts on these shocks. The model with no MA lags converges much faster to a stable distribution,
so I use this assumption in the baseline case.
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The HRS earnings reports are
ysit = (β + δ)
′
xit + τ
pypermit + τ
ty
MA(k)
it −
L∑
l=1
τkl Iitlkitl +mi + nit. (2.48)
δ is a vector of bias terms in the regression coefficients; τp, τ t and the τkl terms are the
average fractions of the earnings components reported (permanent, on-the-job transitory and
transitory due to career interruption); mi is permanent and nit is transitory measurement
error with mean zero and positive variance. The variance of transitory measurement error
can also depend on labor histories:
V ar (nit) =
L∑
l=1
λnl Iitl. (2.49)
I use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) for estimation that requires distributional as-
sumptions. I assume that all random variables apart from the kitl and Iitl are distributed
normally and are uncorrelated with each other. The uncorrelatedness assumption is not par-
ticularly restrictive as considerable dependence is already built in the model. Iitl is assumed
to follow a Bernoulli distribution with a constant parameter, p. I assume that the transitory
earnings loss terms, the kitl-s, follow an exponential distribution with p.d.f.
f (kitl) = γl exp (−γlkitl) , (2.50)
kitl ∈ [0,∞] . (2.51)
The motivation for this p.d.f. is the following: Imagine that an l-type career interruption
implies that the person works for Titl and does not work for 12 − Titl months. His earnings
loss is Kitl = 1 − Titl12 fraction of his earnings potential. Assuming that the fraction Kitl is
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uniformly distributed between zero and one, and taking log leads to the p.d.f. in (2.50) with
parameter γl = 1, and kitl ≡ 1 − ln (1−Kitl). I allow γl to differ from one, and I will estimate
separate γl terms for each type of career interruption. The average log and level earnings
losses decrease with γl:
E(kitl) =
1
γl
, (2.52)
E(Kitl) =
1
γl + 1
, (2.53)
Figure 2.3 shows that this distributional assumption works well. It shows the histogram of
earnings losses from year t−1 to year t for observations when t−1 was a stable year and year
t involved a major job loss. The figure also shows a simulated density that is the sum of two
terms: one with a p.d.f. from (2.50) with γl = 1, and one with the empirical distribution of
earnings changes when both t− 1 and t were stable years. The shape of the two distributions
are similar, but the empirical histogram falls a little short of the simulated one. It appears
persons lose less than half of their earnings after a typical job loss. Consequently we can
expect the corresponding γ term to be above one.
2.4.2 Estimation methodology
I use a Bayesian estimation method, Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), for estimation.
Gelman et al. (2013) provides a thorough overview of MCMC and other similar techniques.
In some ways, MCMC is a more general version of Maximum Simulated Likelihood. It
requires a fully specified model, but it can be used in very complex cases when it is too
tedious or too slow to simulate the likelihood function.
The unusual feature of MCMC is that it assumes that the parameters of the model being
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estimated are random. The data generating process is described by the c.d.f. F (y, α), where y
represents the data and α represents the unknown parameters. The goal of the procedure is to
derive the posterior distribution of the parameters, F (α|y). Once the posterior is estimated,
one can use its mean as the estimate, and its standard deviation as the standard error:
αˆ = EF (α|y) , (2.54)
se (αˆ) = StdF (α|y). (2.55)
Alternatively, one can directly define a 95% confidence interval by taking the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentile of F (α|y). In this paper I shall only provide the means and standard errors from
(2.54) and (2.55).
The posterior distributions of the parameters are simulated with the following procedure:
1. Take initial guesses for all αj-s, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}. The set of α-s includes the parameters
and potentially other latent or auxiliary random effects, such as the innovation terms
of the random walk, the Iitl and kitl terms, etc.
2. Define a prior distribution for all the parameters f0 (αj). The priors can be defined
individually, jointly or in blocks.
3. Draw new values of the parameters from their posterior distribution conditional on
their prior, the data and other parameters, F (αj |y, α−j , f0 (αj)). One can update the
parameters individually, jointly or in blocks.
4. Repeat step 3 NS times, where NS is the number of simulation draws.
5. Drop the first NB burn-in draws and use the rest NS −NB for inference.
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The prior distributions are auxiliary objects and researchers almost always choose vague
(or flat or non-informative) priors so that they do not influence the results. One can, for
example, use a prior of N (0, 100) for the distribution of mean log earnings. I also use vague
priors in this project.
The number of necessary simulation draws, NS, sometimes has to be large, because the
consecutive simulation draws can have, and often do have, a large positive autocorrelation,
which decreases the effective sample size of the simulated data. In this project, I use 100, 000
simulation draws for each parameter, and I discard the first 10, 000 burn-in draws.
The most challenging part of the estimation is to derive the posterior distributions, the
F (αj |y, α−j , f0 (αj))-s, of all parameters. In standard cases, there are readily available formu-
las. For example, when the data are distributed normally, means, variances and regression
coefficients can be updated easily. In other cases, the posterior distributions are unknown
or they do not have analytical forms. In such cases the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm can
be used to simulate the posterior distribution. In this project I use the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm to update the MA coefficients and the earnings loss variables due to career inter-
ruptions: Iitl, kitl and latent transitory measurement error terms due to career interruptions.
Other parameters are updated using the standard Gibbs sampler.
MCMC is particularly useful for models that feature a large number of random effects or
missing data. In such cases the MCMC procedure is substantially simpler than alternatives.
Other features are harder to implement with MCMC. Properly modeling moving average
processes and time-varying variances, such as variances that depend on labor histories, are
harder. The simulation part of the Matlab code of my preferred model has almost 500 lines.
Details can be found on my website.31
31https://sites.google.com/site/phudomiet/research.
114
2.4.3 Results
Tables 2.14-2.18 show the main results of the paper. All of these specifications are estimated
using years between 1991 and 2011, with age ranging between 50 and 60, and no lags in the
moving average process of on-the-job transitory earnings. Appendix C shows results using
alternative modeling assumptions.
The models are run separately for males and females. Tables 2.14 contains the regression
coefficients of mean earnings; Table 2.15 shows the covariates in the means and variances of
the random walk innovation terms; Table 2.16 contains other parameters of earnings; and
Tables 2.17 and 2.18 show parameters of measurement error.
All Tables have six columns corresponding three alternative sets of covariates in earnings
and gender. My preferred model is in Column 2. Column 1 only includes a constant term.
Column 2 adds basic covariates such as race, education, age, GDP gap32. Column 3 adds
year dummies instead of the other macro variables.
The estimated coefficients in mean earnings (Table 2.14) are standard: Minorities earn
less than whites; education increases earnings; the age-earnings profile is an increasing and
concave function; earnings are procyclical (and the cyclicality is stronger for males); male
real earnings were slightly falling between 1991 and 2011 while female earnings stagnated or
slightly increased. Cognition is a strong positive predictor of earnings, and the predictive
power of education substantially decreases with the inclusion of cognition.
The mean and variance of the random walk innovation term (of permanent earnings) are
allowed to depend on labor histories. I include dummies for 1. major job finding; 2. major
job loss and major job finding; 3. zero earnings; and 4. latent job loss in stable years. I
do not include a dummy for major job loss, as it is not separately identified from major job
32I use the IMF GDP gap measures divided by 100.
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finding. When one loses his job, his permanent earnings are not observed until he finds a
job again. Hence, it is not possible to identify the effect of a job loss and a consequent job
finding separately. My models attribute all changes to job finding.
Moving from non-employment to employment has a small negative effect on permanent
earnings for both males and females. In my preferred Model 2, the permanent earnings
loss is 7.4% for males and 7.7% for females. This mean effect, however, masks a large cross-
sectional heterogeneity. The standard deviation of the random walk innovation is close
to zero on-the-job (0.06 for both males and females), but it jumps up to around 0.4 when
persons find a new job. Not working for an entire year has an even more detrimental effect on
earnings, on average: permanent earnings fall by 24% per year for males and 21% per year for
females. Experiencing both a major job loss and a major job finding, the case that includes
employment-to-employment switches, has a zero effect on permanent earnings, on average,
for males, and a small positive effect for females. Finally, latent job loss in stable years is
associated with a very large negative effect on permanent earnings, too: 21% earnings loss
for males and 17% for females. Some of these earnings losses might be due to demotions; a
reduction in work hours; or losing a job and being rehired in a lower position. The cross-
sectional variation in earnings growth is very large in all cases when career interruptions
occur.
Table 2.16 shows the rest of the parameters in earnings. The cross-sectional variation in
earnings is quite large at age 50 already. Transitory earnings shocks on-the-job, however, are
small: The standard deviation is around 0.04 for males and 0.03 for females. The correspond-
ing variances are practically zero. Transitory earnings shocks due to career interruptions,
however, are very large, on average. The estimated γl coefficients are larger than 1 in all
cases, which means that earnings loss is less than half a year on average. Average earnings
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losses are between 23% and 45% based on the formula in (2.53). The largest transitory earn-
ings loss is due to major job losses (41% for males and 45% for females) and the smallest is
in latent job losses in stable years (24% for males and 25% for females).
The most important parameters, describing the properties of measurement error, are in
Tables 2.17 and 2.18. The basic covariates have little effect on the mean of the error for
both males and females. The standard deviation of permanent measurement error is small
for both groups (0.16 for males and 0.15 for females). The standard deviation of transitory
measurement error in stable years is also small (0.1 for males and 0.14 for females), but it
is considerably larger when career interruptions occur. Depending on the type of shock,
the standard deviation of the error is between 0.5 and 0.68. Persons report close to 100%
of their permanent earnings, and substantially less of their transitory earnings. Identifying
the fraction of on-the-job transitory earnings reported was an obstacle, likely because these
shocks are very small, on average. In my baseline specification I simply calibrated the
reported fraction to zero.33 The fraction of transitory shocks due to career interruptions
reported are between 50% and 87%. In my preferred model 2, male (female) interviewees
report 84% (∼ 77%) of the transitory shocks due to a major job loss, 62% (69%) of shocks due
to a major job finding, 54% (65%) of shocks associated with both a job loss and a job finding,
and 50% (73%) of shocks due to a latent job loss in stable years. Most parameters are very
similar in the different specifications. The only exception is the fraction of reported earnings
due to a latent job loss. This parameter varies between 50% and 100% in the alternative
models.
Tables 2.24-2.48 in Appendix C carry out several robustness checks. Tables 2.24-2.33
33Table 2.38 in Appendix C show that the main results are robust to alternative assumptions in regard to
this parameter: assuming that people report 50% or 100% of these shocks or that the fraction is estimated.
In the case of the fraction being estimated, its standard error is quite large, and the distribution of the
parameter does not appear to converge to a stable distribution.
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estimates separate models by education groups; Tables 2.34-2.38 allow for higher order MA
terms in transitory earnings, Tables 2.39-2.43 make alternative assumptions about the frac-
tion of on-the-job transitory shocks reported, and Tables 2.44-2.48 uses different samples.
The main results of the paper are robust to these changes: transitory earnings shocks due
to career interruptions are large and are severely under-reported in the survey.
2.5 Discussion of bias correction
According to the descriptive results summarized in Table 2.6, respondents report around
1− 0.26 = 74% of their earnings growth, on average. According to Figure 2.2, under-reporting
is an approximately linear function of earnings growth itself. The GMM estimates in Table
2.13 suggest that respondents report around 68% of their transitory earnings shocks. These
results indicate that a simple model, in which measurement error has a classical component
together with a mean-reverting one due to reporting only ∼ 70% of transitory earnings fluc-
tuations, might be a good approximation of the way people report their earnings in surveys.
The MCMC estimates show a somewhat more nuanced picture: earnings losses due to job
finding appears to be less salient than earnings losses due to job losses. The 70% number is
approximately in the middle of the different MCMC estimates, though.
A natural question is: what do these results imply for biases in applied work and what
can researchers do to correct them? The appropriate bias correction formulas depend on
many factors such as:
1. Are earnings on the left- or right-hand side of regressions?
2. Does the researcher aim at including a measure of permanent earnings (or perhaps
human capital or earnings potential) of individuals or their total earnings including
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short-term transitory fluctuations?
3. Does the researcher model earnings levels or earnings growth?
4. Does the data have reliable measures of career interruptions or not?
5. Do particular variables in the regression correlate with turnover or not?
Discussing all of these is beyond the scope of this paper. I only consider a few interesting
cases.
First, because measurement error in earnings growth appears to be an approximately
linear function of earnings growth, the CorrME error model of Bound et al. (2001) might
work well in these cases. According to Table 2.6, when earnings growth is on the left-hand
side of regressions, the coefficients should be divided by 0.74; and when earnings growth is
on the right-hand side regressions, the coefficients should be divided by 0.68. This simple
procedure only works, however, if the researcher aims at including growth in total earnings,
as opposed growth in permanent earnings. This is the case, for example, if one is interested
in the transitory earnings loss of displaced workers either on the left or right hand side of
regressions.
Second, when one is interested, instead, in permanent earnings growth, the correc-
tion formulas should be adjusted. This is the case if one wants to characterize differen-
tial earnings trends between groups over time, or one is interested in the effect of pro-
motions/demotions/retirement on consumption growth. As people report the permanent
component of their earnings accurately, no correction is needed when earnings growth is on
the left hand side of regressions. Using observed earnings growth, as a proxy for permanent
earnings growth on the right-hand side of regressions, however, should be done with cau-
tion. Not only is earnings growth measured with error, but it is dominated by transitory
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fluctuations as opposed to permanent changes.
Third, consider the case of using annual earnings (in levels) on the left hand side of regres-
sions as a proxy for permanent earnings, such as in a Mincer earnings function. Interestingly,
my results suggest that using survey-based measures is (slightly) superior to administrative
records. Imagine that administrative and survey earnings take the following form:
yai = y
perm
i + y
trans
i , (2.56)
ypermi = β0 + β1xi + ηi, (2.57)
ytransi = εi − Iiki, (2.58)
ysi = y
perm
i + τy
trans
i +mi, (2.59)
where Ii indicates career interruptions, ki indicates annual earnings losses due to career
interruptions with mean 1/γ, and the coefficient of interest is β1. Under these assumption,
the probability limit of regression coefficients with either yai or y
s
i on the left hand side of the
regression are
plimβˆa1 = β1 −
1
γ
βI,x, (2.60)
plimβˆs1 = β1 −
τ
γ
βI,x, (2.61)
where βI,x is the coefficient from a regression of career interruption on x. The regression
coefficient is biased if variable xit is correlated with career interruptions. The sign of the bias
depends on the sign of βI,x. Variables with a positive effect on turnover have a negative bias,
while negative predictors of turnover are biased upward. The survey-based regression is less
biased than the administrative whenever τ < 1, as persons under-report transitory shocks,
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and hence, under-report the bias. In the extreme case of τ = 0, the survey based coefficient is
actually unbiased. In most applications the regression coefficient βI,x is likely to be close to
zero, since the unconditional probability of turnover is relatively low to begin with. Overall,
unless variable x is expected to be a very strong predictor of turnover, one might expect
negligible bias in these regressions.
Fourth, consider the case when annual earnings (in levels) appear on the right-hand side
of a regression as proxies of permanent earnings.
zi = β0 + β1y
perm
i + ηi, (2.62)
yai = y
perm
i + εi − Iiki, (2.63)
ysi = y
perm
i + τ (εi − Iiki) +mi. (2.64)
Regression coefficients are inconsistent in this case. Under the assumption that all error
terms are uncorrelated, Pr (Ii = 1) = p and V ar (ki) = 1γ2 , the probability limit of regression
coefficients with either yai or y
s
i on the right-hand side are
plimβˆa1 = β1
V ar (ypermi )
V ar (ypermi ) + V ar (εi) +
p
γ2
, (2.65)
plimβˆs1 = β1
V ar (ypermi )
V ar (ypermi ) + τ
(
V ar (εi) +
p
γ2
)
+ V ar (mi)
. (2.66)
Under-reporting transitory shocks helps on the right hand side as it decreases the second
term in the denominator of (2.66). The third (classical error) term in (2.66), however,
increases the denominator and increases the bias. The measurement error is large enough
that the bias is stronger when the survey measure is used. The bias is non-negligible in both
cases, though, and it is dominated by terms related to career interruptions. The variance of
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transitory earnings shocks on-the-job (V ar (εi)) is negligible compared to V ar (y
perm
i ) , but
p
γ2
is not. Moreover, as we saw in Tables 2.17 and 2.27, the variance of measurement error is
small in stable years, and much larger in years when career interruptions occur. If researchers
use either yai or y
s
i as right-hand side variables as proxies of y
perm
i it is crucial to account for
partial year earnings, by either dropping those values from the regression, or better: modeling
turnover appropriately.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the properties of measurement error in annual earnings with a particular
focus on how partial year earnings are reported in a household survey. I find strong evidence
that transitory earnings fluctuations are severely under-reported. Transitory earnings losses
due to career interruptions are very large, on average, and people systematically under-report
these shocks, too. Earnings losses due to recent job losses are reported better, perhaps
because these shocks are more salient. Earnings losses due to recently starting a new job are
reported less accurately, perhaps because people prefer reporting their annualized earnings
after starting new jobs. Overall, career interruptions have large and non-standard effects on
the quality of earnings reports in surveys. The implied error has a small positive mean, it
is right-skewed and it correlates with predictors of turnover. The implied biases are likely
to be relatively small in most cases, as career interruptions are rare. When researchers use
earnings growth in their models, or when they analyze questions that are strongly related to
turnover, more caution is warranted.
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Tables anmd figures
Figure 2.1: Histogram of measurement error in annual earnings
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Figure 2.2: Nonparametric relationship between measurement error and earnings
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Figure 2.3: Histogram of earnings growth after major job loss
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Figure 2.4: Histogram and time series plots of selected coefficients in the baseline
specification of the structural model
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The coefficients are from Model 2 of the baseline specification reported in Table 2.17.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Figure 2.5: Fraction of reported earnings loss after job loss or job finding
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of measurement error in simulated data based on the
model
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Error:σerrorstable = 0.15; σ
error
interrupt0.6; Reported earnings:τ
perm = 1; τ trans = 0; τ interruption = 0.7.
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Table 2.1: Type of wage and salary reports
All observations 50-60-year-old, employees
N Fraction of total N Fraction of total
Continuous value 58,075 32.8 29,858 62.3
Complete bracket 5,181 2.9 2,476 5.2
Half open interval 1,576 0.9 501 1.0
No income 105,919 59.8 12,801 26.7
Missing 6,244 3.5 2,309 4.8
Total 176,995 100.0 47,945 100.0
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011
Table 2.2: Components of annual earnings, HRS 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old em-
ployees
Fraction positive Mean* Fraction of total N
Wage and salary income 99.2 36489 93.1 33,090
Tips, bonuses, commissions 10.1 1146 2.9 33,090
Professional practice and trade 3.3 1259 3.2 33,090
2nd job or military reserves 4.3 314 0.8 33,090
Total 100 39209 100.0 33,090
Average earnings adjusted to 2000 dollars with the CPI.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
Table 2.3: Fraction of successful matches between the HRS and SSA
N Fraction matched
1. All observations 176,995 57.7
2. 50-60-year-old employees 47,945 61.2
3. (2) + non-missing HRS response 45,639 64.2
4. (3) + positive HRS response 33,090 66.2
5. (4) + 1992 wave 4673 88.2
6. (4) + 1994 wave 3681 64.1
7. (4) + 1996 wave 2959 65.4
8. (4) + 1998 wave 3403 73.1
9. (4) + 2000 wave 2590 70.6
10. (4) + 2002 wave 1854 71.2
11. (4) + 2004 wave 2703 73.1
12. (4) + 2006 wave 2314 60.2
13. (4) + 2008 wave 1916 60.1
14. (4) + 2010 wave 3798 48.7
15. (4) + 2012 wave 3199 46.4
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011
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Table 2.4: OLS of successful matches between the HRS and SSA
Matched
Female 0.008
[0.008]
Less than high school -0.014
[0.013]
Some college -0.018
[0.014]
BA -0.009
[0.017]
Postgraduate 0.015
[0.018]
Age - 50 -0.007**
[0.003]
Age - 50, sq 0.001***
[0.000]
Partnered 0.050***
[0.019]
Single -0.023**
[0.010]
Black -0.082***
[0.012]
Hispanic -0.077***
[0.016]
Salaried worker -0.006
[0.009]
log HRS earnings -0.003
[0.004]
1994 wave -0.244***
[0.008]
1996 wave -0.234***
[0.010]
1998 wave -0.156***
[0.009]
2000 wave -0.184***
[0.011]
2002 wave -0.179***
[0.012]
2004 wave -0.152***
[0.010]
2006 wave -0.282***
[0.012]
2008 wave -0.285***
[0.013]
2010 wave -0.386***
[0.010]
2012 wave -0.408***
[0.011]
Constant 0.950***
[0.043]
Observations 33,090
R-squared 0.078
Robust standard errors clustered on the household level in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.5: HRS earnings reports and W2 earnings records
HRS earnings reports
W2 earnings records Zero $1-$1,000 $1,001-$5,000 $5,001-$10,000 $10,001+ Missing Total
Zero 6,118 53 130 67 242 10 6620
$1-$1,000 367 91 52 11 21 <3 543
$1,001-$5,000 341 37 485 158 174 7 1202
$5,001-$10,000 261 15 157 797 593 16 1839
$10,001+ 921 45 118 317 18373 166 19940
Missing 6,344 103 556 640 9,855 303 17801
Total 14,352 344 1,498 1,990 29,258 503 47,945
Earnings are deflated to 2000 dollars with the CPI.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
Table 2.6: Reliability ratios and other moments of earnings and error
Log earnings Earnings growth
All observations Y > $1k Y > $5k Y > $10k All observations
Reliability ratio, classical 0.822*** 0.812*** 0.785*** 0.748*** 0.502***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.012] [0.016] [0.024]
Reliability ratio, correlated 0.982*** 0.920*** 0.834*** 0.777*** 0.682***
[0.015] [0.013] [0.015] [0.018] [0.044]
γm,ya -0.099*** -0.073*** -0.038*** -0.025*** -0.263***
[0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.021]
Raw moments
Mean earnings 10.167*** 10.202*** 10.296*** 10.411*** -0.003
[0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.004]
Mean error 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.012*** 0.004 -0.005
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Variance of earnings 0.849*** 0.701*** 0.502*** 0.369*** 0.255***
[0.018] [0.012] [0.008] [0.006] [0.014]
Variance of error 0.183*** 0.163*** 0.138*** 0.125*** 0.253***
[0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.022]
Covariance of earnings and error -0.084*** -0.051*** -0.019*** -0.009*** -0.067***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.006]
Observations 21,394 21,219 20,365 18,805 11,698
Earnings growth is the log difference of earnings in year t and t− 2.
Robust standard errors clustered on the household level in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.7: Detailed labor histories created from the SSA data
Matched sample Including off years
Detailed labor history N Fraction N Fraction
Single job, full year earnings 14,570 48.3 28,923 48.8
Multiple job, full year earnings 922 3.1 1850 3.1
Single job loss 1,183 3.9 2,521 4.3
Major job loss 187 0.6 363 0.6
Minor job loss 336 1.1 683 1.2
Single job finding 852 2.8 1734 2.9
Major job finding occurs 174 0.6 336 0.6
Minor job finding occurs 275 0.9 554 0.9
Minor job loss, minor job finding 577 1.9 1111 1.9
Major job loss, minor job finding 274 0.9 574 1.0
Minor job loss, major job finding 310 1.0 634 1.1
Major job loss, major job finding 1,711 5.7 3,513 5.9
Zero earnings 6,603 21.9 14,332 24.2
Last observed year 2,170 7.2 2,176 3.7
Total 30,144 100.0 59,304 100.0
The second sample includes the off years of the survey, when HRS reports are not available.
Major job loss: highest paid job at t or t− 1
Major job finding: highest paid job at t or t+ 1
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
Table 2.8: Detailed labor histories and distribution of earnings
W2 earnings records, row percentages
Detailed labor history Zero $1− $1k $1k − $5k $5k − $10k $10k+ Total
Single job, full year earnings 0 1.1 2.3 5.6 91.0 100.0
Multiple job, full year earnings 0 0.3 1.1 5.1 93.5 100.0
Single job loss 0 10.7 18.4 14.6 56.2 100.0
Major job loss 0 2.1 9.1 12.8 75.9 100.0
Minor job loss 0 0.3 3.9 5.7 90.2 100.0
Single job finding 0 9.2 21.4 16.4 53.1 100.0
Major job finding occurs 0 1.1 10.9 14.9 73.0 100.0
Minor job finding occurs 0 0.0 2.5 8.0 89.5 100.0
Minor job loss, minor job finding 0 0.3 3.6 8.7 87.3 100.0
Major job loss, minor job finding 0 2.2 13.5 16.1 68.2 100.0
Minor job loss, major job finding 0 1.0 16.1 19.4 63.5 100.0
Major job loss, major job finding 0 7.5 11.3 15.0 66.1 100.0
Zero earnings 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Last observed year 1 1.3 4.4 7.7 85.8 100.0
Total 22 1.8 4.0 6.1 66.1 100.0
Earnings are deflated to 2000 dollars with the CPI.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.9: Detailed labor histories and distribution of earnings
W2 earnings records, number of cases
Detailed labor history Zero $1− $1k $1k − $5k $5k − $10k $10k+ Total
Single job, full year earnings 0 160 339 810 13,261 14,570
Multiple job, full year earnings 0 3 10 47 862 922
Single job loss 0 127 218 173 665 1,183
Major job loss 0 4 17 24 142 187
Minor job loss 0 1 13 19 303 336
Single job finding 0 78 182 140 452 852
Major job finding occurs 0 2 19 26 127 174
Minor job finding occurs 0 0 7 22 246 275
Minor job loss, minor job finding 0 2 21 50 504 577
Major job loss, minor job finding 0 6 37 44 187 274
Minor job loss, major job finding 0 3 50 60 197 310
Major job loss, major job finding 0 129 194 256 1,131 1,710
Zero earnings 6,603 0 0 0 0 6,603
Last observed year 17 28 95 168 1,863 2,171
Total 6,620 543 1,202 1,839 19,940 30,144
Earnings are deflated to 2000 dollars with the CPI.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
Table 2.10: Detailed labor histories and distribution of earnings
HRS earnings reports, row percentages
Aggregate labor history Zero $1− $1k $1k − $5k $5k − $10k $10k+ Missing Total
Stable year 5.7 0.3 2.1 4.2 86.9 0.8 100.0
Major job loss 25.8 2.1 7.0 8.4 55.8 0.9 100.0
Major job finding 10.3 3.6 11.4 11.0 62.9 0.8 100.0
Major job loss and job finding 14.3 2.1 7.7 9.0 66.3 0.6 100.0
Zero earning 92.6 0.8 2.0 1.0 3.5 0.2 100.0
Total 28.2 0.8 3.1 4.3 63.0 0.6 100.0
HRS earnings reports, number of cases
Zero $1− $1k $1k − $5k $5k − $10k $10k+ Missing Total
Stable year 954 55 344 698 14,500 129 16,680
Major job loss 424 35 115 138 918 14 1,644
Major job finding 138 48 152 147 840 11 1,336
Major job loss and job finding 244 36 131 154 1,134 11 1,710
Zero earning 6,117 53 129 64 230 10 6,603
Total 7,877 227 871 1,201 17,622 175 27,973
Earnings are deflated to 2000 dollars with the CPI.
Stable years: Positive earnings and no evidence of major job loss or job finding.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.11: Measurement error by labor histories and earnings
Mean measurement error in earnings W2 earnings records
Aggregate labor history $1− $1k $1k − $5k $5k − $10k $10k+ Total
Stable year 0.554 0.239 0.073 0.004 0.013
Major job loss 0.849 0.383 0.113 -0.011 0.078
Major job finding 0.942 0.454 0.173 0.053 0.184
Major job loss and job finding 0.972 0.419 0.120 0.001 0.089
Total 0.867 0.354 0.099 0.005 0.033
Earnings are deflated to 2000 dollars with the CPI.
Stable years: Positive earnings and no evidence of major job loss or job finding.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
Table 2.12: Measurement error by earnings in stable years
W2 earnings records, mean measurement error
Sign of change in earnings since last year $1− $5k $5k − $10k $10k+ Total
Negative 0.365 0.128 0.034 0.053
Non-negative 0.153 0.037 -0.008 -0.003
Total 0.265 0.073 0.004 0.013
W2 earnings records, number of cases
Sign of change in earnings since last year $1− $5k $5k − $10k $10k+ Total
Negative 168 333 4,018 4,519
Non-negative 150 499 10,399 11,048
Total 318 832 14,417 15,567
Earnings are deflated to 2000 dollars with the CPI.
Stable years: Positive earnings and no evidence of major job loss or job finding in year t or t− 1.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
Table 2.13: GMM estimates of basic moments of earnings and error
All observations Stable years
Mean earnings 10.230*** 10.371***
[0.012] [0.013]
Mean error 0.031*** 0.012***
[0.004] [0.004]
Permanent earnings variance 0.609*** 0.479***
[0.015] [0.014]
transitory earnings variance 0.124*** 0.029***
[0.009] [0.004]
Permanent error variance 0.021*** 0.014***
[0.002] [0.002]
Transitory error variance 0.114*** 0.076***
[0.010] [0.010]
Fraction of permanent earnings reported 0.955*** 0.978***
[0.006] [0.006]
Fraction of transitory earnings reported 0.679*** 0.764***
[0.027] [0.051]
N 13,950 7,956
Stable years: Positive earnings and no evidence of major job loss or job finding in year t or t+ 1 or t+ 2.
Robust standard errors clustered on the household level in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.14: MCMC estimates in the baseline specification, covariates in earnings
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant 10.655*** 10.688*** 10.613*** 10.150*** 9.911*** 9.927***
[0.011] [0.027] [0.020] [0.012] [0.030] [0.020]
Black -0.277*** -0.280*** -0.020 -0.025
[0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028]
Hispanic -0.316*** -0.293*** -0.102** -0.076*
[0.033] [0.033] [0.041] [0.040]
Less than high school -0.286*** -0.286*** -0.240*** -0.259***
[0.033] [0.032] [0.037] [0.036]
Some college 0.105*** 0.111*** 0.214*** 0.218***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.029] [0.028]
BA 0.407*** 0.406*** 0.494*** 0.486***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.036] [0.036]
More than BA 0.490*** 0.489*** 0.769*** 0.754***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.035] [0.035]
Age - 50 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.013***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
(Age - 50) squared -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Single -0.015** -0.017** -0.004 -0.003
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Salaried worker 0.014*** 0.012** 0.020*** 0.020***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
GDP gap 0.400*** 0.150***
[0.057] [0.055]
Year-1980 -0.005*** 0.001
[0.001] [0.002]
Year dummies YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.15: MCMC estimates in the baseline specification, covariates in the
innovation term of permanent earnings
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Means
Major job finding -0.065*** -0.074*** -0.092*** -0.065*** -0.077*** -0.089***
[0.015] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013]
Major job loss and job finding 0.024** 0.007 0.015 0.073*** 0.059*** 0.070***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
Zero earnings -0.275*** -0.237*** -0.240*** -0.226*** -0.205*** -0.220***
[0.021] [0.030] [0.022] [0.019] [0.015] [0.015]
Latent job loss in stable years -0.212*** -0.214*** -0.207*** -0.185*** -0.171*** -0.191***
[0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016]
Standard deviation
Stable years 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.064***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Major job finding 0.478*** 0.433*** 0.456*** 0.457*** 0.458*** 0.418***
[0.013] [0.012] [0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011]
Major job loss and job finding 0.413*** 0.411*** 0.416*** 0.419*** 0.419*** 0.414***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011]
Zero earnings 0.785*** 0.810*** 0.797*** 0.662*** 0.631*** 0.669***
[0.035] [0.034] [0.038] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.834*** 0.840*** 0.823*** 0.756*** 0.719*** 0.747***
[0.022] [0.025] [0.026] [0.018] [0.019] [0.017]
Standard deviation, raw coefficients
Constant -2.763*** -2.762*** -2.773*** -2.679*** -2.727*** -2.746***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.020] [0.018] [0.019]
Major job finding 2.027*** 1.924*** 1.991*** 1.894*** 1.948*** 1.875***
[0.031] [0.032] [0.035] [0.031] [0.029] [0.032]
Major job loss and job finding 1.879*** 1.871*** 1.894*** 1.807*** 1.859*** 1.865***
[0.029] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.027] [0.029]
Zero earnings 2.525*** 2.555*** 2.552*** 2.270*** 2.270*** 2.349***
[0.039] [0.039] [0.044] [0.040] [0.037] [0.031]
Latent job loss in stable years 2.581*** 2.584*** 2.573*** 2.397*** 2.394*** 2.453***
[0.026] [0.025] [0.026] [0.023] [0.024] [0.025]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.16: MCMC estimates in the baseline specification, other parameters in
earnings
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Permanent std, age 50 0.608*** 0.520*** 0.520*** 0.652*** 0.582*** 0.576***
[0.009] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
Transitory std 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.030***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Probability of latent job loss in stable years 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.108*** 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.115***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
Avg transitory earnings loss by labor history
Major job loss 0.409*** 0.407*** 0.414*** 0.454*** 0.454*** 0.446***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Major job finding 0.372*** 0.377*** 0.375*** 0.428*** 0.426*** 0.429***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Major job loss and job finding 0.367*** 0.371*** 0.372*** 0.416*** 0.410*** 0.420***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.231*** 0.236*** 0.237*** 0.250*** 0.245*** 0.256***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Raw coefficients of transitory earnings loss, γj
Major job-loss 1.448*** 1.457*** 1.413*** 1.204*** 1.206*** 1.242***
[0.030] [0.031] [0.029] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024]
Major job finding 1.688*** 1.657*** 1.663*** 1.338*** 1.351*** 1.332***
[0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027]
Major job loss and job finding 1.726*** 1.698*** 1.691*** 1.403*** 1.442*** 1.382***
[0.034] [0.033] [0.033] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026]
Latent job loss in stable years 3.349*** 3.258*** 3.241*** 3.013*** 3.091*** 2.919***
[0.081] [0.077] [0.073] [0.064] [0.070] [0.067]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.17: MCMC estimates in the baseline specification, covariates in mea-
surement error
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant 0.007* -0.024* -0.017 -0.005 -0.038** -0.009
[0.004] [0.013] [0.012] [0.004] [0.016] [0.015]
Black 0.01 0.004 -0.007 -0.002
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
Hispanic -0.026** -0.022* -0.033** -0.041***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014]
Less than high school -0.016 -0.023** -0.031*** -0.026**
[0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012]
Some college 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.014 0.011
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009]
BA 0.030*** 0.028** -0.01 -0.012
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
More than BA 0.029** 0.023** 0.006 0.009
[0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.013]
Age - 50 0.006* 0.005 0.001 -0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
(Age - 50) squared -0.000** -0.000* 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Single 0.011 0.01 0.006 0
[0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
Salaried worker 0.007 0.008 0.036*** 0.038***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
GDP gap 0.093 0.07
[0.097] [0.121]
Year-1980 0 0.001**
[0.001] [0.001]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.18: MCMC estimates in the baseline specification, other parameters in
measurement error
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Std permanent error 0.156*** 0.160*** 0.154*** 0.137*** 0.147*** 0.133***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Std transitory error
Stable years 0.103*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.164*** 0.144*** 0.172***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.008] [0.010] [0.006]
Major job loss 0.549*** 0.563*** 0.537*** 0.633*** 0.649*** 0.630***
[0.015] [0.018] [0.016] [0.022] [0.021] [0.020]
Major job finding 0.499*** 0.499*** 0.489*** 0.579*** 0.563*** 0.564***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.021] [0.016] [0.015]
Major job loss and job finding 0.611*** 0.609*** 0.573*** 0.657*** 0.649*** 0.645***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.016] [0.022] [0.021] [0.019]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.658*** 0.654*** 0.654*** 0.681*** 0.682*** 0.686***
[0.026] [0.023] [0.025] [0.027] [0.033] [0.035]
Fraction of earnings component reported in the survey
Permanent earnings 0.971*** 0.954*** 0.949*** 0.966*** 0.949*** 0.932***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Transitory on-the-job 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transitory due to job-loss 0.867*** 0.840*** 0.866*** 0.753*** 0.771*** 0.792***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012]
Transitory due to job finding 0.634*** 0.619*** 0.564*** 0.724*** 0.687*** 0.689***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010]
Transitory due to job loss and job finding 0.527*** 0.540*** 0.609*** 0.667*** 0.652*** 0.711***
[0.012] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
Transitory due to latent job loss in stable years 0.867*** 0.495*** 0.869*** 0.810*** 0.733*** 1.086***
[0.022] [0.027] [0.023] [0.023] [0.025] [0.022]
The fraction of transitory reports are calibrated to zero in the baseline specification.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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APPENDIX E
Derivation of the conditional mean of the error in
Section 2.2.1
The earnings model can be summarized by the following equations:
yai = y
perm
i + εi − Iik, (2.67)
εi ∼ N (0, Vε) , (2.68)
ypermi ∼ N (µ, Vp) , (2.69)
E (Ii) = p, (2.70)
mi = (τ − 1) (εi − Iik) + ξi, (2.71)
σy ≡
√
Vε + Vp (2.72)
The last equation (2.72) is just a definition to simplify notation. The conditional mean
of the error is
E (mi|yai ) = E (mi|yai , Ii = 0) Pr (Ii = 0|yai ) + E (mi|yai , Ii = 1) Pr (Ii = 1|yai ) . (2.73)
I shall derive each of the four terms on the right hand side of (2.73). The conditional
distribution of earnings given Ii is
f (yi|Ii = 1) = 1
σy
φ
(
yai + k − µ
σy
)
, (2.74)
f (yi|Ii = 0) = 1
σy
φ
(
yai − µ
σy
)
, (2.75)
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where φ(·) denotes the standard normal p.d.f. The unconditional distribution of earnings is
f (yi) =
1− p
σy
φ
(
yai − µ
σy
)
+
p
σy
φ
(
yai + k − µ
σy
)
. (2.76)
Now I use the Bayes Theorem to derive the distribution of Ii given yai .
Pr (Ii = 0|yai ) =
f (yait|Ii = 0) Pr (Ii = 0)
f (yait)
=
1−p
σy
φ
(
yai −µ
σy
)
1−p
σy
φ
(
yai −µ
σy
)
+ pσy φ
(
yai +k−µ
σy
) (2.77)
=
(1− p)φ
(
yai −µ
σy
)
(1− p)φ
(
yai −µ
σy
)
+ pφ
(
yai +k−µ
σy
) , (2.78)
=
(1− p) exp
(
− (yai −µ)22σ2y
)
(1− p) exp
(
− (y
a
i −µ)
2
2σ2y
)
+ p exp
(
− (y
a
i +k−µ)
2
2σ2y
) (2.79)
=
(1− p) exp
(
− (yai −µ)22σ2y
)
(1− p) exp
(
− (y
a
i −µ)
2
2σ2y
)
+ p exp
(
− (y
a
i −µ)
2
2σ2y
)
exp
(
−k(2(y
a
i −µ)+k)
2σ2y
) (2.80)
=
(1− p)
(1− p) + p exp
(
k
σ2y
(
µ− yai − k2
)) (2.81)
Pr (Ii = 1|yi) =
p exp
(
k
σ2y
(
µ− yai − k2
))
(1− p) + p exp
(
k
σ2y
(
µ− yai − k2
)) . (2.82)
The expected value of the error conditional on yai and Ii is
E (mi|yai , Ii = 0) = E ((τ − 1) εi|ypermi + εi) = − (1− τ)
Vε
Vε + Vp
(yai − µ) , (2.83)
E (mi|yai , Ii = 1) = E ((τ − 1) (εi − k) |ypermi + εi + k) = (1− τ)
(
− Vε
Vε + Vp
(yai − µ+ k) + k
)
(2.84)
= (1− τ)
(
− Vε
Vε + Vp
(yai − µ) +
Vp
Vε + Vp
k
)
. (2.85)
(2.83)-(2.85) are standard applications of the formulas for the multivariate normal distri-
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bution. Now we have all the pieces of (2.73).
E (mi|yai ) = (1− τ)
− Vε
Vε + Vp
(yai − µ) + k
Vp
Vε + Vp
p exp
(
k
Vε+Vp
(
µ− yai − k2
))
(1− p) + p exp
(
k
Vε+Vp
(
µ− yai − k2
))
 .(2.86)
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APPENDIX F
Measurement error in the Selective Memory Model
Let us assume that log earnings is the sum of a permanent and a transitory component, each
distributed normally.
yai = y
perm
i + εi, (2.87) ypermi
εi
 ∼ N

 µ
0
 ,
 Vp 0
0 Vε

 . (2.88)
Persons report their permanent earnings accurately, but they report only a fraction of their
transitory earnings, depending on the sign of shock.
ysi =

ypermi + τpεi + ξi if εi > 0
ypermi + τnεi + ξi if εi ≤ 0
, (2.89)
τp > τn (2.90)
where ξi is a classical error component. The total measurement error is
mi =

− (1− τp) εi + ξi if εi > 0
− (1− τn) εi + ξi if εi ≤ 0
(2.91)
The following theorems summarize the properties of the measurement error: It has a positive
mean, a negative correlation with true earnings (yai ) and it is convex, implying that the error
is larger at low earnings values.
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Theorem 1. Under the assumptions of the model average measurement error equals to
E (mi) =
τp − τn
4
√
Vεφ (0) ≈ 0.1
√
Vε (τp − τn) > 0. (2.92)
Proof.
E (mi) = E ((τp − 1) εi + ξi|εi > 0) Pr (εi > 0) + E ((τn − 1) εi + ξi|εi ≤ 0) Pr (εi ≤ 0) (2.93)
= (τp − 1)E (εi|εi > 0) Pr (εi > 0) + (τn − 1)E (εi|εi ≤ 0) Pr (εi ≤ 0) (2.94)
=
τp − 1
2
E (εi|εi > 0) + τn − 1
2
E (εi|εi ≤ 0) (2.95)
=
τp − 1
2
√
Vε
φ (0)
1− Φ (0) +
τn − 1
2
√
Vε
−φ (0)
Φ (0)
(2.96)
=
τp − τn
4
√
Vεφ (0) ≈ 0.1
√
Vε (τp − τn) (2.97)
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions of the model the conditional expectation of measurement
error is
E (mi|yai ) = (τn − 1)
Vε
Vε + Vp
(yai − µ) + (τp − τn) [A+B (yai − µ)] (2.98)
where
A =
√
VεVp
Vε + Vp
φ
(√
Vε
Vp (Vε + Vp)
(yai − µ)
)
(2.99)
B =
Vε
Vε + Vp
Φ
(√
Vε
Vp (Vε + Vp)
(yai − µ)
)
(2.100)
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Proof.
E (mi|yai ) = E ((τp − 1) εi + ξi|εi > 0, yai ) Pr (εi > 0|yai )
+E ((τn − 1) εi + ξi|εi ≤ 0, ya) Pr (εi ≤ 0|ya) (2.101)
= (τp − 1)E (εi|εi > 0, yai ) Pr (εi > 0|yai )
+ (τn − 1)E (εi|εi ≤ 0, yai ) Pr (εi ≤ 0|yai ) (2.102)
I compute the different terms of (2.102) separately. Using the formulas for the multivariate
normal distribution and the truncated normal distribution,
E (εi|εi > 0, yai ) =
 Vε
Vε + Vp
(yai − µ) +
A
Φ
(√
Vε
Vp(Vε+Vp)
(yai − µ)
)
 , (2.103)
A ≡
√
VεVp
Vε + Vp
φ
(√
Vε
Vp (Vε + Vp)
(yai − µ)
)
, (2.104)
E (εi|εi ≤ 0, yai ) =
 Vε
Vε + Vp
(yai − µ)−
A
Φ
(
−
√
Vε
Vp(Vε+Vp)
(yai − µ)
)
 , (2.105)
Pr (εi > 0|yai ) = Φ
(√
Vε
Vp (Vε + Vp)
(yai − µ)
)
, (2.106)
Pr (εi ≤ 0|yai ) = Φ
(
−
√
Vε
Vp (Vε + Vp)
(yai − µ)
)
. (2.107)
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By plugging (2.103)-(2.107) into (2.102),
E (mi|yai ) = (τp − 1)
(
Vε
Vε + Vp
(yai − µ) Φ
(√
Vε
Vp (Vε + Vp)
(yai − µ)
)
+A
)
(2.108)
+ (τn − 1)
(
Vε
Vε + Vp
(yai − µ)
(
1− Φ
(√
Vε
Vp (Vε + Vp)
(yai − µ)
))
−A
)
(2.109)
= (τn − 1) Vε
Vε + Vp
(yai − µ) + (τp − τn) [A+B (yai − µ)] (2.110)
B ≡ Vε
Vε + Vp
Φ
(√
Vε
Vp (Vε + Vp)
(yai − µ)
)
(2.111)
Theorem 3. Under the assumptions of the model, the derivative of the conditional expecta-
tion is
∂
∂ya
E (mi|yai ) = (τn − 1)
Vε
Vε + Vp
+ (τp − τn) Vε
Vε + Vp
Φ
(√
Vε
Vp (Vε + Vp)
(yai − µ)
)
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Proof. Let C denote C ≡ VεVε+Vp .
∂
∂yai
E (mi|yai ) = (τn − 1)C
+ (τp − τn)
√
CVpφ
′
(√
C
Vp
(yai − µ)
)√
C
Vp
+ (τp − τn)
[
CΦ
(√
C
Vp
(yai − µ)
)]
+ (τp − τn)
[
C (yai − µ)φ
(√
C
Vp
(yai − µ)
)√
C
Vp
]
= (τn − 1)C
+ (τp − τn)C
[
φ′
(√
C
Vp
(yai − µ)
)
+ Φ
(√
C
Vp
(yai − µ)
)]
+ (τp − τn)
[
C (yai − µ)φ
(√
C
Vp
(yai − µ)
)√
C
Vp
]
= (τn − 1)C
+ (τp − τn)C
[(
−
√
C
Vp
(yai − µ)
)
φ
(√
C
Vp
(yai − µ)
)
+ Φ
(√
C
Vp
(yai − µ)
)]
+ (τp − τn)
[
C (yai − µ)φ
(√
C
Vp
(yai − µ)
)√
C
Vp
]
= (τn − 1)C + (τp − τn)CΦ
(√
C
Vp
(yai − µ)
)
If τp > τn, the derivative reaches its maximum as yai →∞ and its value is
max
∂
∂yai
E (mi|yai ) = (τp − 1)C < 0
Thus the function is always downward sloping and the slope is closest to zero at the high
end of the earnings distribution.
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Theorem 4. Under the assumptions of the model, the second derivative of the conditional
expectations is
∂2
∂ (yai )
2E (mi|yai ) = (τp − τn)
C3/2√
Vp
φ
(√
C
Vp
(yai − µ)
)
> 0
Proof. It is straightforward after theorem (3)
Therefore the function is negative sloped and convex. We can also see that the function
becomes linear only if τp = τn, that is, the rate of forgetting does not depend on the sign of
the transitory income shock.
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APPENDIX G
Additional tables
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Table 2.19: Reliability ratios and other moments of earnings and error
Log earnings Males Females HS dropouts HS Some college College
Reliability ratio, classical 0.792*** 0.819*** 0.747*** 0.811*** 0.812*** 0.823***
[0.014] [0.010] [0.021] [0.015] [0.017] [0.017]
Reliability ratio, correlated 0.983*** 0.987*** 0.981*** 0.982*** 1.019*** 0.995***
[0.030] [0.018] [0.043] [0.027] [0.035] [0.030]
γm,ya -0.122*** -0.104*** -0.160*** -0.108*** -0.125*** -0.105***
[0.013] [0.009] [0.023] [0.011] [0.015] [0.014]
Raw moments
Mean earnings 10.485*** 9.934*** 9.703*** 9.997*** 10.198*** 10.647***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.021] [0.015] [0.019] [0.018]
Mean error 0.041*** 0.027*** -0.001 0.022*** 0.052*** 0.049***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.010] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006]
Variance of earnings 0.675*** 0.848*** 0.767*** 0.716*** 0.757*** 0.761***
[0.024] [0.023] [0.042] [0.026] [0.036] [0.036]
Variance of error 0.177*** 0.188*** 0.260*** 0.167*** 0.175*** 0.164***
[0.016] [0.012] [0.029] [0.016] [0.019] [0.019]
Covariance of earnings and error -0.083*** -0.088*** -0.122*** -0.077*** -0.095*** -0.080***
[0.010] [0.008] [0.021] [0.009] [0.013] [0.011]
Observations 9,053 12,341 3,336 7,384 5,151 5,523
Robust standard errors clustered on the household level in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
Table 2.20: Reliability ratios and other moments of earnings and error
Earnings growth Males Females HS dropouts HS Some college College
Reliability ratio, classical 0.489*** 0.508*** 0.509*** 0.504*** 0.526*** 0.469***
[0.032] [0.031] [0.048] [0.043] [0.030] [0.055]
Reliability ratio, correlated 0.691*** 0.677*** 0.706*** 0.672*** 0.830*** 0.571***
[0.067] [0.055] [0.095] [0.076] [0.080] [0.080]
γm,ya -0.298*** -0.245*** -0.273*** -0.248*** -0.348*** -0.191***
[0.044] [0.023] [0.061] [0.031] [0.039] [0.045]
Raw moments
Mean earnings growth -0.013** 0.004 0.022* -0.001 0.003 -0.023***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.013] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
Mean error growth -0.001 -0.008* -0.008 -0.010* -0.001 0
[0.006] [0.004] [0.012] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Variance of earnings growth 0.224*** 0.274*** 0.348*** 0.254*** 0.245*** 0.216***
[0.020] [0.018] [0.050] [0.023] [0.024] [0.023]
Variance of error growth 0.234*** 0.265*** 0.336*** 0.250*** 0.221*** 0.245***
[0.027] [0.030] [0.054] [0.039] [0.024] [0.050]
Covariance of earnings and error growth -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.095*** -0.063*** -0.085*** -0.041***
[0.011] [0.008] [0.024] [0.009] [0.014] [0.010]
Observations 4,564 7,134 1,592 4,112 2,873 3,121
Robust standard errors clustered on the household level in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.21: GMM estimates of basic moments of earnings and error by age
Means Earnings variance Error variance Fraction reported N
Age Earnings Error Permanent Transitory Permanent Transitory Permanent Transitory
50-51 10.225*** 0.022** 0.581*** 0.083*** 0.016** 0.089*** 0.961*** 0.592*** 1,485
[0.022] [0.009] [0.028] [0.018] [0.006] [0.018] [0.013] [0.097]
52-53 10.238*** 0.045*** 0.612*** 0.160*** 0.021*** 0.093*** 0.965*** 0.695*** 2,339
[0.019] [0.007] [0.025] [0.026] [0.004] [0.011] [0.010] [0.059]
54-55 10.266*** 0.036*** 0.584*** 0.129*** 0.022*** 0.123*** 0.941*** 0.605*** 2,865
[0.016] [0.007] [0.023] [0.021] [0.005] [0.029] [0.013] [0.061]
56-57 10.247*** 0.032*** 0.607*** 0.103*** 0.026*** 0.116*** 0.951*** 0.677*** 3,091
[0.016] [0.007] [0.024] [0.017] [0.005] [0.020] [0.012] [0.064]
58-59 10.187*** 0.026*** 0.614*** 0.154*** 0.01 0.107*** 0.963*** 0.734*** 2,881
[0.017] [0.006] [0.026] [0.016] [0.006] [0.011] [0.012] [0.051]
60-61 10.172*** 0.024*** 0.665*** 0.093*** 0.020*** 0.154*** 0.952*** 0.756*** 2,440
[0.018] [0.008] [0.028] [0.022] [0.007] [0.038] [0.013] [0.094]
62-63 10.013*** 0.059*** 0.784*** 0.178*** 0.022** 0.122*** 0.951*** 0.729*** 1,637
[0.024] [0.009] [0.042] [0.026] [0.009] [0.014] [0.015] [0.074]
64-65 9.765*** 0.073*** 0.915*** 0.252*** 0.044*** 0.197*** 0.906*** 0.787*** 1,081
[0.033] [0.015] [0.051] [0.037] [0.012] [0.052] [0.018] [0.060]
66-67 9.560*** 0.087*** 0.955*** 0.310*** 0.027** 0.194*** 0.950*** 0.727*** 723
[0.042] [0.017] [0.067] [0.054] [0.011] [0.028] [0.021] [0.085]
68-69 9.367*** 0.088*** 0.801*** 0.307*** 0.066* 0.156*** 0.927*** 0.805*** 528
[0.046] [0.020] [0.075] [0.081] [0.037] [0.054] [0.044] [0.115]
Robust standard errors clustered on the household level in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-70-year-old employees
Table 2.22: GMM estimates of basic moments of earnings and error by gender and
education
Means Earnings variance Error variance Fraction reported N
Age Earnings Error Permanent Transitory Permanent Transitory Permanent Transitory
All 10.230*** 0.031*** 0.609*** 0.124*** 0.021*** 0.114*** 0.955*** 0.679*** 13,950
[0.012] [0.004] [0.015] [0.009] [0.002] [0.010] [0.006] [0.027]
Males 10.563*** 0.043*** 0.476*** 0.107*** 0.027*** 0.091*** 0.926*** 0.627*** 5,780
[0.016] [0.005] [0.021] [0.013] [0.004] [0.011] [0.012] [0.051]
Females 9.994*** 0.023*** 0.573*** 0.134*** 0.017*** 0.128*** 0.954*** 0.688*** 8,170
[0.015] [0.005] [0.019] [0.011] [0.003] [0.015] [0.008] [0.032]
HS dropouts 9.774*** -0.003 0.483*** 0.186*** 0.026*** 0.133*** 0.931*** 0.743*** 1,991
[0.027] [0.010] [0.030] [0.031] [0.008] [0.017] [0.020] [0.068]
HS 10.044*** 0.020*** 0.484*** 0.137*** 0.011*** 0.112*** 0.961*** 0.717*** 4,886
[0.018] [0.006] [0.020] [0.014] [0.004] [0.018] [0.008] [0.037]
Some college 10.256*** 0.053*** 0.509*** 0.127*** 0.023*** 0.125*** 0.924*** 0.628*** 3,343
[0.022] [0.008] [0.029] [0.016] [0.005] [0.019] [0.015] [0.046]
BA or more 10.695*** 0.044*** 0.525*** 0.083*** 0.035*** 0.101*** 0.910*** 0.443*** 3,718
[0.021] [0.007] [0.037] [0.013] [0.011] [0.021] [0.016] [0.091]
Robust standard errors clustered on the household level in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.23: GMM estimates of basic moments of earnings and error by gender and
education in stable years
Means Earnings variance Error variance Fraction reported N
Age Earnings Error Permanent Transitory Permanent Transitory Permanent Transitory
All 10.371*** 0.012*** 0.479*** 0.029*** 0.014*** 0.076*** 0.978*** 0.764*** 7,956
[0.013] [0.004] [0.014] [0.004] [0.002] [0.010] [0.006] [0.051]
Males 10.680*** 0.022*** 0.374*** 0.025*** 0.012* 0.056*** 0.973*** 0.636*** 3,346
[0.017] [0.005] [0.020] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.014] [0.119]
Females 10.145*** 0.006 0.440*** 0.032*** 0.012*** 0.089*** 0.973*** 0.774*** 4,610
[0.016] [0.005] [0.017] [0.005] [0.004] [0.017] [0.009] [0.054]
HS dropouts 9.943*** -0.017* 0.347*** 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.084*** 0.955*** 0.754*** 1,054
[0.029] [0.010] [0.024] [0.011] [0.008] [0.016] [0.016] [0.178]
HS 10.173*** -0.001 0.385*** 0.026*** 0.014*** 0.091*** 0.969*** 0.741*** 2,715
[0.019] [0.007] [0.017] [0.004] [0.005] [0.021] [0.010] [0.085]
Some college 10.393*** 0.027*** 0.385*** 0.042*** 0.009* 0.057*** 0.972*** 0.788*** 1,877
[0.023] [0.007] [0.028] [0.010] [0.005] [0.012] [0.013] [0.062]
BA or more 10.788*** 0.029*** 0.409*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.077*** 0.928*** 0.469*** 2,302
[0.021] [0.007] [0.034] [0.008] [0.009] [0.024] [0.022] [0.147]
Stable years: Positive earnings and no evidence of major job loss or job finding in year t or t+ 1 or t+ 2.
Robust standard errors clustered on the household level in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
Table 2.24: MCMC estimates by education, covariates in earnings
Less than HS HS Some college BA or more
Constant 10.410*** 10.748*** 10.883*** 11.013***
[0.051] [0.040] [0.051] [0.048]
Black -0.250*** -0.300*** -0.205*** -0.433***
[0.060] [0.045] [0.060] [0.072]
Hispanic -0.273*** -0.344*** -0.285*** -0.342***
[0.056] [0.062] [0.070] [0.089]
Age - 50 0.013** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.007*
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
(Age - 50) squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Single -0.005 -0.026* -0.016 -0.017
[0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.013]
Salaried worker 0.007 0.006 0.014 0.024***
[0.014] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009]
GDP gap 0.643*** 0.556*** 0.394*** 0.183**
[0.161] [0.111] [0.131] [0.083]
Year-1980 -0.007** -0.007*** -0.011*** 0.002
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old male employees
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Table 2.25: MCMC estimates by education, covariates in the innovation term of
permanent earnings
Less than HS HS Some college BA or more
Means
Major job finding -0.072*** -0.101*** -0.086*** -0.064**
[0.019] [0.031] [0.028] [0.029]
Major job loss and job finding 0.005 0.009 0.018 0
[0.018] [0.021] [0.018] [0.024]
Zero earnings -0.235*** -0.243*** -0.264*** -0.266***
[0.036] [0.049] [0.052] [0.043]
Latent job loss in stable years -0.209*** -0.207*** -0.217*** -0.186***
[0.055] [0.036] [0.040] [0.029]
Standard deviation
Stable years 0.062*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.054***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002]
Major job finding 0.211*** 0.575*** 0.430*** 0.507***
[0.020] [0.025] [0.022] [0.027]
Major job loss and job finding 0.298*** 0.457*** 0.336*** 0.481***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.016] [0.020]
Zero earnings 0.725*** 0.892*** 0.829*** 0.750***
[0.052] [0.057] [0.067] [0.061]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.879*** 0.843*** 0.809*** 0.779***
[0.045] [0.036] [0.037] [0.033]
Standard deviation, raw coefficients
Constant -2.782*** -2.713*** -2.702*** -2.930***
[0.057] [0.036] [0.046] [0.038]
Major job finding 1.218*** 2.160*** 1.857*** 2.250***
[0.106] [0.052] [0.071] [0.067]
Major job loss and job finding 1.566*** 1.926*** 1.610*** 2.197***
[0.084] [0.054] [0.063] [0.053]
Zero earnings 2.461*** 2.601*** 2.521*** 2.647***
[0.093] [0.066] [0.085] [0.088]
Latent job loss in stable years 2.652*** 2.539*** 2.486*** 2.672***
[0.072] [0.050] [0.055] [0.046]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old male employees
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Table 2.26: MCMC estimates by education, other parameters in earnings
Less than HS HS Some college BA or more
Permanent std, age 50 0.508*** 0.463*** 0.523*** 0.582***
[0.017] [0.012] [0.015] [0.015]
Transitory std 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.029***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Probability of latent job loss in stable years 0.087*** 0.102*** 0.115*** 0.120***
[0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006]
Avg transitory earnings loss by labor history
Major job loss 0.408*** 0.413*** 0.436*** 0.384***
[0.011] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009]
Major job finding 0.395*** 0.369*** 0.370*** 0.371***
[0.012] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010]
Major job loss and job finding 0.422*** 0.383*** 0.362*** 0.309***
[0.011] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.236*** 0.214*** 0.263*** 0.261***
[0.012] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010]
Raw coefficients of transitory earnings loss, γj
Major job-loss 1.460*** 1.422*** 1.296*** 1.609***
[0.067] [0.052] [0.057] [0.063]
Major job finding 1.533*** 1.714*** 1.705*** 1.702***
[0.075] [0.069] [0.080] [0.071]
Major job loss and job finding 1.376*** 1.607*** 1.764*** 2.242***
[0.057] [0.057] [0.073] [0.087]
Latent job loss in stable years 3.239*** 3.698*** 2.823*** 2.855***
[0.199] [0.164] [0.130] [0.110]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old male employees
Table 2.27: MCMC estimates by education, covariates in measurement error
Less than HS HS Some college BA or more
Constant -0.065 -0.015 0.006 0.012
[0.041] [0.020] [0.026] [0.030]
Black -0.057*** -0.011 0.035 0.077***
[0.021] [0.017] [0.023] [0.027]
Hispanic -0.066*** -0.049** 0.017 0.102***
[0.019] [0.023] [0.026] [0.039]
Age - 50 0.022** -0.003 0.003 0.013*
[0.011] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007]
(Age - 50) squared -0.002** 0 0 -0.001**
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Single 0.014 0.002 0.028* -0.001
[0.021] [0.013] [0.016] [0.019]
Salaried worker 0.01 0.009 0.025** -0.002
[0.020] [0.010] [0.011] [0.014]
GDP gap -0.043 0.221 0.357* -0.196
[0.325] [0.169] [0.188] [0.207]
Year-1980 0 0.001* -0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old male employees
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Table 2.28: MCMC estimates in the baseline specification, other parameters in
measurement error
Less than HS HS Some college BA or more
Std permanent error 0.112*** 0.129*** 0.149*** 0.167***
[0.012] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]
Std transitory error
Stable years 0.150*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.128***
[0.009] [0.005] [0.005] [0.010]
Major job loss 0.585*** 0.566*** 0.532*** 0.497***
[0.037] [0.022] [0.030] [0.023]
Major job finding 0.634*** 0.507*** 0.430*** 0.366***
[0.043] [0.027] [0.023] [0.017]
Major job loss and job finding 0.650*** 0.558*** 0.587*** 0.573***
[0.035] [0.023] [0.030] [0.026]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.753*** 0.681*** 0.564*** 0.629***
[0.044] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026]
Fraction of earnings component reported in the survey
Permanent earnings 1.008*** 0.952*** 0.934*** 0.913***
[0.014] [0.009] [0.011] [0.010]
Transitory on-the-job* 0 0 0 0
Transitory due to job-loss 0.667*** 0.844*** 0.857*** 0.942***
[0.028] [0.017] [0.022] [0.022]
Transitory due to job finding 0.283*** 0.793*** 0.502*** 0.629***
[0.034] [0.017] [0.017] [0.024]
Transitory due to job loss and job finding 0.417*** 0.596*** 0.459*** 0.887***
[0.019] [0.018] [0.022] [0.025]
Transitory due to latent job loss in stable years 1.058*** 0.760*** 0.715*** 1.099***
[0.124] [0.060] [0.050] [0.116]
*The fraction of transitory reports are calibrated to zero in the baseline specification.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old male employees
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Table 2.29: MCMC estimates by education, covariates in earnings
Less than HS HS Some college BA or more
Constant 9.697*** 9.938*** 10.155*** 10.449***
[0.063] [0.048] [0.054] [0.050]
Black 0.028 -0.084* 0.056 -0.065
[0.065] [0.050] [0.054] [0.057]
Hispanic -0.072 -0.093 -0.081 -0.099
[0.066] [0.087] [0.087] [0.101]
Age - 50 0.015** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
(Age - 50) squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Single 0.023 0.003 -0.026** 0.004
[0.020] [0.012] [0.013] [0.011]
Salaried worker -0.003 0.008 0.015** 0.042***
[0.017] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008]
GDP gap 0.276 0.172* 0.232** 0.000
[0.237] [0.102] [0.096] [0.092]
Year-1980 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.007**
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old female employees
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Table 2.30: MCMC estimates by education, covariates in the innovation term of
permanent earnings
Less than HS HS Some college BA or more
Means
Major job finding -0.128*** -0.053** -0.092*** -0.108***
[0.027] [0.021] [0.030] [0.029]
Major job loss and job finding 0.105*** 0.065*** 0.056*** 0.090***
[0.019] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020]
Zero earnings -0.184*** -0.215*** -0.249*** -0.200***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.045] [0.037]
Latent job loss in stable years -0.113** -0.178*** -0.138*** -0.302***
[0.047] [0.030] [0.028] [0.043]
Standard deviation
Stable years 0.078*** 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.063***
[0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Major job finding 0.286*** 0.404*** 0.508*** 0.473***
[0.024] [0.018] [0.026] [0.023]
Major job loss and job finding 0.251*** 0.500*** 0.438*** 0.352***
[0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017]
Zero earnings 0.609*** 0.624*** 0.691*** 0.640***
[0.047] [0.039] [0.048] [0.063]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.744*** 0.771*** 0.630*** 0.853***
[0.044] [0.028] [0.027] [0.033]
Standard deviation, raw coefficients
Constant -2.545*** -2.682*** -2.800*** -2.766***
[0.065] [0.032] [0.035] [0.028]
Major job finding 1.294*** 1.780*** 2.126*** 2.018***
[0.107] [0.052] [0.060] [0.055]
Major job loss and job finding 1.157*** 1.988*** 1.974*** 1.722***
[0.095] [0.046] [0.052] [0.056]
Zero earnings 2.052*** 2.216*** 2.429*** 2.320***
[0.091] [0.069] [0.071] [0.104]
Latent job loss in stable years 2.251*** 2.419*** 2.336*** 2.606***
[0.078] [0.042] [0.050] [0.042]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old female employees
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Table 2.31: MCMC estimates by education, other parameters in earnings
Less than HS HS Some college BA or more
Permanent std, age 50 0.538*** 0.619*** 0.599*** 0.569***
[0.021] [0.015] [0.017] [0.015]
Transitory std 0.055*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.018***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Probability of latent job loss in stable years 0.106*** 0.120*** 0.129*** 0.097***
[0.009] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005]
Avg transitory earnings loss by labor history
Major job loss 0.474*** 0.452*** 0.429*** 0.404***
[0.012] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010]
Major job finding 0.407*** 0.423*** 0.416*** 0.422***
[0.012] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011]
Major job loss and job finding 0.450*** 0.407*** 0.412*** 0.373***
[0.011] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.233*** 0.254*** 0.220*** 0.287***
[0.015] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010]
Raw coefficients of transitory earnings loss, γj
Major job-loss 1.113*** 1.213*** 1.335*** 1.474***
[0.051] [0.039] [0.052] [0.064]
Major job finding 1.461*** 1.371*** 1.407*** 1.375***
[0.073] [0.046] [0.059] [0.059]
Major job loss and job finding 1.224*** 1.461*** 1.428*** 1.681***
[0.055] [0.046] [0.052] [0.071]
Latent job loss in stable years 3.338*** 2.963*** 3.571*** 2.495***
[0.252] [0.125] [0.143] [0.111]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old female employees
Table 2.32: MCMC estimates by education, covariates in measurement error
Less than HS HS Some college BA or more
Constant 0.028 -0.005 -0.053** -0.061
[0.051] [0.024] [0.024] [0.038]
Black -0.063** 0.003 -0.023 0.02
[0.025] [0.014] [0.018] [0.028]
Hispanic -0.057** -0.038* 0.005 -0.024
[0.025] [0.022] [0.027] [0.048]
Age - 50 -0.012 -0.002 0.002 -0.001
[0.014] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010]
(Age - 50) squared 0.001 0 0 0
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Single -0.011 -0.026** 0.025* 0.022
[0.022] [0.011] [0.013] [0.018]
Salaried worker 0.105*** 0.022** 0.035*** 0.063***
[0.031] [0.010] [0.011] [0.017]
GDP gap 0.417 0.312 -0.086 0.096
[0.483] [0.193] [0.180] [0.283]
Year-1980 0 0.001 0.002* 0.002
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old female employees
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Table 2.33: MCMC estimates in the baseline specification, other parameters in
measurement errors
Less than HS HS Some college BA or more
Std permanent error 0.128*** 0.089*** 0.148*** 0.193***
[0.018] [0.007] [0.013] [0.010]
Std transitory error
Stable years 0.206*** 0.150*** 0.109*** 0.197***
[0.013] [0.011] [0.006] [0.009]
Major job loss 0.617*** 0.596*** 0.598*** 0.613***
[0.035] [0.023] [0.028] [0.029]
Major job finding 0.642*** 0.581*** 0.597*** 0.479***
[0.038] [0.025] [0.035] [0.026]
Major job loss and job finding 0.772*** 0.669*** 0.668*** 0.407***
[0.043] [0.030] [0.034] [0.018]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.832*** 0.657*** 0.619*** 0.657***
[0.069] [0.033] [0.025] [0.046]
Fraction of earnings component reported in the survey
Permanent earnings 0.975*** 0.963*** 0.917*** 0.928***
[0.017] [0.007] [0.009] [0.013]
Transitory on-the-job* 0 0 0 0
Transitory due to job-loss 0.440*** 0.782*** 0.870*** 0.738***
[0.042] [0.014] [0.017] [0.032]
Transitory due to job finding 0.539*** 0.659*** 0.677*** 0.867***
[0.026] [0.015] [0.017] [0.024]
Transitory due to job loss and job finding 0.450*** 0.582*** 0.796*** 0.878***
[0.028] [0.016] [0.014] [0.024]
Transitory due to latent job loss in stable years 0.625*** 0.971*** 0.471*** 0.927***
[0.106] [0.026] [0.048] [0.074]
*The fraction of transitory reports are calibrated to zero in the baseline specification.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old female employees
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Table 2.34: MCMC estimates with alternative modeling assumptions, covariates
in earnings
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
MA(1) MA(2) No latent MA(1) MA(2) No latent
Constant 10.688*** 10.679*** 10.606*** 9.927*** 9.894*** 9.729***
[0.028] [0.029] [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030]
Black -0.313*** -0.298*** -0.262*** -0.021 -0.019 -0.026
[0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030]
Hispanic -0.323*** -0.308*** -0.280*** -0.097** -0.088** -0.034
[0.034] [0.034] [0.036] [0.043] [0.042] [0.043]
Less than high school -0.285*** -0.279*** -0.265*** -0.249*** -0.259*** -0.189***
[0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.038] [0.038] [0.037]
Some college 0.088*** 0.093*** 0.086*** 0.203*** 0.224*** 0.193***
[0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030]
BA 0.395*** 0.411*** 0.361*** 0.485*** 0.500*** 0.437***
[0.033] [0.033] [0.034] [0.037] [0.037] [0.039]
More than BA 0.483*** 0.480*** 0.442*** 0.754*** 0.767*** 0.721***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.034] [0.037] [0.037] [0.039]
Age - 50 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.018***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004]
(Age - 50) squared -0.000** -0.000** -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.002***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Single -0.006 -0.020** -0.154*** -0.001 0.004 0.045***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.017] [0.007] [0.008] [0.015]
Salaried worker 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.165*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.192***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.013] [0.005] [0.005] [0.012]
GDP gap 0.483*** 0.522*** 0.937*** 0.254*** 0.223*** 0.400***
[0.063] [0.067] [0.152] [0.067] [0.066] [0.145]
Year-1980 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.000 0.001 0.004**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.35: MCMC estimates with alternative modeling assumptions, covariates
in the innovation term of permanent earnings
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
MA(1) MA(2) No latent MA(1) MA(2) No latent
Means
Major job finding -0.088*** -0.077*** -0.081*** -0.089*** -0.097*** -0.083***
[0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.014]
Major job loss and job finding 0.003 0.007 -0.021** 0.018 0.041*** 0.021**
[0.013] [0.013] [0.009] [0.013] [0.013] [0.008]
Zero earnings -0.277*** -0.282*** -0.247*** -0.246*** -0.233*** -0.214***
[0.024] [0.023] [0.011] [0.017] [0.018] [0.009]
Latent job loss in stable years -0.311*** -0.357*** -0.264*** -0.271***
[0.027] [0.029] [0.023] [0.024]
Standard deviation
Stable years 0.063*** 0.067*** 0.085*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.084***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.003] [0.000]
Major job finding 0.527*** 0.532*** 0.418*** 0.560*** 0.543*** 0.412***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.009] [0.015] [0.015] [0.008]
Major job loss and job finding 0.541*** 0.514*** 0.184*** 0.517*** 0.542*** 0.186***
[0.013] [0.012] [0.004] [0.013] [0.014] [0.004]
Zero earnings 0.839*** 0.840*** 0.140*** 0.703*** 0.698*** 0.139***
[0.036] [0.038] [0.003] [0.028] [0.027] [0.002]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.981*** 0.989*** 0.829*** 0.860***
[0.026] [0.028] [0.023] [0.025]
Standard deviation, raw coefficients
Constant -2.767*** -2.697*** -2.461*** -2.721*** -2.751*** -2.473***
[0.030] [0.031] [0.006] [0.034] [0.041] [0.006]
Major job finding 2.128*** 2.066*** 1.589*** 2.143*** 2.141*** 1.586***
[0.037] [0.038] [0.021] [0.041] [0.048] [0.020]
Major job loss and job finding 2.151*** 2.031*** 0.766*** 2.062*** 2.140*** 0.792***
[0.034] [0.036] [0.020] [0.039] [0.044] [0.020]
Zero earnings 2.594*** 2.526*** 0.496*** 2.370*** 2.393*** 0.499***
[0.043] [0.047] [0.019] [0.046] [0.054] [0.016]
Latent job loss in stable years 2.747*** 2.683*** 2.530*** 2.597***
[0.034] [0.037] [0.040] [0.041]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.36: MCMC estimates with alternative modeling assumptions, other pa-
rameters in earnings
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
MA(1) MA(2) No latent MA(1) MA(2) No latent
Permanent std, age 50 0.541*** 0.537*** 0.576*** 0.601*** 0.601*** 0.654***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009]
Transitory std 0.061*** 0.068*** 0.313*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.282***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
MA(1) term -0.283*** -0.298*** -0.523*** -0.565***
[0.034] [0.045] [0.034] [0.045]
MA(2) term -0.089** -0.191***
[0.036] [0.044]
Total transitory 0.064*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.077***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.012] [0.014]
Probability of latent job loss in stable years 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.076*** 0.077***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Avg transitory earnings loss by labor history
Major job loss 0.410*** 0.405*** 0.400*** 0.435*** 0.433*** 0.421***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006]
Major job finding 0.354*** 0.347*** 0.349*** 0.397*** 0.398*** 0.385***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007]
Major job loss and job finding 0.356*** 0.345*** 0.364*** 0.362*** 0.381*** 0.387***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.283*** 0.286*** 0.270*** 0.264***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008]
Raw coefficients of transitory earnings loss, γj
Major job-loss 1.441*** 1.467*** 1.503*** 1.301*** 1.307*** 1.374***
[0.029] [0.030] [0.040] [0.025] [0.025] [0.034]
Major job finding 1.827*** 1.884*** 1.870*** 1.525*** 1.516*** 1.600***
[0.040] [0.042] [0.060] [0.031] [0.033] [0.045]
Major job loss and job finding 1.809*** 1.899*** 1.750*** 1.764*** 1.628*** 1.585***
[0.035] [0.037] [0.047] [0.033] [0.031] [0.040]
Latent job loss in stable years 2.545*** 2.507*** 2.717*** 2.817***
[0.071] [0.074] [0.069] [0.084]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.37: MCMC estimates with alternative modeling assumptions, covariates
in measurement error
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
MA(1) MA(2) No latent MA(1) MA(2) No latent
Constant -0.039* -0.03 -0.02 -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.024
[0.020] [0.020] [0.030] [0.019] [0.019] [0.029]
Black 0.017 0.02 0.025 -0.01 -0.003 0.001
[0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.011] [0.011] [0.015]
Hispanic -0.02 -0.027* -0.024 -0.037** -0.036** -0.031
[0.015] [0.014] [0.020] [0.015] [0.015] [0.020]
Less than high school -0.024* -0.025* -0.034** -0.029** -0.023* -0.063***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.013] [0.013] [0.017]
Some college 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.052*** 0.021** 0.017 0.031**
[0.011] [0.011] [0.015] [0.011] [0.011] [0.014]
BA 0.02 0.017 0.054*** -0.004 0 0.031*
[0.013] [0.013] [0.018] [0.014] [0.014] [0.018]
More than BA 0.034** 0.027** 0.074*** 0.013 0.019 0.048***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.018] [0.014] [0.014] [0.018]
Age - 50 0.012** 0.010* 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003
[0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008]
(Age - 50) squared -0.001*** -0.001** 0 0 -0.001 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Single 0.019* 0.012 0.043*** 0.002 0.004 -0.027**
[0.011] [0.010] [0.015] [0.008] [0.008] [0.011]
Salaried worker 0.015* 0.016* -0.02 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.01
[0.009] [0.009] [0.013] [0.009] [0.009] [0.012]
GDP gap 0.205 0.183 0.473** -0.011 -0.05 -0.18
[0.148] [0.149] [0.234] [0.149] [0.149] [0.232]
Year-1980 0 0 0 0.002*** 0.002*** 0
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.38: MCMC estimates with alternative modeling assumptions, other pa-
rameters in measurement error
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
MA(1) MA(2) No latent MA(1) MA(2) No latent
Std permanent error 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.120*** 0.149*** 0.152*** 0.108***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.012] [0.005] [0.006] [0.012]
Std transitory error
Stable years 0.207*** 0.200*** 0.339*** 0.216*** 0.211*** 0.363***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Major job loss 0.463*** 0.479*** 0.483*** 0.540*** 0.536*** 0.615***
[0.011] [0.013] [0.019] [0.016] [0.015] [0.023]
Major job finding 0.428*** 0.425*** 0.525*** 0.502*** 0.514*** 0.595***
[0.011] [0.010] [0.023] [0.016] [0.015] [0.023]
Major job loss and job finding 0.344*** 0.398*** 0.554*** 0.404*** 0.430*** 0.637***
[0.007] [0.011] [0.020] [0.009] [0.011] [0.021]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.595*** 0.597*** 0.657*** 0.648***
[0.040] [0.040] [0.034] [0.035]
Fraction of earnings component reported in the survey
Permanent earnings 0.921*** 0.907*** 0.954*** 0.935*** 0.935*** 1.001***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008]
Transitory on-the-job* 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transitory due to job-loss 0.849*** 0.846*** 0.865*** 0.811*** 0.794*** 0.726***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.034] [0.013] [0.014] [0.034]
Transitory due to job finding 0.632*** 0.677*** 0.707*** 0.701*** 0.752*** 0.692***
[0.018] [0.019] [0.044] [0.013] [0.014] [0.033]
Transitory due to job loss and job finding 0.587*** 0.664*** 0.606*** 0.621*** 0.739*** 0.615***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.036] [0.013] [0.012] [0.035]
Transitory due to latent job loss in stable years 0.760*** 0.601*** 0.699*** 0.726***
[0.035] [0.059] [0.028] [0.027]
*The fraction of transitory reports are calibrated to zero in this specification.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.39: MCMC estimates with alternative modeling of reporting transitory
shocks, covariates in earnings
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
τ trans = 0.5 τ trans = 1 τ trans estim τ trans = 0.5 τ trans = 1 τ trans estim
Constant 10.694*** 10.696*** 10.691*** 9.920*** 9.921*** 9.917***
[0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.030] [0.028] [0.027]
Black -0.295*** -0.305*** -0.299*** -0.016 -0.019 -0.015
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027]
Hispanic -0.306*** -0.315*** -0.306*** -0.088** -0.069* -0.117***
[0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.041] [0.042] [0.040]
Less than high school -0.287*** -0.267*** -0.279*** -0.236*** -0.245*** -0.217***
[0.032] [0.031] [0.032] [0.035] [0.034] [0.039]
Some college 0.112*** 0.108*** 0.097*** 0.221*** 0.218*** 0.228***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028]
BA 0.406*** 0.411*** 0.392*** 0.492*** 0.498*** 0.501***
[0.031] [0.032] [0.032] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036]
More than BA 0.483*** 0.482*** 0.476*** 0.756*** 0.763*** 0.768***
[0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.036] [0.035] [0.036]
Age - 50 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
(Age - 50) squared -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Single -0.014* -0.016** -0.013* -0.004 -0.006 -0.005
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Salaried worker 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
GDP gap 0.414*** 0.445*** 0.393*** 0.160*** 0.148*** 0.161***
[0.057] [0.060] [0.057] [0.053] [0.054] [0.055]
Year-1980 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.40: MCMC estimates with alternative modeling of reporting transitory
shocks, covariates in the innovation term of permanent earnings
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
τ trans = 0.5 τ trans = 1 τ trans estim τ trans = 0.5 τ trans = 1 τ trans estim
Means
Major job finding -0.095*** -0.085*** -0.074*** -0.085*** -0.075*** -0.079***
[0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014]
Major job loss and job finding 0.024** 0.016 0.020* 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.063***
[0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
Zero earnings -0.250*** -0.254*** -0.249*** -0.207*** -0.195*** -0.213***
[0.023] [0.028] [0.022] [0.015] [0.017] [0.021]
Latent job loss in stable years -0.210*** -0.225*** -0.214*** -0.184*** -0.173*** -0.195***
[0.019] [0.020] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
Standard deviation
Stable years 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.070***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Major job finding 0.457*** 0.470*** 0.431*** 0.449*** 0.445*** 0.467***
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.013]
Major job loss and job finding 0.408*** 0.403*** 0.413*** 0.424*** 0.414*** 0.435***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.012]
Zero earnings 0.795*** 0.791*** 0.800*** 0.651*** 0.630*** 0.640***
[0.035] [0.040] [0.044] [0.025] [0.025] [0.023]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.806*** 0.820*** 0.817*** 0.750*** 0.731*** 0.734***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.021] [0.020] [0.019]
Standard deviation, raw coefficients
Constant -2.757*** -2.698*** -2.741*** -2.697*** -2.657*** -2.653***
[0.022] [0.021] [0.023] [0.019] [0.017] [0.020]
Major job finding 1.978*** 1.945*** 1.901*** 1.896*** 1.848*** 1.893***
[0.034] [0.032] [0.034] [0.032] [0.029] [0.032]
Major job loss and job finding 1.859*** 1.787*** 1.856*** 1.839*** 1.776*** 1.823***
[0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.027] [0.025] [0.033]
Zero earnings 2.529*** 2.472*** 2.526*** 2.268*** 2.200*** 2.207***
[0.042] [0.040] [0.050] [0.042] [0.035] [0.037]
Latent job loss in stable years 2.536*** 2.495*** 2.534*** 2.406*** 2.340*** 2.341***
[0.027] [0.026] [0.028] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.41: MCMC estimates with alternative modeling of reporting transitory
shocks, other parameters in earnings
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
τ trans = 0.5 τ trans = 1 τ trans estim τ trans = 0.5 τ trans = 1 τ trans estim
Permanent std, age 50 0.520*** 0.518*** 0.522*** 0.585*** 0.581*** 0.584***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Transitory std 0.040*** 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.026***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Probability of latent job loss 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.115*** 0.118*** 0.114***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004]
Avg transitory earnings loss by labor history
Major job loss 0.410*** 0.414*** 0.411*** 0.452*** 0.458*** 0.452***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Major job finding 0.357*** 0.381*** 0.375*** 0.425*** 0.440*** 0.427***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Major job loss and job finding 0.375*** 0.364*** 0.375*** 0.404*** 0.408*** 0.407***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.246*** 0.235*** 0.233*** 0.245*** 0.250*** 0.236***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Raw coefficients of transitory earnings loss, γj
Major job-loss 1.442*** 1.414*** 1.432*** 1.213*** 1.184*** 1.213***
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024]
Major job finding 1.807*** 1.622*** 1.667*** 1.353*** 1.272*** 1.344***
[0.040] [0.036] [0.036] [0.028] [0.025] [0.027]
Major job loss and job finding 1.665*** 1.749*** 1.668*** 1.477*** 1.449*** 1.460***
[0.032] [0.034] [0.032] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027]
Latent job loss in stable years 3.084*** 3.267*** 3.308*** 3.101*** 3.023*** 3.264***
[0.069] [0.080] [0.076] [0.069] [0.065] [0.076]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.42: MCMC estimates with alternative modeling of reporting transitory
shocks, covariates in measurement error
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
τ trans = 0.5 τ trans = 1 τ trans estim τ trans = 0.5 τ trans = 1 τ trans estim
Constant -0.027** -0.030** -0.017 -0.034** -0.032** -0.030**
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
Black 0.003 0.002 0.003 0 -0.005 -0.002
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009]
Hispanic -0.021 -0.019 -0.025** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.043***
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Less than high school -0.025** -0.026** -0.021* -0.032*** -0.028** -0.025**
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
Some college 0.024** 0.026*** 0.026** 0.011 0.017** 0.017*
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
BA 0.028** 0.023** 0.029** -0.012 -0.008 -0.006
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
More than BA 0.029** 0.022* 0.031*** 0.011 0.015 0.01
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Age - 50 0.007** 0.008** 0.005* 0 0.001 0
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
(Age - 50) squared -0.001** -0.001*** -0.000* 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Single 0.019** 0.011 0.014* -0.001 0.003 -0.002
[0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Salaried worker 0.009 0.012* 0.005 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.033***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
GDP gap 0.059 0.085 0.039 0.041 0.045 -0.087
[0.101] [0.103] [0.097] [0.125] [0.123] [0.120]
Year-1980 0 0 0 0.001** 0.001* 0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.43: MCMC estimates with alternative modeling of reporting transitory
shocks, other parameters in measurement error
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
τ trans = 0.5 τ trans = 1 τ trans estim τ trans = 0.5 τ trans = 1 τ trans estim
Std permanent error 0.162*** 0.152*** 0.160*** 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.127***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Std transitory error
Stable years 0.108*** 0.114*** 0.091*** 0.166*** 0.158*** 0.121***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.008] [0.016]
Major job loss 0.561*** 0.536*** 0.519*** 0.627*** 0.621*** 0.623***
[0.016] [0.014] [0.014] [0.017] [0.019] [0.020]
Major job finding 0.498*** 0.502*** 0.468*** 0.566*** 0.572*** 0.535***
[0.014] [0.015] [0.012] [0.014] [0.018] [0.015]
Major job loss and job finding 0.591*** 0.562*** 0.574*** 0.653*** 0.614*** 0.620***
[0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.020] [0.017] [0.019]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.645*** 0.671*** 0.643*** 0.689*** 0.673*** 0.675***
[0.018] [0.023] [0.019] [0.032] [0.023] [0.022]
Fraction of earnings component reported in the survey
Permanent earnings 0.948*** 0.949*** 0.961*** 0.945*** 0.948*** 0.966***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Transitory on-the-job 0.5 1 -0.514*** 0.5 1 -3.277***
[0.140] [0.681]
Transitory due to job-loss 0.885*** 0.827*** 0.864*** 0.745*** 0.730*** 0.712***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
Transitory due to job finding 0.597*** 0.614*** 0.593*** 0.757*** 0.717*** 0.645***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008]
Transitory due to job loss and find 0.536*** 0.519*** 0.570*** 0.633*** 0.594*** 0.532***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010]
Transitory due to latent job loss 0.519*** 0.770*** 0.757*** 0.834*** 0.856*** 0.800***
[0.031] [0.029] [0.029] [0.022] [0.020] [0.023]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
168
Table 2.44: MCMC estimates using alternative samples, covariates in earnings
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
1980-2011 matched sample 1980-2011 matched sample
with off years no off years with off years no off years
Constant 10.712*** 10.701*** 10.700*** 9.785*** 9.943*** 9.971***
[0.019] [0.024] [0.027] [0.021] [0.025] [0.026]
Black -0.270*** -0.237*** -0.219*** 0.012 -0.025 -0.030
[0.024] [0.029] [0.029] [0.025] [0.027] [0.025]
Hispanic -0.285*** -0.277*** -0.269*** -0.117*** -0.093** -0.095***
[0.029] [0.034] [0.033] [0.037] [0.039] [0.037]
Less than high school -0.279*** -0.233*** -0.231*** -0.250*** -0.205*** -0.235***
[0.025] [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.033] [0.032]
Some college 0.100*** 0.128*** 0.160*** 0.184*** 0.225*** 0.219***
[0.023] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026]
BA 0.399*** 0.419*** 0.440*** 0.446*** 0.503*** 0.501***
[0.028] [0.031] [0.031] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034]
More than BA 0.481*** 0.496*** 0.506*** 0.751*** 0.735*** 0.706***
[0.027] [0.030] [0.030] [0.033] [0.035] [0.034]
Age - 50 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.011***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
(Age - 50) squared -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000* 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Single -0.025*** -0.011 -0.045*** -0.003 -0.001 0.029***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009]
Salaried worker 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.038***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006]
GDP gap 0.366*** 0.397*** 0.174* 0.167*** 0.158*** -0.153
[0.041] [0.062] [0.101] [0.040] [0.055] [0.099]
Year-1980 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 0.008*** 0.003** 0.003**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.45: MCMC estimates using alternative samples, covariates in the inno-
vation term of permanent earnings
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
1980-2011 matched sample 1980-2011 matched sample
with off years no off years with off years no off years
Means
Major job finding -0.082*** -0.107*** -0.091*** -0.057*** -0.124*** -0.113***
[0.011] [0.012] [0.014] [0.011] [0.014] [0.015]
Major job loss and job finding 0.026*** -0.01 -0.044*** 0.089*** 0.049*** 0
[0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010]
Zero earnings -0.233*** -0.179*** -0.145*** -0.174*** -0.141*** -0.197***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.019] [0.019] [0.010] [0.013]
Latent job loss in stable years -0.201*** -0.169*** -0.041*** -0.158*** -0.169*** -0.132***
[0.015] [0.018] [0.012] [0.015] [0.017] [0.016]
Standard deviation
Stable years 0.069*** 0.060*** 0.035*** 0.073*** 0.065*** 0.042***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004]
Major job finding 0.431*** 0.299*** 0.252*** 0.449*** 0.426*** 0.325***
[0.011] [0.015] [0.015] [0.010] [0.013] [0.019]
Major job loss and job finding 0.404*** 0.342*** 0.240*** 0.420*** 0.356*** 0.214***
[0.009] [0.011] [0.013] [0.009] [0.010] [0.016]
Zero earnings 0.745*** 0.331*** 0.317*** 0.698*** 0.165*** 0.302***
[0.033] [0.035] [0.034] [0.030] [0.035] [0.030]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.776*** 0.722*** 0.377*** 0.717*** 0.684*** 0.502***
[0.018] [0.023] [0.015] [0.017] [0.017] [0.021]
Standard deviation, raw coefficients
Constant -2.681*** -2.821*** -3.348*** -2.622*** -2.743*** -3.165***
[0.015] [0.026] [0.066] [0.017] [0.021] [0.048]
Major job finding 1.838*** 1.606*** 1.962*** 1.822*** 1.892*** 2.048***
[0.026] [0.045] [0.095] [0.025] [0.035] [0.069]
Major job loss and job finding 1.774*** 1.744*** 1.918*** 1.755*** 1.708*** 1.628***
[0.022] [0.035] [0.088] [0.024] [0.031] [0.082]
Zero earnings 2.393*** 1.720*** 2.194*** 2.269*** 0.899*** 1.965***
[0.032] [0.102] [0.115] [0.032] [0.235] [0.109]
Latent job loss in stable years 2.427*** 2.492*** 2.372*** 2.288*** 2.362*** 2.481***
[0.022] [0.030] [0.066] [0.022] [0.027] [0.051]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.46: MCMC estimates using alternative samples, other parameters in
earnings
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
1980-2011 matched sample 1980-2011 matched sample
with off years no off years with off years no off years
Permanent std, age 50 0.558*** 0.425*** 0.417*** 0.642*** 0.488*** 0.437***
[0.006] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
Transitory std 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.050***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Probability of latent job loss 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.129*** 0.115*** 0.121*** 0.121***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Avg transitory earnings loss by labor history
Major job loss 0.392*** 0.394*** 0.381*** 0.421*** 0.433*** 0.430***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Major job finding 0.334*** 0.373*** 0.418*** 0.409*** 0.437*** 0.454***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006]
Major job loss and job finding 0.372*** 0.352*** 0.363*** 0.425*** 0.400*** 0.431***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.237*** 0.232*** 0.325*** 0.239*** 0.252*** 0.307***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Raw coefficients of transitory earnings loss, γj
Major job-loss 1.549*** 1.539*** 1.627*** 1.376*** 1.311*** 1.327***
[0.029] [0.033] [0.038] [0.025] [0.026] [0.028]
Major job finding 1.994*** 1.679*** 1.396*** 1.448*** 1.291*** 1.203***
[0.039] [0.038] [0.034] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
Major job loss and job finding 1.688*** 1.844*** 1.761*** 1.356*** 1.499*** 1.325***
[0.030] [0.039] [0.039] [0.023] [0.030] [0.027]
Latent job loss in stable years 3.242*** 3.326*** 2.082*** 3.195*** 2.982*** 2.264***
[0.070] [0.084] [0.054] [0.063] [0.081] [0.066]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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Table 2.47: MCMC estimates using alternative samples, covariates in measure-
ment error
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
1980-2011 matched sample 1980-2011 matched sample
with off years no off years with off years no off years
Constant -0.018 -0.021 -0.021 -0.018 -0.027* -0.027*
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] [0.014]
Black 0.002 0.004 0.012 -0.007 -0.007 -0.012
[0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Hispanic -0.015 -0.026** -0.031** -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.043***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015]
Less than high school -0.032*** -0.026** -0.021* -0.034*** -0.027** -0.028**
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Some college 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.022** 0.01 0.020**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
BA 0.027** 0.021* 0.023* -0.005 -0.011 -0.01
[0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
More than BA 0.027** 0.022* 0.029** 0.013 0.003 0.001
[0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.012]
Age - 50 0.006* 0.007** 0.004 -0.001 0 -0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
(Age - 50) squared -0.001** -0.001** -0.000* 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Single 0.012 0.015* 0.006 0 0.008 -0.002
[0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Salaried worker 0.006 0.011* 0.006 0.035*** 0.045*** 0.030***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
GDP gap 0.101 0.077 0.149 0.051 -0.016 0.089
[0.104] [0.098] [0.098] [0.126] [0.125] [0.106]
Year-1980 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
172
Table 2.48: MCMC estimates using alternative samples, other parameters in
measurement error
Males Females
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
1980-2011 matched sample 1980-2011 matched sample
with off years no off years with off years no off years
Std permanent error 0.161*** 0.149*** 0.158*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.149***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.008] [0.005]
Std transitory error
Stable years 0.109*** 0.102*** 0.090*** 0.164*** 0.161*** 0.115***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.008] [0.011] [0.006]
Major job loss 0.527*** 0.540*** 0.521*** 0.634*** 0.632*** 0.623***
[0.014] [0.015] [0.017] [0.020] [0.021] [0.023]
Major job finding 0.495*** 0.527*** 0.509*** 0.573*** 0.591*** 0.585***
[0.013] [0.017] [0.015] [0.020] [0.017] [0.025]
Major job loss and job finding 0.592*** 0.594*** 0.581*** 0.623*** 0.669*** 0.674***
[0.017] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.023]
Latent job loss in stable years 0.638*** 0.653*** 0.615*** 0.670*** 0.668*** 0.688***
[0.034] [0.027] [0.034] [0.026] [0.034] [0.050]
Fraction of earnings component reported in the survey
Permanent earnings 0.954*** 0.942*** 0.937*** 0.949*** 0.910*** 0.936***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007]
Transitory on-the-job* 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transitory due to job-loss 0.891*** 0.839*** 0.840*** 0.772*** 0.781*** 0.711***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.010] [0.008]
Transitory due to job finding 0.611*** 0.670*** 0.704*** 0.723*** 0.748*** 0.732***
[0.011] [0.010] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009] [0.007]
Transitory due to job loss and find 0.540*** 0.566*** 0.656*** 0.632*** 0.712*** 0.706***
[0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008]
Transitory due to latent job loss 0.986*** 0.587*** 0.889*** 0.827*** 1.013*** 0.859***
[0.042] [0.046] [0.020] [0.023] [0.039] [0.014]
*The fraction of transitory reports are calibrated to zero in this specification.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample: HRS, 1991-2011, 50-60-year-old employees
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CHAPTER III
Estimating Second Order Probability Beliefs
from Subjective Survival Data
3.1 Introduction
Textbook models of uncertainty usually treat probabilities as known or knowable objects.
This is the case for outcomes of symmetric devices with known properties that are subject to
random forces such as the toss of a coin or die, the shuffling of a deck of cards or the shaking
of an urn containing balls of different colors. In contrast, the probabilities that confront
economic decision makers are usually less precisely known.34, 35
In this paper, we investigate the probability beliefs held by a given individual about
personal mortality risks elicited from survey questions on the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) that ask respondents about the numerical probability that he or she will survive to
34Frank Knight, as early as in 1921, introduced the distinction between, as he called, “risk” for known and
“uncertainty” for unknown probabilities.
35Pate´-Cornell (1996) observes that “. . . uncertainties in decision and risk analyses can be divided into two
categories: those that stem from variability in known (or observable) populations and, therefore, represent
randomness in samples (aleatory uncertainties), and those that come from basic lack of knowledge about
fundamental phenomena (epistemic uncertainties also known in the literature as ambiguity).”
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a given age that is 10-20 years in the future. In forming his belief about mortality risk, a
person might consult a life table based on the experience of millions of individuals. The life
table provides an estimate of the mean probability of survival for persons of given age and sex
with essentially no sampling error. However, the individual may be ambiguous about whether
this probability represents the risk he himself faces. He may have personal information that
makes him think that he has a higher or lower risk than the average person of his age and
sex. Moreover, he may be unsure about the influence that personal information such as the
ages at death of parents and relatives, health history and current symptoms, or exercise and
dietary habits will have on his likely longevity. Finally, in answering the survey question,
a person must construct a probability judgment “on the fly,” accessing whatever frequentist
data or epistemic beliefs he may have stored in his brain and manipulating this information
through reasoning or gut reaction to produce an answer to the specific question about, say,
the probability he will survive to age 80, all within less than a minute.36
In this paper, we assume that probability beliefs about survival are ambiguous in the
sense that an individual has in mind a range of possible values of the probability that can
be described by a density function, g(p), that can take on a variety of shapes depending on
both its mean and the degree of ambiguity. The theory literature calls this density function
second order probability beliefs. (See, for example, Gilboa and Marinacci, 2011).
We compare the predicted survival rates of our sample members to the actual survival
of sample members eight years later, as reported in the 2010 wave of HRS. The predictions
from our models track actual mortality fairly closely for sample members who are below age
80, but begin to diverge substantially at the oldest ages, with older respondents being overly
36The attempt to determine the probabilistic beliefs of lay people using direct questions on surveys has
only become commonplace in the past two decades (Manski, 2004). There is a related but somewhat separate
tradition of eliciting probability beliefs of experts as part of risk assessments in engineering and operations
research applications. See Pate´-Cornell (1996) for a summary of this tradition.
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optimistic. The predicted survival rates co-vary with demographic characteristics, health
status, parental mortality, smoking behavior and cognitive status in largely the same way
that they do in regressions that explain actual mortality. Thus, it appears that the subjective
survival probability answers are good candidates for modeling individual level heterogeneity
in survival chances.37
The major contribution of this paper is to provide an estimate of ambiguity about survival
probabilities that is embodied in the spread of g(p). We find that survival expectations are
very uncertain in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and that uncertainty varies in
the population: more educated people have more certain beliefs, women have less certain
beliefs, and deterioration of health, especially from previously excellent levels, leads to more
uncertainty about survival chances.
Identifying second order probability beliefs is possible under the assumptions of our survey
response model, the Modal Response Hypothesis (MRH) which is a mapping from probability
beliefs g(p) to survey responses. It assumes that people report the mode of g(p) whenever it
exists and they report 50%, whenever g(p) is so ambiguous that it does not have a unique
mode. The motivation for the MRH is twofold. First, imagine that people estimate the
probabilities of certain events after observing some successes and failures of these events.
Under some conditions a na¨ıve estimator, which is the ratio of “good cases”, is exactly
equal to the mode of the Bayesian updated posterior probability distribution. Moreover,
this estimator is biased in finite samples. The MRH assumes that people report this simple,
37Our findings about the external validity of the HRS subjective probability questions are consistent with
those in earlier papers that have studied these questions in the HRS (Hurd and McGarry, 2002; Smith et al.,
2001). The overly optimistic expectations of people over 75 in HRS has also been noted by Hurd et al. (2005)
who find the same pattern across eleven European countries in the SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe). There are also a few papers that use these questions in models of behavior under
uncertainty such as, for example, Picone et al. (2004) who find that people who expect to live longer are
more likely to choose medical screening tests.
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na¨ıve estimator in surveys. The second motivation comes from the literature using numerical
subjective probabilities on surveys. When people are asked to report a numerical probability
using any digit between 0 and 100, an unusually large fraction of answers are heaped on 50.
The excessive use of 50 has been interpreted as occurring because many people treat “50-50”
as a synonym for“I don’t know”or even for“God only knows,”a sentiment that suggests that
the true probability is unknowable (Fischhoff and Bruine De Bruin, 1999; Bruine de Bruin
and Carman, 2012; Lillard and Willis, 2001).38,39 Researchers have realized that these focal
answers might introduce bias into estimates of subjective probabilities. As a remedy,Manski
and Molinari (2010) think of focal responses as extreme versions of rounding, where some
people always round to 0, 50 or 100 percent. Lumsdaine and van Loon (2013) model the
probability of providing a focal answer as a separate equation in their econometric model.
These papers found that accounting for focal responses is important for valid inference.
However, they are agnostic about the reasons so many people provide such answers. Our
approach, instead, is to model focal responses with an economic model and relate it to the
precision of beliefs of individuals. In our model people answer with an epistemic 50 percent
as a way of saying “I am very unsure”, when their beliefs are too ambiguous. As far as we
know the MRH model is the first in the literature that makes use of the focal responses to
learn something about the beliefs of individuals.40
38In recent waves of the Health and Retirement Study, respondents have been asked a follow-up question
if they answered 50 to survival probability question: Do you think that it is about equally likely that you
will die before 75 as it is that you will live to 75 or beyond, or are you just unsure about the chances? About
two-thirds say that they are “just unsure.” In this paper, we use data from the 2002 wave of HRS which did
not have a follow-up question.
39In addition, the answers to the survival questions also exhibit some heaping at 0 and 100. Taken literally,
of course, these answers cannot represent rational probability beliefs except, perhaps, in the case of zero for
persons who know themselves to be terminally ill or planning suicide.
40Manski and Molinari (2010) discuss an alternative, more direct approach to learn about the imprecision
of belief. They make use of a follow-up question in a different survey (the ALP) asking about the range of
probabilities responders had in mind when they provided their answers. Roughly half of the sample reported
that their answers were “exact”, and the rest reported relatively wide ranges of probabilities with the average
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For comparison, we present an alternative model of survey response which assumes that
the person reports the mean of g(p). We show that the MRH model can account quite
well for heaping at 0, 50 and 100 while the mean response model cannot. The overuse
of focal responses can be especially problematic when very low or very high probabilities
are modeled since the high ratio of 50 percent responses can arbitrarily push the estimated
mean probabilities away from their true, extreme values. We show in this paper that our
modal response model which explicitly models focal answers works better than the simple
mean model typically used in research on subjective probabilities. When the modal response
model is used for extreme probabilities both the estimated unconditional means and the
average partial effects are closer to ones estimated from realized mortality data. Alternative
models of focal responses, such as Manski and Molinari (2010) and Lumsdaine and van Loon
(2013) might work equally well to reduce this bias and to predict enough focal answers. The
main advantage of the MRH is that it is based on an economic model of limited information
and uncertain beliefs.
Learning about the degree of uncertainty in individuals’ beliefs can be important for
several reasons. First, the value of information about mortality risk, for example, should be
a function of this uncertainty. Uncertain people might value information more, and certain
people might rationally ignore any new information since they have already established a
good understanding of the risks they face. Even in a fully Bayesian Subjective Expected
Utility (SEU) framework the degree of uncertainty might play an important role if the utility
function is not linear in probabilities. This is the case, for example, if people can invest in
width being 18 percent. We believe that this approach is very informative about general uncertainty in the
population, but it is less obvious how to make use of the provided ranges. First, the meaning of an “exact”
answer is ambiguous. Second, one would expect that 50 percent responders provide wider ranges of possible
probabilities than people with other answers ending with 0 or 5 (like 10 or 15 percent). However, they did
not find a strong pattern like that in their data.
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learning about their own mortality risks.41 Second, learning about the degree of uncertainty
in individuals’ beliefs is useful from a survey methodological point of view, too. People whose
probability beliefs are more certain may answer probabilistic survey questions with greater
precision. However, if beliefs are uncertain, as is the case with mortality expectations,
we expect large measurement error in survey responses, that might even account for the
discrepancy between subjective and objective survival probabilities at later ages. Future
research should investigate the potential role of measurement error in subjective expectation
data and its link to uncertainty in individuals’ beliefs. Third, learning about the degree of
uncertainty in individuals’ beliefs might be very important in Non-Bayesian/Non-Expected
Utility models. While we don’t work in these frameworks, empirical evidence on ambiguous
beliefs may be useful to those who do.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we provide a quick overview of the
literature on ambiguity and its role in economic decisions. Section 2 describes the subjective
survival data in HRS that we use in this paper. Section 3 introduces the MRH model that
can be used to model any subjective expectation data that uses the HRS framework. Section
4 describes a simple and tractable model of individual survival curves. Section 5 discusses
the estimation method and identification and Section 6 shows the results.
3.2 Ambiguity in economics
Knightian uncertainty, epistemic uncertainty and ambiguity are roughly synonymous terms
that figure prominently in a longstanding and ongoing debate about the link between ra-
tionality and probability beliefs, on the one hand, and the relationship between beliefs and
41Another example is Bommier and Villeneuve (2012), who discuss a model of mortality risk aversion,
where the utility function is not additively separable over time, and thus, mortality probabilities enter the
model in a non-linear fashion as well.
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decisions, on the other hand. In an excellent and authoritative review of this debate since
Pascal’s famous bet on the existence of God in 1670, Gilboa and Marinacci (2011) discuss
the different models of expectation formation, including Bayesian and Non-Bayesian models.
They call the model we use in this paper “the smooth model of ambiguity” or “second order
probability beliefs.” In typical models of ambiguity, agents have a set of possible probability
distributions in mind but they are not able to compound this information into a single prob-
ability distribution. The smooth model, however, makes compounding possible. The real
question in the smooth model is whether agents have a preference for known probabilities
(in other words they are ambiguity-averse) or not (in which case they are simple Bayesians).
As Gilboa and Marinacci (2011) write “. . . beyond the above mentioned separation [be-
tween beliefs and utilities], the smooth preferences model enjoys an additional advantage of
tractability. Especially if one specifies a simple functional form for [preferences for known
probabilities], one gets a simple model in which uncertainty/ambiguity attitudes can be an-
alyzed in a way that parallels the treatment of risk attitudes in the classical literature.”, pp.
45.
The major contribution of this paper is to provide an estimate of second order probability
beliefs about survival probabilities that are embodied in the spread of g(p). It is important
to clarify the role of this object in alternative views of uncertainty. Conventional economic
theory of behavior under uncertainty, rooted in subjective expected utility (SEU) theory
(Savage, 1954), is often interpreted as having erased the distinction between known and
unknown probabilities because expected utility is a linear function of probabilities. That is,
assume that the person’s ambiguous probability beliefs are described by g(p). His expected
utility is
EU =
ˆ 1
0
[pUlive + (1− p)Udie] g(p)dp = p¯Ulive + (1− p¯)Udie, (3.1)
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where is the mean of this ambiguous distribution. Clearly, expected utility is invariant to a
mean preserving spread of g(p); hence, decisions based on expected utility are unaffected by
ambiguity.
In the famous Ellsberg experiments (Ellsberg, 1961) subjects were presented with choices
of drawing balls from different urns whose compositions were either known or ambiguous.
Most people revealed distaste for ambiguity which was at odds with the SEU theory. The
survey by Gilboa and Marinacci (2011) provides a comprehensive and insightful discussion
of this.
We separate the issues concerning ambiguity of probability beliefs from those concerning
the effects of epistemic uncertainty and ambiguity aversion on decisions. We do so by utilizing
survey data that asks directly about people’s probability beliefs. As Manski (2004) empha-
sizes, this approach differs from the practice in much of applied economics of assuming that
individuals have exogenously given probabilities. It also differs from Savage’s theory which
infers probability beliefs from choice situations. This means that we can explore empirically
how beliefs about risk and uncertainty vary in the population without being required to take
a stand on how decisions are affected by probability beliefs.
3.3 Subjective survival probability questions on the
HRS
The Health and Retirement Study has asked probabilistic expectation questions on various
topics since its beginning in 1992. The survival question that we use in this paper comes
from the 2002 wave and it reads as follows: “What is the percent chance that you will live
to be [TARGET AGE] or more?” The target age exceeds the individual’s age by at least 10
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years: it is 80 years for people below 70, and 85, 90, 95 and 100 for individuals in successive
five year age intervals.
Although the subjective probability responses in HRS seem reasonable when averaged
across respondents, individual responses appear to contain considerable noise and are often
heaped on values of “0”, “50” and “100” (See for example Manski, 2004, for a discussion).
Considering the whole group of probability questions in HRS-1998, for example, while only
5% of respondents refused to answer the probability questions, 52% of questions were heaped
on either “0” or “100” and an additional 15% were heaped on “50”.
These patterns are illustrated in Figure 3.1 by histograms of responses to the HRS-
2002 survival probability question. We have included separate histograms by the target age
used in the survival question and a total histogram in the six panels of Figure 3.1. Each
histogram shows a high frequency of focal answers, especially at 50. The ratio of 50 responses
is somewhat smaller at old ages where the actual survival probabilities are low, but it still
accounts for 16 percent of the responses for people above 84.
Some psychologists, especially Fischhoff, Bruine de Bruin and their colleagues (Fischhoff
and Bruine De Bruin, 1999; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2000; Bruine de Bruin and Carman, 2012)
have argued that answers of“50”may reflect“epistemic uncertainty;” that is, a failure to have
any probability belief at all about the event in question or, at least, to have no clear idea
of what the probability could be. Alternatively, of course, an answer of “50” might reflect
a very precise belief about the probability that a fair coin will come up heads or perhaps a
somewhat less precise belief that a given event is about equally likely to occur or not occur.
Indeed, while HRS probability questions offer participants a scale of integers from 0 to 100,
the large majority of “non-focal” answers are integers ending in “5” or “0”, suggesting that
responses from most people involve rounding or approximation. See Manski and Molinari
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(2010) for a discussion of the different rounding practices of survey respondents in the HRS
and of potential remedies.
There has been much less emphasis in the psychological literature on focal answers at “0”
or “100”. When a probability question concerns an event such as the chance of being alive
ten or fifteen years from now, it does not seem credible to assume that a respondent who
gives such an answer of “100” is completely certain he will be alive then and, apart from a
person diagnosed with a terminal illness, an answer of “0” should not be taken at face value,
either.42
Previous researchers have found that the tendency to give focal answers is associated
with low education, lower cognitive ability and it varies with other demographic variables,
too. (Lillard and Willis, 2001; Hurd and McGarry, 1995; Lumsdaine and van Loon, 2013).
These covariates are known to correlate with mortality. Focal responses, thus, might bias
estimated average survival probabilities if we take them at face value and the bias might be
stronger in situations where the underlying probability is far from 50 percent. In order to
test whether this is the case, in the empirical part of the paper we will compare estimated
individual survival curves to actual survival of the respondents eight years later in 2010,
which is the last available wave of the HRS.
42It is possible to regard answers of “0” or “100” as approximations which are no different in kind than
rounded answers of “5”, “40” or “95”. However, in a discussion of Gan et al. (2005), Willis (2005) provides
evidence against this interpretation.
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3.4 Probability beliefs and the Modal Response Hy-
pothesis
In this section, we describe a theoretical model which attempts to relate answers that an
individual gives to a survey question about the subjective probability of a given event and his
underlying probability beliefs. In our model we distinguish between ambiguity and epistemic
uncertainty, with the latter corresponding to cases when information is limited.
Let us assume that person is faced with the problem of estimating the probability pi
of an event A. Initially he has no information about the probability of this event, he has
an uninformed prior ppriori ∼ U(0, 1), where U denotes the uniform distribution. The person
observes event A happening αi − 1 times and not happening βi − 1 times. In the survival
context, for example, this means that a person is aware of αi − 1 people similar to himself
who survived to the given target age and βi − 1 similar people who died before reaching
that age. It is well known that if this new information is used to Bayesian update one’s
beliefs about pi, the posterior distribution has a Beta distribution with parameters αi and
βi, pi ∼ Beta(αi, βi).
When faced with a survey question about the probability of event A, the person might
respond with the mean or the mode of this distribution. When αi and βi are larger than
one43, the mean and the mode of the Beta distribution are
pmeani =
αi
αi + βi
, (3.2)
pmodei =
αi − 1
αi + βi − 2 . (3.3)
43Other cases will be discussed below.
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A Bayesian agent would report pmeani , which is the expected value of the Bayesian updated
posterior distribution. Note that pmodei is exactly equal to the na¨ıve estimator of the proba-
bility that can be computed by the number of “good cases” which is αi − 1 over the number
of all cases which is αi + βi − 2. A frequentist agent, thus, would not report the mean but,
rather, the mode of the distribution gi (p). The modal response hypothesis assumes that peo-
ple report pmodei rather than p
mean
i to probabilistic survey questions for at least two reasons.
First, as Lillard and Willis (2001) argue, it is cognitively less burdensome for a respondent to
answer a survey probability question quickly by reporting the most likely value of p, given by
the mode of g(p), than it is to report the expected value given by pmeani =
´
pgi(p)dp. Second,
pmodei is equal to a very simple rule-of-thumb estimator for the probability in question: the
frequentist response. In a survey situation where people have to answer many questions in a
very short timeframe, it seems a reasonable assumption that they give frequentist approxi-
mations to probability questions instead of Bayesian updating their priors. Moreover, in this
model the mode is often a good approximation of the mean.
The formula in (3.3) does not give the mode of the distribution when either αi or βi is
smaller than 1. Whenever αi < 1, βi ≥ 1 the distribution is always decreasing and has a unique
mode at zero. Whenever αi ≥ 1, β < 1 the distribution is always increasing and its unique
mode is at one. Finally, if αi < 1, βi < 1 the distribution has a U-shape and it has two maxima
at zero and one. In this case one finds it more probable that the probability of event A is
zero or one than that it is 50 percent.
We have motivated the use of the Beta distribution with a Bayesian framework where
agents observe certain numbers of successes and failures. As we shall show, however, the
distributions that occur when either αi or βi is smaller than 1 cannot be derived from Bayesian
updating based on evidence. Indeed, these distributions correspond to situations in which,
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in effect, the agent has very little objective evidence on which to base his beliefs and, lacking
evidence, tends to give conventional “epistemic “ responses to survey questions about his
probabilistic beliefs. In particular, we hypothesize that the person will respond with an
extreme value of either zero or one when g(p) is monotonically decreasing or increasing. When
the distribution is U-shaped, we hypothesize that the person will answer “50” as a synonym
for “God only knows” rather than as necessarily a belief that the outcome in question is
equally likely to occur or not.44
To show how the shape of is related to the amount of evidence on which an individual
bases his beliefs, we introduce two more parameters that are functions of and
µi =
αi
αi + βi
, (3.4)
ni = αi + βi. (3.5)
µi is the expected value of the distribution of the probability in question, and ni is a measure
of the precision of beliefs. Higher ni means more precise beliefs: that is, a tighter gi(p)
density function. Earlier, we argued that an uninformed agent with a uniform prior over
the unit interval would update his prior after observing α − 1 successes and β − 1 failures in
a sample of N = α + β − 2. Note that B(1, 1) is a uniform distribution so that ni = α + β = 2
for an uninformed agent. Equivalently, such an agent observes no data since N = 0. Thus,
a necessary condition for Bayesian updating is that the agent observes a positive amount of
data, which implies that α > 1, β > 1 and N > 0. As we have seen, any Beta function satisfying
44In the survival context, a U-shaped distribution could represent the beliefs of someone who is unsure
whether he had inherited a genetically transmitted disease. In case he did, he might face a low survival
probability to the target age, but if he did not he has a high probability of surviving. The posterior
distribution of the survival probability in this case can have a U shape, where the extreme probabilities are
more likely than any middle values. However, it is not plausible that such situations are common enough to
account for the large number of “50” responses that we see in survey responses.
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this condition is unimodal where the mode falls in the interval, 0 < p < 1. Conversely, when
α < 1 or β < 1 g(p) may be monotonically increasing, decreasing or U-shaped depending on
the value of µ and if α+β < 1, g(p) is always U-shaped. Obviously, Bayesian updating cannot
be the source of such beliefs since one cannot observe a negative number of signals! That is
why we label such beliefs as “epistemic” and distinguish them from “ambiguous” ones.
In our development of the Beta model, the precision parameter, ni = αi + βi, is assumed
to be an integer equal to two less than the size of the sample that is observed by agent
i. A broader and more useful interpretation of precision is that it measures the confidence
that an individual has in his judgment of the risk of a given event. For instance, educated
individuals can utilize, in addition to their personal experience, a broader knowledge of
evidence about mortality and its causes from past coursework, wider reading and better
informed family and social networks. Thus, we may interpret precision as a measure of a
person’s capacity to assess his survival risks based on his knowledge of mortality risks and his
ability to translate personal information about his own health, health behavior and family
history into its implications for survival chances.
The relationship between ni, µi and g(p) is depicted in Figure 3.2. The figure presents a
matrix of 81 probability density functions—g(p|µ, n) —corresponding to nine different values
of the mean of g(p), given by µi on the horizontal axis, and nine different degrees of precision,
measured by ni, on the vertical axis. The figure also illustrates the boundary between am-
biguous beliefs that can be represented by a second order probability distribution based on
Bayesian principles and epistemic uncertainty in which the individual has too little knowl-
edge about the risk in question to be able to form an evidence-based probability judgment.
Possible ambiguous densities appear in the darkly shaded, inverted U-shaped region in Fig-
ure 3.2 for which ni > 2. Note that throughout this region, reports of pmeani and p
mode
i tend
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to be very close to one another. The lightly shaded area at the top of the figure corresponds
to epistemic 50 percent responses. As we can see, when uncertainty is high (ni is low) for
any values of µi the model predicts a 50 percent response, including cases when the mean
probability is very low or very high. The MRH, thus, predicts that the large fraction of 50
percent answers, typical in subjective probabilistic expectation data, can in fact correspond
to mean probabilities that are far from 50 percent. The two unshaded triangular regions
in Figure 3.2 correspond to epistemic 0 and 100 responses. Such responses are typical in
cases when the mean probability, µi is also close to 0 or 100. However, when ni is close to 2,
that is beliefs are almost uniform, 0 and 100 percent answers can occur when is close to 50
percent. Thus, the MRH can predict a large fraction of focal 0, 50 and 100 answers and the
corresponding bias can be either positive or negative.
To summarize, the modal response hypothesis claims that survey respondents report a
potentially rounded version of the mode of gi(p) whenever it exists and they report 50 percent
whenever has a U shape,
pmrhi =

round
(
αi−1
αi+βi−2
)
if αi > 1, βi > 1
1 if αi > 1, βi ≤ 1
0 if αi ≤ 1, βi > 1
0.5 if αi ≤ 1, βi ≤ 1.
(3.6)
The round function can be rounding to the closest 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent or
anything that seems appropriate in the context of the survey. Manski and Molinari (2010),
for example, use a framework where there are individual differences in rounding practices.
Their approach can also be modeled in our framework by letting the round function vary
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across individuals.
The hypothesis of this paper is that people answer subjective probabilistic expectation
questions according to the MRH. It would be desirable, however, to test the MRH against
other survey response models. A natural candidate for comparison is the mean model where
people respond a potentially rounded version of the mean of gi(p)
pmmi = round(µi). (3.7)
In the mean model the precision of beliefs (ni) is not identified, only the mean (µi) is. The
mean and the mode models, however, converge to each other as ni goes to infinity. That
is, the mean model is embedded in the MRH, and thus, a relatively small estimated belief
precision (n) would be evidence in favor of the MRH.
3.5 Individual subjective survival curves
In the previous section, we introduced two survey response models that transform second
order probability distributions g(p|µi, ni) into the survey response pmrhi or pmmi . These models
can be applied to any subjective probabilities in the HRS format and not just to survival
data. To close the model, however, we need to specify the mean (µi) and the precision (ni)
of beliefs. There is no unique way of modeling these two variables; it is the task of the
researcher to find the appropriate model in the context of the particular project. In this
section, we show how µi and ni can be modeled in the context of survival probabilities.
The so-called Gompertz model of longevity has been widely used in both demography
and biology because its increasing mortality hazard assumption lines up with mortality data
of humans and other species very well (Vaupel, 1997). The Gompertz model assumes that
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the hazard of death is exponentially increasing with age:
h(a) = γ0γ1 exp (γ1a) , (3.8)
where γ0 is a positive scale and γ1 is a positive shape parameter. By simple calculation, (3.8)
leads to the following survival probability from age a to age t:
S (a, t) = exp (−γ0 (exp (γ1t)− exp (γ1a))) . (3.9)
The main advantage of subjective survival data is that we can estimate individual hetero-
geneity in survival chances. With objective survival data we can only identify group-specific
survival probabilities by computing the ratio of survivors in a particular group. Unobserved
heterogeneity within groups, however, is not identified. In contrast, subjective survival data
enables us to estimate individual heterogeneity in survival chances as we collect probability
data on the individual level. We follow Vaupel et al. (1979) by allowing the scale parameter
(γ0) to have a gamma distribution with shape parameter k and scale parameter θ and we
assume that the shape parameter (γ1) is fixed in the population:
γ0i ∼ Υ (k, θ) . (3.10)
The expected value of the gamma distribution is kθ and thus both parameters increase
mortality chances and decrease the probability of survival (see equation (3.9)). The main
advantage of using the gamma distribution, as we shall argue, is analytic tractability. Note,
however, that this is a flexible 2 parameter distribution with both parameters being esti-
mated, and hence this assumption is not very restrictive. The first advantage of the gamma
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distribution is that the average survival probabilities can be derived analytically. As we
show in Appendix C2 in the e-companion online supplement, the average survival probabil-
ities from age a to age t is
E (Si (a, t|k, θ, γ1)) = (1 + θ (exp (γ1t)− exp (γ1a)))−k . (3.11)
The second advantage of the gamma-Gompertz framework is that we can analytically derive
the effect of individual heterogeneity on sample selection. Different survival chances are
modeled by letting γ0 have a distribution in the population. In this paper we refer to γ0 as
“frailty” (Vaupel et al., 1979), which includes genetic, environmental and behavioral factors
that affect the underlying mortality of individuals other than age. As long as survival chances
are heterogeneous in a population, fit individuals will be overrepresented in the sample over
time as frail individuals are more likely to die and not participate in the HRS. By applying
the formula from Vaupel et al. (1979) we can analytically characterize this sample selection.
See the appendix for details. To sum up, we use the following structural equations for
individual survival chances.
µi = Si (a, t) = exp (−γ0i (exp (γ1t)− exp (γ1a))) , (3.12)
γ0i ∼ Υ (k, θ) , (3.13)
θi =
1
1
θr + (exp (γ1a)− exp (γ1r))
, (3.14)
θr = x′iβθ. (3.15)
θr represents the scale parameter of the gamma distribution in the reference cohort which
is the 50 year old (r = 0.5). Equation (3.14) shows the effect of sample selection. The scale
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parameter is decreasing with age, as fit individuals are increasingly overrepresented in the
sample. Equation (3.15) shows that we add covariates to the scale parameter of the 50 year
old cohort. Finally the Appendix shows how average partial effects of the different covariates
can be derived after fitting this model.
So far we have only talked about how to model the mean survival probability, µi. For
modeling the precision of beliefs (ni), we use a very simple log-normal framework.
lnni = z
′
iβn + uni, (3.16)
uni ∼ N(0, σ2n). (3.17)
Equations (3.12)-(3.17) together with the survey response models of the previous section
fully specify our model.
3.6 Estimation and identification
Our structural model has two unobservables: γ0i which is a function of the mean survival
probability and uni which is the unobserved heterogeneity in the precision of beliefs. Based
on the distributional assumptions from the previous section, the model is fully specified and
it can be estimated with maximum likelihood.
We only observe one survival probability answer in HRS. In Section 3, we proposed two
survey response models. The mean model assumed that people report a rounded version of
their true survival chances, while the MRH model assumed that people report a rounded
version of the mode of the distribution of probability beliefs g(p|µi, ni) or 50 percent when the
mode does not exist.
The joint distribution of the two random variables γ0i and uni is complicated because
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one is gamma, the other is normal and they enter the model in a non-linear fashion. The
estimation of the MRH, thus, can be carried out by maximum simulated likelihood. The
estimation of the mean model is more straightforward as the precision of beliefs plays no role
in the model. The appendix shows how the likelihood function of these two models can be
constructed.
It is worth discussing how our main parameters are identified. We seek to estimate the
following set of parameters: γ1, k, βθ, βn, σn. In the case of the mean model, parameters of
the belief precision, βn and σn are not identified. Parameter γ1 is the shape parameter of
the individual survival function and it is identified from how fast the probability responses
(phrsi ) change with age
(
∂E
(
phrsi |a
)
/∂a
)
. Parameters k and βθ determine the scale parameter
of the individual subjective survival curves (γ0i) and they are identified from the location
and dispersion of the individual responses (E
(
phrsi |xi
)
and V
(
phrsi |a
)
).
The identification of the belief precision parameters βn and σn primarily comes from the
fraction of different focal answers in different demographic groups. If we have many focal
answers, we expect ni to be small. If we have many different types of focal answers (0, 50 and
100), we expect a high σn, indicating a high dispersion of belief precision in the population.
3.7 Empirical analysis
Beliefs about subjective survival probabilities presumably depend on an individual’s knowl-
edge of different risk factors and demographic differences in the society; his personal infor-
mation about his own health, habits and family members’ longevity; his ability to translate
this information into a probability and on his level of optimism or pessimism. In the empir-
ical model estimated in this section, we use the information available in the HRS to try to
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capture several of the major determinants of beliefs in a parsimonious fashion.
3.7.1 Sample and measures employed
The sample used in the empirical analysis consists of 13,038 age eligible respondents to the
2002 Health and Retirement Study, over age 54 in 2002,45 who provided responses to the
subjective survival probability question. Excluded from the sample are proxy respondents
and non-respondents in the 2000 wave of data collection. Also excluded are persons over
90 who were not asked the survival probability questions and people for whom we did not
have realized survival information in 2010.46 Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the
variables used in our analyses. The average age of our sample members is just over 68 years
(ranging from 54 to 89 years) and on average the target age was 16 years from their current
age. The modal sample member is a white female with a high school education although
there is substantial variance in each of these dimensions.
Our theory suggests that people may utilize personal information in forming their sub-
jective survival beliefs. Parents’ age at death, one’s own current health status and health
behavior are such variables. As Table 3.1 shows, 16 percent of our sample still has a living
mother but only 5 percent has a living father. The average age at death of the mothers is 76
years while the corresponding number for the fathers is 72 years. We construct six variables
about parental mortality. Three of them correspond to the mortality of the same sex parent
(father-son, mother-daughter pairs) and three correspond to the opposite sex parent. Within
each pair we first take the age at death of the parent if he/she is dead. If (s)he is alive we
impute the expected age at death of the parent based on his/her gender and age. In all mod-
45The 2002 HRS is a representative panel sample of the 54+ population and their spouses.
46Actual mortality of HRS respondent is very precisely measured from administrative data (the National
Health Index) and it is even available for people who dropped out of the survey in a later wave.
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els we include dummy variables about whether the parents are alive to control for potential
imputation bias. Finally we create a linear spline from the imputed parental mortality with
a single cut-off point at the age of the interviewee. This approach is motivated by the idea
that individuals might consider parental mortality less informative about their own survival
chances if they have already lived longer than their parents.47 These four splines (two for
each parent) together with the two dummies constitute our six parental mortality variables.
We also include in our analysis three sets of variables on health related behavior. As
Table 3.1 shows, 43 percent of our sample reports regular exercise at least three times a
week. While only 14 percent of the sample smoked in 2002, almost 60 percent reported
having smoked in the past. There is a big variation in the sample in drinking behavior.
Roughly half of our sample (48 percent) reports that they drink alcohol sometimes, but the
majority are not regular alcohol consumers. Among those who are, the average number of
days when they drink is 3.4 days a week, and the average number of alcoholic beverages
consumed is 1.9. Self-rated health in the HRS is measured on a five-point scale–1) Excellent,
2) Very Good, 3) Good, 4) Fair and 5) Poor.48 We translate these into three categories: 1)
excellent/very good; 2) good; 3) fair/poor . We then construct dummy variables representing
the combination of self-rated health in 2000 and 2002 for each respondent with excellent/very
good in both years as the baseline case. In Table 3.1 we only show the marginals of this joint
distribution. As we can see the fraction of people in “excellent/very good” health decreased
from 47 percent in 2000 to 43 percent in 2002. The fraction of people in “good” health did
not change much (31 and 32 percent) and the fraction in “fair/poor” health increased from
47Simple exploratory work suggested that parental mortality has a stronger effect on expectations when
the parent died at an old age. The specification we use in this paper is not the only way to allow for such
non-linearity and future work should explore alternative models.
48These three categories represent relatively good, average and relatively bad health. The reason for the
aggregation is that we interact subjective health in 2000 and 2002 and adding 5 x 5 = 25 interactions would
make the interpretation of these variables difficult.
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22 to 25 percent.
We also include two cognitive measures (“Vocabulary” and the “27-point cognitive capac-
ity scale”49), and the CESD depression score which measures depressive symptoms.50 Table
3.1 shows that the average member of our sample has higher cognitive and lower depression
scores than the average HRS respondent.
3.7.2 Maximum likelihood model estimates
The objective of this section is to test the modal response hypothesis (MRH) through a
series of performance tests. All the results we present in this section are based on the twelve
estimated models shown in Table 3.2, 3.7, 3.11 and 3.15. Table 3.2 reports models without
covariates, Table 3.7 adds basic demographic information, Table 3.11 expands the model
with cognition, personality and parental mortality and finally 3.15 contains all variables
including subjective health. All tables present three models. The first columns show actual
eight year survival of the HRS respondents between 2002 and 2010 estimated with nonlinear
least squares. The second columns shows results using subjective expectations based on
the mean model and the last two columns show results from the MRH “mode” model. All
the parameters of our model (γ0, θ0.5, n, γ1, k, σn) are assumed to be positive and thus their
logarithms enter the likelihood function. Covariates potentially enter two equations. The first
is the equation of θ0.5, which is the scale parameter of the gamma distribution of the mortality
hazard at the age of 50. In the actual survival models we model γ0 directly. Covariates with
positive coefficients are estimated to increase the mortality hazard and decrease the survival
chances. The magnitudes of these coefficients will be analyzed later when we derive average
49The 27-point scale Langa-Weir method is discussed in Crimmins et al. (2011). HRS cognitive measures
are described in Fisher et al. (2012).
50See Ofstedal et al. (2005).
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partial effects of them on various survival probabilities. The second equation where covariates
appear is the equation of the precision of beliefs (n). Positive coefficients mean tighter, more
precise probability beliefs.
Panel A of Figure 3.3 compares estimated actual 8 year survival probabilities of HRS
respondents to subjective survival beliefs in 2002 computed from the models in Table 3.2
with no covariates. The horizontal axis shows the current age of respondents in 2002 and the
vertical axis shows the fitted average 8 year survival chances from the three models. As we
discussed in Section 3, heterogeneity in survival chances leads to sample selection as people
with better fitness are more likely to survive and become respondents of the HRS survey at
older ages. In the case of realized survival, only the interpretation of the estimates changes,
but we do not need to make any further adjustments of the parameters. The demography
literature calls survival tables of this sort “Survival probabilities of the survivors.” In the case
of subjective survival chances, however, we do have to properly adjust for the unmeasured
genetic and environmental differences of cohorts as discussed in Section 4. As we can see,
both the mean and the MRH “mode” model track the actual survival chances very well up
until about age 84, when the subjective probabilities become too optimistic. While the 8 year
actual survival chance of a 90 year old is roughly 20 percent, the corresponding numbers in
the MRH and mean models are ˜45 and 55 percent, respectively. Thus, although the MRH
model provides numbers that are closer to the true survival chances at old ages, these numbers
are still too large on average. It is not obvious, however, whether these overly optimistic
numbers are biases in people’s heads or biases due to measurement error in the survey. In
this paper we do not try to separate these two types of bias and we simply compare the
mean, the mode and the actual survival models using the raw data.
Panel B of Figure 3.3 shows the estimated heterogeneity of survival chances in our sample.
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The different curves correspond to different values of γ0 with lower values meaning better
fitness. As we can see, there is notable variability in survival chances. For example, the
difference in median survival (i.e., half-life) between those in the 10th and 90th percentiles
of the estimated frailty distribution is about 25 years. That is, comparing two groups of 50
year olds, half of those in the 90th percentile are expected to survive to age 70 while among
those in the 10th percentile half are expected to survive to age 95. Using only mortality
data, one cannot identify the unobserved heterogeneity in survival chances.51
The reason the MRH model is somewhat better than the mean model in predicting low
probability events is that the high fraction of 50 percent answers are allowed to be focal
answers that do not arbitrarily push the mean survival chances up. To visualize this effect
we simulated survey responses based on the estimated models of subjective survival chances
in Table 3.15. To get precise numbers, we used 651,900 observations for simulation which is
50 times the size of our dataset (651, 900 = 50×13, 038). As we can see in Figure 3.4, the MRH
model is able to predict histograms of responses that are very similar to the histogram of
actual responses in the bottom panel. The ratio of 50 percent answers is around 25 percent,
while the ratio of 0 and 100 percent answers are both around 10 percent. What is more
important, the MRH model recognizes that the high fraction of focal answers should not be
taken at face value as a large fraction of them only reflect imprecise knowledge. The mean
model, however, takes all the focal answers at face value. Consequently, the mean model
is not able to predict a histogram similar to actual responses, and it seriously biases the
51There is a long history of discussion about the difficulty in separately identifying duration effects and
unobserved heterogeneity. See, for example, Vaupel et al. (1979) and Heckman and Singer (1984). Using
subjective survival data, however, identifying unobserved heterogeneity in frailty is easier, because we observe
probabilities of survival on the individual level. This contrasts with the use of mortality data, where it is
hard to know which survivor is fit and which is simply luckier than other non-survivors. Even though we
use a particular functional form for how unobserved heterogeneity enters the model (the gamma-Gompertz
framework) it is important to note that these functional form assumptions are not needed for identifying
unobserved heterogeneity in subjective frailty.
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estimation of low or high probability events.
Much of a person’s personal information about health is likely embodied in his assessment
of the level and trajectory of self-rated health. To explore the effects of other covariates,
we present estimates of models with and without subjective health in Tables 3.4 and 3.3
respectively. Both tables show estimated average partial effects of surviving from age 55
to 75 and from 75 to 95. Appendix B in the e-companion contains more detailed versions
of these tables and further specifications, including models with only demographic variables
and partial effects of surviving from 2002 to 2010.
The tables show that the majority of the coefficients are smaller in absolute value when
subjective as opposed to objective information is used, but the coefficients based on the
MRH are closer to objective values. This pattern is more obvious for low probability events
(surviving from age 75 to 95), as the coefficients are roughly two times as big in the MRH.
Thus, not only the average survival probabilities (Figure 3.3), but the average partial effects
are also closer to objective values compared to the mean model. We take it as evidence
that the MRH model is more successful for modeling subjective probabilistic expectations,
particularly for low probability events, because the bias from focal answers is explicitly
modeled.
However, the majority of the coefficients are still smaller in absolute value in the MRH
than in the actual survival models. There are two potential explanations for this. Either there
is measurement error in the data or people are underestimating the effect of some variables
when forming expectations about their longevity. Without further assumptions, measure-
ment error, other than focal responses, is not identified in our model. Note, however, that
not all coefficients are attenuated equally. In fact two coefficients are systematically higher
in absolute value in the subjective models: same sex parents’ age at death and depression.
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This is consistent with a model in which agents base their expectations on easily observable
determinants of mortality (parent’s survival) because they have limited information on de-
mographic differences in the society and on the role of different behavioral factors, such as
smoking and exercising, on survival. In this case the partial effects of personal information is
expected to be higher for subjective than for objective survival; and the pattern is expected
to be the reverse for other variables. This is exactly what we see in the data.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 also show that people are aware that regular exercising is beneficial, and
smoking is harmful for them, although they underestimate the role of these factors. We can
also see that regular but limited alcohol consumption is not damaging, while teetotalling and
heavy drinking are. Even more interesting is the comparison of the models with and without
controlling for subjective health. Not surprisingly both the objective and subjective survival
probabilities are less affected by behavior when subjective health is controlled. However,
the subjective values shrink more strongly. For example, as Table 3.3 shows those who quit
smoking expect a 2 percentage point lower chance of surviving from age 55 to 75 compared
to those who never smoked. However, this effect disappears when subjective health is taken
into account (Table 3.4). It means that healthy quitters falsely believe that their survival
chances are the same as those who never smoked; whereas quitters who had already acquired
a disease understand its consequences.
It is also worth noting the demographic differences in subjective and objective survival.
As expected, females are more likely to live longer and this is reflected in their subjective
expectations. Racial differences, however, are more complex. Conditional on education,
personal information, health and behavior, blacks and Hispanics have a higher chance of
survival than whites in this age range. African Americans’ expectations reflect this difference,
but Hispanics are more pessimistic than Non-Hispanics. Table 3.8-3.10 in the e-companion
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show roughly similar patterns when only demographic variables enter the model. Finally
even though the educated are more likely to live longer (Table 3.8-3.10), when personality,
personal information and behavior are controlled, the effect of education becomes negative
(!). Further investigation, not shown in the paper, shows that this result is driven by the
cognitive capacity variable. Education and cognition have a strong positive correlation but
cognition is a better predictor of survival than education. Moreover, the educated also have
better subjective health, and thus the effect of education becomes even more negative when
health is controlled (Table 3.4). Moreover, the educated believe themselves to have better
chances of surviving independent of the control variables used.
Finally let us take a look at the estimated distribution of probability beliefs (second
order probability distribution, gi(p)) of HRS respondents. Based on the MRH model without
covariates (Table 3.2) we computed the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles of belief
precision (n) and the scale parameter of the survival function (γ0) for the cohort of age 50.
These numbers can be found in Table 3.6. Figure 3.5 shows the corresponding probability
belief distributions of the probability of surviving from age 50 to age 80. As we can see, there
is an enormous heterogeneity in probability beliefs. The median responder in HRS (3rd row
and 3rd column of Figure 3.5) has a belief distribution that is single peaked but wide, having
significant probability mass for any possible probability values between zero and one. It
means that although the median responder’s best guess for the probability of surviving from
age 50 to age 80 is roughly 50 percent, she is quite unsure about this probability. People
with even less precise beliefs are very unsure. For example, already at the 25th percentile
of belief precision (where n = 1.58) everyone provides a focal response of either 0, 50 or 100.
At the 10th percentile (where n = 0.4) everyone has U-shaped beliefs and, thus, responds
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with an epistemic 50%52. As we increase belief precision to the 75th percentile, the second
order probability belief distribution becomes quite tight, having most of its mass in the
neighborhood of the mean probability. It means that at least 25 percent of the respondents
have very precise beliefs about their own survival chances.
Determinants of belief precision appear in Table 3.5 and the last columns of Table 3.7,3.11
and 3.15. Positive coefficients mean tighter, more precise beliefs. As we can see more
educated people have more certain beliefs. This is consistent with our hypothesis, discussed
in Section 3, that more educated people may have a broader knowledge of evidence about
mortality and its causes. We can also see that the deterioration of health, especially from
previously excellent levels, leads to more uncertainty about survival chances, perhaps because
of uncertainty about the future course of a new disease. Those who were in poor health both
in 2000 and in 2002, however, hold the most certain and pessimistic beliefs about their
survival chances.
The effect of age and the time horizon of the survival question in HRS have complicated
relations to uncertainty. For a fixed time horizon, the net effect of age on uncertainty is
negative, because the interaction term dominates for any time horizon values used in HRS
(from 11 years to 26 years). Thus, older people seem to have more precise beliefs about
their survival chances which might reflect learning. For a fixed age, the net effect of the time
horizon on uncertainty is also negative, because the interaction term dominates again. This
means that people hold more precise views about their long run than their short run survival
52Note, however, that the particular shape of the distribution of beliefs is only identified from the lognormal
functional form in the region where n is below 1. Because there are many focal responses in the HRS data, the
model estimates many uncertain responses where n < 1. It is hard to know, however, what the distribution
of looks like, conditional on being below 1. The log-normality assumption might or might not describe this
conditional distribution well. It is possible, for example, that no-one has U-shaped beliefs, but all epistemic
50 responses come from a uniform distribution. If that is the case, then the log-normality assumption of n
is inappropriate.
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chances.
The two splines measuring same sex parental mortality in Table 3.11 and 3.15 shows a
“V” shape. It means that people are the most unsure about their survival chances when they
are around the age when their same sex parent died. We can also see that active smokers
and those who have already quit have less precise survival expectations compared to those
who never smoked; infrequent alcohol consumption leads to more precise beliefs; women are
less sure than men and depressed people are relatively more certain about their otherwise
poor survival expectations.
3.8 Conclusion
The modal response hypothesis is used in this paper as the foundation for an econometric
model that is intended to provide a mapping between survey responses to probability ques-
tions and the underlying subjective probability beliefs of individuals about their chances of
surviving to a target age. In this paper, we have presented the MRH as a hypothesis designed
to capture the kinds of “gut response” to such questions that would be made after about 15
seconds of consideration by persons who vary in the amount of information they have about
actuarial risks to health, about their own health-related circumstances and in their capacity
to process such information into subjective beliefs. We argued in Section 3 that reporting
the mode is relatively easier from a cognitive point of view than the mean or the median;
the mode is equal to a very simple rule-of-thumb estimator for the probability in question;
and that the mode often provides a good approximation to the expected probability that is
called for in SEU theory.
Our empirical findings suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity in subjective sur-
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vival risks, some of it associated with age, sex, race, education, health related behavioral
factors, parental mortality and cognitive capacity. We have shown that subjective survival
expectations line up with actual mortality very well when the objective probabilities are
moderate. The subjective survival probabilities, however, become overly optimistic at old
ages when the true survival probabilities are relatively low. We have shown that the MRH
model does a better job compared to a standard mean model in reducing this bias as the
MRH models focal answers in an explicit way. It remains for future research to learn whether
the overly optimistic subjective expectations are biases in the heads of individuals, poten-
tially having behavioral consequences, or they are a result of survey measurement error,
potentially being related to uncertain beliefs.
In the empirical section of this paper, we have also found substantial uncertainty about
mortality risks which is manifested by considerable spread in the estimated distribution of
subjective survival probabilities for a typical respondent. In addition, we found significant
variation in uncertainty, holding expected survival risk constant. It remains for future work
to explore the explanation of these findings more deeply and to see whether survival risk and
uncertainty about this risk play a role in decisions made by HRS respondents.
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Tables and figures
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Survival Probabilities to Target Age, by Age of Re-
spondent, HRS-2002
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Figure 3.2: Density of probability beliefs (gi(p)) for different mean (µi) and pre-
cision (ni) values
Figure 3.3: Average actual and expected survival probabilities and dispersion in
beliefs
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Pr
(S
u
rv
ive
 
to
 
20
10
)
54 59 64 69 74 79 84 89
Current age
Mean model Mode model
Actual survival
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
Su
rv
iva
l p
ro
ba
bi
liti
es
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Target age
10th quantile 25th quantile
50th quantile 75th quantile
90th quantile
Panel A: 8 year actual and expected survival Panel B: Heterogeneity in the subjective
probabilities by age in 2002 survival curves, MRH model
206
Figure 3.4: Simulated survey responses based on the mean and the mode models
with all covariates and the empirical distribution of survey responses
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Figure 3.5: Estimated distribution of probability beliefs gi(p) of surviving from
age 50 to age 80
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics, HRS-2002
mean sd
Alive in 2010 0.77 0.42
Subjective survival probability to target age 48.40 32.13
Age 68.15 8.69
Target age less actual age 15.97 4.17
Female 0.59 0.49
Black 0.12 0.33
Hispanic 0.06 0.24
Years of education 12.54 3.00
Mother is alive 0.16 0.37
Mother’s age of death/100 or current age 0.76 0.15
Father is alive 0.05 0.23
Father’s age of death/100 or current age 0.72 0.14
Exercises at least 3 times a week 0.43 0.49
Ever smoked 0.59 0.49
Smokes now 0.14 0.34
Ever drinks alcohol 0.48 0.50
# of days a week when drinks alcohol 1.10 2.08
# of days a week when drinks alcohol if positive 3.42 2.34
# of drinks when drinks alcohol 0.61 1.18
# of drinks when drinks alcohol if positive 1.92 1.36
Health excellent / very good, 2002 0.43 0.49
Health good, 2002 0.32 0.47
Health fair / poor, 2002 0.25 0.43
Health excellent / very good, 2000 0.47 0.50
Health good, 2000 0.31 0.46
Health fair / poor, 2000 0.22 0.42
Cognition score, std. 0.08 1.01
Vocabulary score, std. 0.11 0.97
CESD depression score, std. -0.04 1.04
N 13038
Table 3.2: Actual survival until 2010 and the mean and MRH models of subjec-
tive survival expectations, models without covariates
Actual survival Mean model MRH
ln γ0 -8.404
[0.21]***
ln θ0.5 -11.174 -8.827
[0.150]*** [0.169]***
lnn 1.978
[0.040]***
ln γ1 2.277 2.73 2.397
[0.024]*** [0.012]*** [0.020]***
ln k -0.656 0.121
[0.011]*** [0.025]***
lnσn 0.814
[0.025]***
N 13038 13038 13038
Log-likelihood -57961.459 -47058.606
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent
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Table 3.3: Average partial effects of surviving from age 55 to 75 and from 75
to 95 in three models with demographic, personality and personal information
variables: actual survival and the mean and MRH models of subjective survival
expectations
55-75 75-95
Actual survival Mean MRH Actual survival Mean MRH
Demographics
Education -0.003** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.004** 0.003*** 0.005***
Female 0.073*** 0.035*** 0.051*** 0.097*** 0.012*** 0.029***
Black 0.043*** 0.031*** 0.07*** 0.058*** 0.011*** 0.04***
Hispanic 0.055*** -0.052*** -0.04** 0.073*** -0.019*** -0.023**
Cognition and personality, standardized scores
Cognition 0.055*** 0.02*** 0.019*** 0.073*** 0.007*** 0.011***
Vocabulary 0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.002
Depression -0.031*** -0.053*** -0.06*** -0.041*** -0.019*** -0.034***
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Same sex, sp1 0.026 0.068 -0.048 0.035 0.024 -0.028
Same sex, sp2 0.159*** 0.314*** 0.415*** 0.21** 0.112*** 0.239***
Same sex lives 0.011 0.001 0.006 0.014 0 0.003
Opp. sex, sp1 0.038 0.186*** 0.156*** 0.051 0.066*** 0.09***
Opp. sex, sp2 0.144** 0.097** 0.116** 0.191** 0.035** 0.067**
Opp. sex lives 0.028 0.007 0.007 0.038 0.002 0.004
Health related behavior
Exercises 0.096*** 0.054*** 0.061*** 0.128*** 0.019*** 0.035***
Ever smoked -0.076*** -0.02*** -0.015** -0.101*** -0.007*** -0.008**
Smokes now -0.097*** -0.059*** -0.06*** -0.128*** -0.021*** -0.035***
Ever drinks 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.033*** 0.074*** 0.016*** 0.019***
# of days drinks 0.007*** 0.004* 0.005** 0.01*** 0.001* 0.003**
# of drinks -0.012*** -0.009** -0.008** -0.016*** -0.003** -0.004**
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level; Bold partial effects at the Mean and the MRH models
indicate that they are closer to the partial effects of actual survival.
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Table 3.4: Average partial effects of surviving from age 55 to 75 and from 75
to 95 in three models with demographic, personality, personal information and
subjective health variables: actual survival and the mean and MRH models of
subjective survival expectations
55-75 75-95
Actual survival Mean MRH Actual survival Mean MRH
Demographics
Education -0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004*** -0.007*** 0.003*** 0.003***
Female 0.067*** 0.026*** 0.039*** 0.086*** 0.01*** 0.024***
Black 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.086*** 0.067*** 0.018*** 0.053***
Hispanic 0.071*** -0.04*** -0.019 0.092*** -0.016** -0.012
Cognition and personality, standardized scores
Cognition 0.05*** 0.009** 0.008** 0.064*** 0.004** 0.005*
Vocabulary 0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.001 -0.002
Depression -0.009*** -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.012*** -0.01*** -0.019***
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Same sex, sp1 0.019 0.104** -0.022 0.025 0.041** -0.014
Same sex, sp2 0.122** 0.268*** 0.375*** 0.157** 0.105*** 0.231***
Same sex lives 0.011 -0.001 0.002 0.014 0 0.001
Opp. sex, sp1 0.043 0.206** 0.155*** 0.056 0.081*** 0.095***
Opp. sex, sp2 0.093 0.061 0.1** 0.12 0.024 0.061**
Opp. sex lives 0.041 0.006 0.003 0.053 0.002 0.002
Health related behavior
Exercises 0.066*** 0.025*** 0.03*** 0.086*** 0.01*** 0.019***
Ever smoked -0.067*** -0.005 -0.002 -0.086*** -0.002 -0.001
Smokes now -0.093*** -0.053*** -0.056*** -0.121*** -0.021*** -0.034***
Ever drinks 0.045*** 0.021*** 0.013* 0.059*** 0.008** 0.008*
# of days drinks 0.005** 0.002 0.003 0.007** 0.001 0.002
# of drinks -0.01** -0.009** -0.007** -0.013** -0.003** -0.004*
Subjective health in 2000/2002
Excel./excel. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Excel./good -0.095*** -0.063*** -0.071*** -0.123*** -0.025*** -0.044***
Excel./poor -0.177*** -0.118*** -0.137*** -0.23*** -0.046*** -0.084***
Good/excel. -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.055*** -0.064*** -0.02*** -0.034***
Good/good -0.095*** -0.097*** -0.113*** -0.124*** -0.038*** -0.069***
Good/poor -0.192*** -0.17*** -0.173*** -0.248*** -0.067*** -0.106***
Poor/excel. -0.124*** -0.1*** -0.108*** -0.161*** -0.04*** -0.066***
Poor/good -0.142*** -0.139*** -0.146*** -0.183*** -0.055*** -0.09***
Poor/poor -0.209*** -0.237*** -0.263*** -0.27*** -0.093*** -0.162***
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level; Bold partial effects at the Mean and the MRH models
indicate that they are closer to the partial effects of actual survival.
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Table 3.5: Predictors of belief precision (n) in three versions of the MRH models
of subjective survival expectations
lnn)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Demographics
Education 0.056*** 0.051*** 0.053***
Female -0.139*** -0.156*** -0.157***
Black 0.053 0.041 0.02
Hispanic 0.188* 0.155 0.132
Cognition and personality, standardized scores
Cognition 0.021 0.027
Vocabulary 0.008 0.009
Depression 0.067*** 0.043*
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Same sex, sp1 -0.493* -0.493*
Same sex, sp2 0.467 0.5
Same sex lives -0.064 -0.071
Opp. sex, sp1 -0.122 -0.117
Opp. sex, sp2 0.528 0.522
Opp. sex lives 0.026 0.032
Health related behavior
Exercises 0.015 0.02
Ever smoked -0.091* -0.091*
Smokes now 0.007 0.006
Ever drinks 0.174*** 0.177***
# of days drinks -0.014 -0.015
# of drinks -0.035 -0.033
Subjective health in 2000/2002
Excel./excel. ref.
Excel./good -0.172**
Excel./poor 0.122
Good/excel. -0.092
Good/good -0.05
Good/poor -0.059
Poor/excel. -0.106
Poor/good -0.042
Poor/poor 0.177**
Age and time horizon of the HRS question; variables divided by 100
Age -2.513* -2.26 -2.333
Horizon -7.503 -9.823 -10.037*
Age X Horizon 25.438** 27.698*** 27.82***
Constant 1.572* 1.845* 1.882**
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
211
Table 3.6: Quantiles of belief precision (n) and probabilities of surviving from
age 50 to age 80
Quantiles n γ0 S(50, 80)
10 0.40 0.000022 0.87
25 1.58 0.000054 0.71
50 7.23 0.000120 0.47
75 33.12 0.000229 0.23
90 130.31 0.000370 0.10
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APPENDIX H
Derivations
Effect of individual survival heterogeneity on sample selection
In our model there is individual heterogeneity in survival chances. One consequence of this
is that fit individuals will be overrepresented in the sample over time as frail individuals are
more likely to die. This sample selection can be conveniently modeled in our framework. Let
ka and θa denote the shape and scale parameters in cohort a. As Vaupel (1979) shows the
following is true for any cohorts
ka = kr, (3.18)
θa =
1
1
θr + (exp (γ1a)− exp (γ1r))
, (3.19)
where r is a reference cohort. As we can see, older and younger cohorts share the same shape
parameter ka, but older cohorts have lower scale parameter θa (lower frailty) than younger
cohorts.
Proof of equation (3.11)
The density function of the gamma distribution is
f (x) =
1
Υ (k) θk
xk−1 exp
(
−x
θ
)
= c (k, θ)xk−1 exp
(
−x
θ
)
. (3.20)
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It is well known that expected value of the gamma function is
E (x) =
ˆ ∞
0
xc (k, θ)xk−1 exp
(
−x
θ
)
dx = kθ. (3.21)
The expected value of a scaled gamma function is also gamma and its expected value is
E (cx) = ckθ. (3.22)
The expected value of the negative exponentiated gamma function is
E (exp (−x)) =
ˆ ∞
0
exp (−x) c (k, θ)xk−1 exp
(
−x
θ
)
dx (3.23)
=
ˆ ∞
0
c (k, θ)xk−1 exp
(
−x
θ
− x
)
dx =
ˆ ∞
0
c (k, θ)xk−1 exp
(
− x
θ
θ+1
)
dx = ...(3.24)
Note that this is very similar to the expected value formula of the gamma function, thus
... =
(k − 1) θ
θ + 1
c (k, θ)
c
(
k + 1, θθ+1
) = (k − 1) θ
θ + 1
Υ (k − 1)
(
θ
θ+1
)k
Υ (k) θk
= ... (3.25)
Note that Γ (k) = (k − 1)Γ (k − 1)and thus
... =
k − 1
k − 1
θk
θk
(1 + θ)
k
= (1 + θ)
k
. (3.26)
Thus if γ0i ∼ Υ (k, θ) then
E (Si (a, T )) = E (exp (−γ0i (exp (γ1T )− exp (γ1a)))) = (1 + θ (exp (γ1T )− exp (γ1a)))−k . (3.27)
214
Details about the use of the Delta method to derive average partial
effects
The goal is to derive point estimates and standard errors of the partial effects of any covariate
on the survival probability from age to age
APEj (a1, a2) = Ex
[
∂Si (a1, a2)
∂xj
]
. (3.28)
The point estimates are
APEj (a, T ) = Ex
[
∂ (1 + θ (exp (γ1T )− exp (γ1a)))−k
∂xj
]
= ... (3.29)
Let us denote e(a′, a) = exp (γ1a′)− exp (γ1a). Then
... = Ex
∂
(
1 + e(T,a)exp(−β′xi)+e(a,r)
)−k
∂xj
 (3.30)
= Ex
[
−k
(
1 +
e(T, a)
exp (−β′xi) + e(a, r)
)−k−1
e(T, a) exp (−β′xi)βj
(exp (−β′xi) + e(a, r))2
]
(3.31)
= Ex
[
−k (exp (−β′xi) + e(T, r))−k−1 (exp (−β′xi) + e(a, r))k−1 e(T, a) exp (−β′xi)βj
]
(3.32)
By substituting the estimated coefficients into this formula we have a point estimate for the
average partial effect of xj on the survival probability from age a to age T . The standard
errors can be computed with the delta method. For any differentiable transformation g(β)
and variance-covariance matrix Σ, the variance covariance matrix of the estimator of is
(∇g)T Σ (∇g). Thus, we only need to compute the first derivatives of g. Let us see them
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one-by-one.
∂APEj (a, T )
∂βl
= −I (j = l)Ex
(
k (exp (−β′xi) + e(T, r))−k−1 (exp (−β′xi) + e(a, r))k−1 e(T, a) exp (−β′xi)
)
−Ex
(
k (k + 1) (exp (−β′xi) + e(T, r))−k−2 (exp (−β′xi) + e(a, r))k−1 e(T, a) exp (−2β′xi)βjxil
)
+Ex
(
k (k − 1) (exp (−β′xi) + e(T, r))−k−1 (exp (−β′xi) + e(a, r))k−2 e(T, a) exp (−2β′xi)βjxil
)
+Ex
(
k (exp (−β′xi) + e(T, r))−k−1 (exp (−β′xi) + e(a, r))k−1 e(T, a) exp (−β′xi)βjxil
)
. (3.33)
∂APEj (a, T )
∂k
= −Ex
[
(exp (−β′xi) + e(T, r))−k−1 (exp (−β′xi) + e(a, r))k−1 e(T, a) exp (−β′xi)βj
]
−Ex
[
k (exp (−β′xi) + e(T, r))−k−1 (exp (−β′xi) + e(a, r))k−1 e(T, a) exp (−β′xi)βj
]
×
× (− ln (exp (−β′xi) + e(T, r))) + Ex (ln (exp (−β′xi) + e(T, r))) . (3.34)
∂APEj (a, T )
∂γ1
= [T exp (γ1T )− r exp (γ1r)] e(T, a) exp (−β′xi)βj ×
×
{
k (k + 1) (exp (−β′xi) + e(T, r))−k−2 (exp (−β′xi) + e(a, r))k−1
−k (k − 1) (exp (−β′xi) + e(T, r))−k−1 (exp (−β′xi) + e(a, r))k−2
}
. (3.35)
By substituting the estimated coefficients into these formulas we have an estimator for the
variance covariance matrix of the average partial effects.
The likelihood function of the mean model
The likelihood function can be written as
li = Pr
(
pi ≤ Si (a, t) ≤ pi
)
(3.36)
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where pi and pi denote the lower and upper bound probabilities that would be rounded to
the survey response. For example, if the rounding function rounds to the closest 1 percent
and the survey response is 27 percent, then pi = 0.265 and pi = 0.275. If the rounding function
rounds to the closest 5 percent, then the corresponding probabilities would be pi = 0.225 and
pi = 0.275.53 The likelihood function, thus, is
li = Pr
( − ln pi
exp (γ1t)− exp (γ1a) ≥ γ0i ≥
− ln pi
exp (γ1t)− exp (γ1a)
)
, (3.37)
which can be easily computed from the c.d.f. of the gamma distribution in with parameters
k and θ.
The likelihood function of the modal response model
The estimation of the MRH can be carried out by maximum simulated likelihood (MSL).
MSL computes the likelihood function by drawing many values from the distribution of one
(or several) random variables and computing the average conditional likelihood, conditioning
on those values. In our case, it is worth simulating values from the distribution of uni. A
standard version of the simulated likelihood would look like the following.54
li =
1
S
S∑
s=1
li (u
s
ni) . (3.38)
53As we can see, a response that is not a multiple of 5 percent cannot be a rounded version of a true latent
probability when we round to the closest 5 percent. The rounding model we have in mind is one where
agents only identify bins (e.g. 0%-2.5%, 2.5%-7.5%, . . . , 97.5%-100%) and any response in a particular bin
only tells the econometrician that the true latent probability is also in the same bin. An alternative model
would be that of Manski and Molinari (2010) where they identify individuals’ rounding practices across many
probability questions and use different rounding functions for each individual.
54Note that in case the simulated values are drawn from the distribution of uni, we do not need to weight
the terms in (3.36) by the density of the draw as the simulation itself already weights the data.
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where S is the number of simulation draws. The problem with this approach is that our
model is full of discontinuities that make this approach infeasible. Let us rewrite the MRH
formula in Section 3 with µi and ni, and let us denote ni = 1niand ni = 1− 1ni . The MRH model
assumes that the survey response is
pmrhi =

round
(
µini−1
ni−2
)
if ni > µi > ni
1 if µi > ni, ni
0 if µi < ni, ni
0.5 if ni < µi < ni.
(3.39)
As we can see, whenever ni ≤ 1 an answer can only be 50 percent. Whenever ni ≤ 2,
an answer can only be 0, 50 or 100 percent. These discontinuities make the simulation
model in (3.38) hard for the following reason. Imagine that during the maximization of the
likelihood function we get into a region where the precision of beliefs ni is always below 2 for
each simulation draw. This could happen if z′iβ
k
n  2 and σ2,kn is small, where k indexes the
actual guesses for the parameters. In this case, the likelihood function would be undefined
and the numerical maximization would fail. As a remedy, we recommend drawing separate
simulation values from each region of ni; this assures that the likelihood is well-defined in
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each iteration of the maximization.55 The likelihood function, thus, is written
li =
1
S1
S1∑
s=1
li (u
s
ni|ni ≤ 1) Pr (ni ≤ 1) +
1
S1
S1∑
s=1
li (u
s
ni|1 < ni ≤ 2) Pr (1 < ni ≤ 2)
+
1
S1
S1∑
s=1
li (u
s
ni|ni > 2) Pr (ni > 2) . (3.40)
Now, whenever z′iβ
k
n  2 and σ2,kn is small in a particular iteration for a non-focal answer,
the likelihood is a well-defined, extremely small number. The probabilities of the different
regions of ni are trivial since ni is assumed to have a log-normal distribution. Whenever
ni ≤ 1 an answer can only be fifty and thus the conditional likelihood is
li (u
s
ni|ni ≤ 1) =

1 if phrsi = 50
0 otherwise,
(3.41)
where phrsi represents the survey response to the HRS mortality question. When 1 < ni ≤ 2,
it is assured that ni ≥ ni and thus
li (u
s
ni|1 < ni ≤ 2) =

Pr
(
ni < Si (a, t) < ni
)
if phrsi = 50
Pr (Si (a, t) ≤ ni) if phrsi = 0
Pr
(
Si (a, t) ≥ ni
)
if phrsi = 100
0 otherwise.
(3.42)
These probabilities can be computed analogously to the mean model derived above. The
55Hill et al. (2004) did not use this trick when they estimated a very similar model. The consequence was
that they had to make restrictions on their model to be able to carry out the numerical estimation. It turned
out that our model is identified and estimable in practice under mild conditions once these discontinuities
are properly taken care of.
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most complicated, although still very straightforward, case is the conditional likelihood in
the region where ni > 2. In this region ni < ni . The only complication is that a 0 and a
100 answer can now be either a focal answer or an exact rounded answer. 50 answers in this
region cannot be focal answers as ni > 2 and thus either αi or βi is larger than one. The
conditional likelihood is
li (u
s
ni|ni > 2) =

Pr
(
Si (a, t) ≤ ni OR Si(a,t)ni−1ni−2 ≤ pi
)
if phrsi = 0
Pr
(
Si (a, t) ≥ ni OR Si(a,t)ni−1ni−2 ≥ pi
)
if phrsi = 100
Pr
(
pi ≤ Si(a,t)ni−1ni−2 ≤ pi
)
otherwise.
(3.43)
After straightforward algebra the conditional likelihood becomes
li (u
s
ni|ni > 2) =

Pr
(
Si (a, t) ≤ max
{
ni,
pi(ni−2)+1
ni
})
if phrsi = 0
Pr
(
Si (a, t) ≥ min
{
ni,
pi(ni−2)+1
ni
})
if phrsi = 100
Pr
(
pi(ni−2)+1
ni
≤ Si (a, t) ≤ pi(ni−2)+1ni
)
otherwise.
(3.44)
and again these probabilities can be computed analogously to the mean model derived above.
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APPENDIX I
Additional Tables
Table 3.7: Outputs of the ML estimation models with demographic variables;
actual survival and the mean and MRH models of subjective survival expecta-
tions
Actual survival Mean MRH
ln γ0 ln θ
0.5 ln θ0.5 lnn
Demographics
Education -0.048 -0.13 -0.089 0.056
[0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.005]*** [0.009]***
Female -0.343 -0.193 -0.209 -0.139
[0.033]*** [0.037]*** [0.027]*** [0.051]***
Black 0.037 -0.007 -0.151 0.053
[0.055] [0.053] [0.038]*** [0.076]
Hispanic -0.157 0.329 0.198 0.188
[0.079]** [0.083]*** [0.062]*** [0.110]*
Age and time horizon of the HRS question; variables divided by 100
Age -2.513
[1.478]*
Horizon -7.503
[6.314]
Age X Horizon 25.438
[10.693]**
Constant -7.538 -9.358 -7.234 1.572
[0.223]*** [0.190]*** [0.181]*** [0.946]*
Other parameters
ln γ1 2.268 2.719 2.358
[0.024]*** [0.012]*** [0.020]***
ln k -0.629 0.158
[0.011]*** [0.025]***
lnσn 0.808
[0.025]***
N 13038 13038 13038
Log-likelihood -57714.3 -46739.4
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
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Table 3.8: Average partial effects of surviving 8 more years in three models
with demographic variables: actual survival and the mean and MRH models of
subjective survival expectations
Actual survival Mean MRH
ln γ0 ln θ
0.5 ln θ0.5 lnn
Demographics
Education 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.056
[0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.009]***
Female 0.061 0.017 0.027 -0.139
[0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]*** [0.051]***
Black -0.007 0.001 0.02 0.053
[0.010] [0.005] [0.006]*** [0.076]
Hispanic 0.028 -0.028 -0.026 0.188
[0.014]** [0.008]*** [0.009]*** [0.110]*
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
Table 3.9: Average partial effects of surviving from age 55 to 75 in three models
with demographic variables: actual survival and the mean and MRH models of
subjective survival expectations
Actual survival Mean MRH
ln γ0 ln θ
0.5 ln θ0.5 lnn
Demographics
Education 0.01 0.023 0.021 0.056
[0.001]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.009]***
Female 0.074 0.035 0.048 -0.139
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.010]*** [0.051]***
Black -0.008 0.001 0.035 0.053
[0.012] [0.009] [0.011]*** [0.076]
Hispanic 0.034 -0.059 -0.046 0.188
[0.017]** [0.017]*** [0.016]*** [0.110]*
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
Table 3.10: Average partial effects of surviving from age 75 to 95 in three models
with demographic variables: actual survival and the mean and MRH models of
subjective survival expectations
Actual survival Mean MRH
ln γ0 ln θ
0.5 ln θ0.5 lnn
Demographics
Education 0.013 0.007 0.011 0.056
[0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.009]***
Female 0.093 0.011 0.025 -0.139
[0.010]*** [0.003]*** [0.007]*** [0.051]***
Black -0.01 0 0.018 0.053
[0.015] [0.003] [0.006]*** [0.076]
Hispanic 0.042 -0.019 -0.024 0.188
[0.022]** [0.006]*** [0.009]*** [0.110]*
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
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Table 3.11: Outputs of the ML estimation models with demographic, personality
and personal information variables; actual survival and the mean and MRH
models of subjective survival expectations
Actual survival Mean MRH
ln γ0 ln θ
0.5 ln θ0.5 lnn
Demographics
Education 0.015 -0.053 -0.037 0.051
[0.006]** [0.008]*** [0.005]*** [0.010]***
Female -0.34 -0.198 -0.215 -0.156
[0.037]*** [0.039]*** [0.029]*** [0.055]***
Black -0.201 -0.177 -0.297 0.041
[0.055]*** [0.053]*** [0.038]*** [0.076]
Hispanic -0.254 0.297 0.171 0.155
[0.078]*** [0.081]*** [0.060]*** [0.106]
Cognition and personality, standardized scores
Cognition -0.254 -0.115 -0.079 0.021
[0.020]*** [0.021]*** [0.015]*** [0.029]
Vocabulary -0.013 -0.017 0.013 0.008
[0.019] [0.021] [0.015] [0.028]
Depression 0.142 0.303 0.253 0.067
[0.015]*** [0.020]*** [0.015]*** [0.025]***
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Same sex, sp1 -0.121 -0.386 0.205 -0.493
[0.153] [0.292] [0.184] [0.291]*
Same sex, sp2 -0.733 -1.784 -1.766 0.467
[0.279]*** [0.214]*** [0.161]*** [0.342]
Same sex lives -0.049 -0.003 -0.025 -0.064
[0.119] [0.059] [0.044] [0.100]
Opp. sex, sp1 -0.177 -1.058 -0.664 -0.122
[0.156] [0.297]*** [0.190]*** [0.292]
Opp. sex, sp2 -0.667 -0.553 -0.494 0.528
[0.282]** [0.210]*** [0.155]*** [0.340]
Opp. sex lives -0.131 -0.037 -0.031 0.026
[0.120] [0.061] [0.045] [0.107]
Health related behavior
Exercises -0.445 -0.309 -0.258 0.015
[0.038]*** [0.035]*** [0.025]*** [0.051]
Ever smoked 0.352 0.113 0.063 -0.091
[0.038]*** [0.038]*** [0.027]** [0.054]*
Smokes now 0.447 0.337 0.257 0.007
[0.050]*** [0.053]*** [0.039]*** [0.076]
Ever drinks -0.259 -0.25 -0.141 0.174
[0.044]*** [0.043]*** [0.031]*** [0.062]***
# of days drinks -0.033 -0.021 -0.019 -0.014
[0.011]*** [0.011]* [0.008]** [0.016]
# of drinks 0.056 0.049 0.033 -0.035
[0.019]*** [0.019]** [0.014]** [0.028]
Table continues on the next page...
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Actual survival Mean MRH
ln γ0 ln θ
0.5 ln θ0.5 lnn
Age and time horizon of the HRS question; variables divided by 100
Age -2.26
[1.471]
Horizon -9.823
[6.149]
Age X Horizon 27.698
[10.367]***
Constant -6.712 -8.595 -5.796 1.845
[0.288]*** [0.239]*** [0.202]*** [0.946]*
Other parameters
ln γ1 2.104 2.684 2.179
[0.041]*** [0.014]*** [0.029]***
ln k -0.573 0.296
[0.011]*** [0.026]***
lnσn 0.773
[0.026]***
N 13038 13038 13038
Log-likelihood -57265.8 -46196.4
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
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Table 3.12: Average partial effects of surviving 8 more years in three models with
demographic, personality and personal information variables: actual survival and
the mean and MRH models of subjective survival expectations
Actual survival Mean MRH
Demographics
Education -0.003 0.005 0.005
[0.001]** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
Female 0.058 0.017 0.029
[0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.007]***
Black 0.034 0.015 0.039
[0.009]*** [0.005]*** [0.010]***
Hispanic 0.043 -0.025 -0.023
[0.013]*** [0.008]*** [0.009]**
Cognition and personality, standardized scores
Cognition 0.043 0.01 0.011
[0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]***
Vocabulary 0.002 0.001 -0.002
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
Depression -0.024 -0.026 -0.034
[0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.007]***
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Same sex, sp1 0.02 0.033 -0.027
[0.026] [0.024] [0.027]
Same sex, sp2 0.124 0.152 0.234
[0.047]*** [0.032]*** [0.059]***
Same sex lives 0.008 0 0.003
[0.020] [0.005] [0.006]
Opp. sex, sp1 0.03 0.09 0.088
[0.026] [0.026]*** [0.026]***
Opp. sex, sp2 0.113 0.047 0.065
[0.048]** [0.020]** [0.028]**
Opp. sex lives 0.022 0.003 0.004
[0.020] [0.005] [0.006]
Health related behavior
Exercises 0.075 0.026 0.034
[0.007]*** [0.005]*** [0.008]***
Ever smoked -0.06 -0.01 -0.008
[0.007]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]**
Smokes now -0.076 -0.029 -0.034
[0.009]*** [0.006]*** [0.009]***
Ever drinks 0.044 0.021 0.019
[0.008]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]***
# of days drinks 0.006 0.002 0.003
[0.002]*** [0.001]* [0.001]**
# of drinks -0.009 -0.004 -0.004
[0.003]*** [0.002]** [0.002]**
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
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Table 3.13: Average partial effects of surviving from age 55 to 75 in three mod-
els with demographic, personality and personal information variables: actual
survival and the mean and MRH models of subjective survival expectations
Actual survival Mean MRH
Demographics
Education -0.003 0.009 0.009
[0.001]** [0.002]*** [0.002]***
Female 0.073 0.035 0.051
[0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.012]***
Black 0.043 0.031 0.07
[0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.017]***
Hispanic 0.055 -0.052 -0.04
[0.017]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]**
Cognition and personality, standardized scores
Cognition 0.055 0.02 0.019
[0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]***
Vocabulary 0.003 0.003 -0.003
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Depression -0.031 -0.053 -0.06
[0.004]*** [0.009]*** [0.013]***
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Same sex, sp1 0.026 0.068 -0.048
[0.033] [0.050] [0.047]
Same sex, sp2 0.159 0.314 0.415
[0.060]*** [0.067]*** [0.100]***
Same sex lives 0.011 0.001 0.006
[0.026] [0.010] [0.010]
Opp. sex, sp1 0.038 0.186 0.156
[0.034] [0.054]*** [0.046]***
Opp. sex, sp2 0.144 0.097 0.116
[0.060]** [0.042]** [0.048]**
Opp. sex lives 0.028 0.007 0.007
[0.026] [0.011] [0.011]
Health related behavior
Exercises 0.096 0.054 0.061
[0.009]*** [0.011]*** [0.014]***
Ever smoked -0.076 -0.02 -0.015
[0.009]*** [0.007]*** [0.007]**
Smokes now -0.097 -0.059 -0.06
[0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.015]***
Ever drinks 0.056 0.044 0.033
[0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]***
# of days drinks 0.007 0.004 0.005
[0.002]*** [0.002]* [0.002]**
# of drinks -0.012 -0.009 -0.008
[0.004]*** [0.004]** [0.004]**
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
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Table 3.14: Average partial effects of surviving from age 75 to 95 in three mod-
els with demographic, personality and personal information variables: actual
survival and the mean and MRH models of subjective survival expectations
Actual survival Mean MRH
Demographics
Education -0.004 0.003 0.005
[0.002]** [0.001]*** [0.002]***
Female 0.097 0.012 0.029
[0.012]*** [0.003]*** [0.009]***
Black 0.058 0.011 0.04
[0.016]*** [0.004]*** [0.012]***
Hispanic 0.073 -0.019 -0.023
[0.023]*** [0.006]*** [0.010]**
Cognition and personality, standardized scores
Cognition 0.073 0.007 0.011
[0.008]*** [0.002]*** [0.004]***
Vocabulary 0.004 0.001 -0.002
[0.005] [0.001] [0.002]
Depression -0.041 -0.019 -0.034
[0.005]*** [0.004]*** [0.009]***
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Same sex, sp1 0.035 0.024 -0.028
[0.043] [0.018] [0.028]
Same sex, sp2 0.21 0.112 0.239
[0.086]** [0.027]*** [0.071]***
Same sex lives 0.014 0 0.003
[0.034] [0.004] [0.006]
Opp. sex, sp1 0.051 0.066 0.09
[0.044] [0.020]*** [0.029]***
Opp. sex, sp2 0.191 0.035 0.067
[0.086]** [0.016]** [0.030]**
Opp. sex lives 0.038 0.002 0.004
[0.035] [0.004] [0.006]
Health related behavior
Exercises 0.128 0.019 0.035
[0.013]*** [0.004]*** [0.010]***
Ever smoked -0.101 -0.007 -0.008
[0.012]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]**
Smokes now -0.128 -0.021 -0.035
[0.015]*** [0.005]*** [0.010]***
Ever drinks 0.074 0.016 0.019
[0.013]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]***
# of days drinks 0.01 0.001 0.003
[0.003]*** [0.001]* [0.001]**
# of drinks -0.016 -0.003 -0.004
[0.006]*** [0.001]** [0.002]**
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
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Table 3.15: Outputs of the ML estimation models with demographic, personality,
personal information and subjective health variables; actual survival and the
mean and MRH models of subjective survival expectations
Actual survival Mean MRH
ln γ0 ln θ
0.5 ln θ0.5 lnn
Demographics
Education 0.026 -0.037 -0.019 0.053
[0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.005]*** [0.010]***
Female -0.31 -0.152 -0.169 -0.157
[0.036]*** [0.038]*** [0.027]*** [0.054]***
Black -0.24 -0.264 -0.369 0.02
[0.053]*** [0.052]*** [0.036]*** [0.075]
Hispanic -0.332 0.229 0.083 0.132
[0.077]*** [0.078]*** [0.056] [0.105]
Cognition and personality, standardized scores
Cognition -0.231 -0.052 -0.035 0.027
[0.019]*** [0.020]** [0.015]** [0.028]
Vocabulary -0.011 -0.018 0.011 0.009
[0.018] [0.020] [0.014] [0.028]
Depression 0.043 0.148 0.131 0.043
[0.016]*** [0.020]*** [0.014]*** [0.026]*
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Same sex, sp1 -0.09 -0.6 0.094 -0.493
[0.154] [0.281]** [0.172] [0.287]*
Same sex, sp2 -0.567 -1.552 -1.608 0.5
[0.272]** [0.207]*** [0.153]*** [0.337]
Same sex lives -0.051 0.006 -0.007 -0.071
[0.114] [0.057] [0.042] [0.099]
Opp. sex, sp1 -0.203 -1.193 -0.663 -0.117
[0.156] [0.285]*** [0.177]*** [0.287]
Opp. sex, sp2 -0.434 -0.353 -0.427 0.522
[0.274] [0.205]* [0.148]*** [0.336]
Opp. sex lives -0.191 -0.032 -0.014 0.032
[0.116]* [0.059] [0.043] [0.105]
Health related behavior
Exercises -0.309 -0.146 -0.13 0.02
[0.038]*** [0.034]*** [0.024]*** [0.051]
Ever smoked 0.31 0.031 0.009 -0.091
[0.038]*** [0.036] [0.026] [0.053]*
Smokes now 0.436 0.308 0.239 0.006
[0.049]*** [0.051]*** [0.037]*** [0.075]
Ever drinks -0.211 -0.119 -0.054 0.177
[0.043]*** [0.042]*** [0.030]* [0.061]***
# of days drinks -0.024 -0.012 -0.011 -0.015
[0.011]** [0.011] [0.008] [0.016]
# of drinks 0.045 0.05 0.029 -0.033
[0.019]** [0.019]*** [0.014]** [0.028]
Table continues on the next page...
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Actual survival Mean MRH
ln γ0 ln θ
0.5 ln θ0.5 lnn
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Excel./excel. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Excel./good 0.442 0.363 0.306 -0.172
[0.065]*** [0.055]*** [0.040]*** [0.084]**
Excel./poor 0.827 0.682 0.585 0.122
[0.091]*** [0.121]*** [0.085]*** [0.157]
Good/excel. 0.231 0.29 0.237 -0.092
[0.079]*** [0.061]*** [0.044]*** [0.095]
Good/good 0.445 0.562 0.483 -0.05
[0.059]*** [0.050]*** [0.035]*** [0.074]
Good/poor 0.894 0.983 0.74 -0.059
[0.065]*** [0.087]*** [0.061]*** [0.104]
Poor/excel. 0.579 0.582 0.461 -0.106
[0.119]*** [0.156]*** [0.106]*** [0.196]
Poor/good 0.66 0.805 0.624 -0.042
[0.075]*** [0.088]*** [0.063]*** [0.116]
Poor/poor 0.973 1.372 1.126 0.177
[0.057]*** [0.070]*** [0.052]*** [0.085]**
Age and time horizon of the HRS question; variables divided by 100
Age -2.333
[1.449]
Horizon -10.037
[6.053]*
Age X Horizon 27.82
[10.204]***
Constant -7.288 -9.366 -6.379 1.882
[0.293]*** [0.233]*** [0.197]*** [0.933]**
Other parameters
ln γ1 2.088 2.686 2.149
[0.041]*** [0.013]*** [0.029]***
ln k -0.54 0.377
[0.011]*** [0.026]***
lnσn 0.758
[0.026]***
N 13038 13038 13038
Log-likelihood -56994.3 -45850.0
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
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Table 3.16: Average partial effects of surviving 8 more years in three models
with demographic, personality, personal information and subjective health vari-
ables: actual survival and the mean and MRH models of subjective survival
expectations
Actual survival Mean MRH
Demographics
Education -0.004 0.003 0.003
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
Female 0.052 0.013 0.023
[0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.006]***
Black 0.04 0.023 0.05
[0.009]*** [0.006]*** [0.012]***
Hispanic 0.056 -0.02 -0.011
[0.013]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]
Cognition and personality, standardized scores
Cognition 0.039 0.004 0.005
[0.003]*** [0.002]** [0.002]**
Vocabulary 0.002 0.002 -0.002
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
Depression -0.007 -0.013 -0.018
[0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]***
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Same sex, sp1 0.015 0.052 -0.013
[0.026] [0.024]** [0.024]
Same sex, sp2 0.095 0.134 0.217
[0.046]** [0.029]*** [0.055]***
Same sex lives 0.009 -0.001 0.001
[0.019] [0.005] [0.006]
Opp. sex, sp1 0.034 0.103 0.09
[0.026] [0.027]*** [0.025]***
Opp. sex, sp2 0.073 0.03 0.058
[0.046] [0.019] [0.026]**
Opp. sex lives 0.032 0.003 0.002
[0.020]* [0.005] [0.006]
Health related behavior
Exercises 0.052 0.013 0.018
[0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]***
Ever smoked -0.052 -0.003 -0.001
[0.006]*** [0.003] [0.004]
Smokes now -0.073 -0.027 -0.032
[0.008]*** [0.006]*** [0.008]***
Ever drinks 0.035 0.01 0.007
[0.007]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*
# of days drinks 0.004 0.001 0.001
[0.002]** [0.001] [0.001]
# of drinks -0.008 -0.004 -0.004
[0.003]** [0.002]** [0.002]*
Table continues on the next page...
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Actual survival Mean MRH
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Excel./excel. ref. ref. ref.
Excel./good -0.074 -0.031 -0.041
[0.011]*** [0.007]*** [0.010]***
Excel./poor -0.139 -0.059 -0.079
[0.016]*** [0.014]*** [0.020]***
Good/excel. -0.039 -0.025 -0.032
[0.013]*** [0.007]*** [0.009]***
Good/good -0.075 -0.048 -0.065
[0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.015]***
Good/poor -0.15 -0.085 -0.1
[0.012]*** [0.015]*** [0.023]***
Poor/excel. -0.097 -0.05 -0.062
[0.020]*** [0.015]*** [0.020]***
Poor/good -0.111 -0.069 -0.084
[0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.020]***
Poor/poor -0.163 -0.118 -0.152
[0.010]*** [0.020]*** [0.033]***
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
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Table 3.17: Average partial effects of surviving from age 55 to 75 in three mod-
els with demographic, personality, personal information and subjective health
variables: actual survival and the mean and MRH models of subjective survival
expectations
Actual survival Mean MRH
Demographics
Education -0.006 0.006 0.004
[0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]***
Female 0.067 0.026 0.039
[0.008]*** [0.008]*** [0.010]***
Black 0.051 0.046 0.086
[0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.020]***
Hispanic 0.071 -0.04 -0.019
[0.017]*** [0.015]*** [0.013]
Cognition and personality, standardized scores
Cognition 0.05 0.009 0.008
[0.004]*** [0.004]** [0.004]**
Vocabulary 0.002 0.003 -0.003
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Depression -0.009 -0.026 -0.031
[0.003]*** [0.005]*** [0.007]***
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Same sex, sp1 0.019 0.104 -0.022
[0.033] [0.048]** [0.042]
Same sex, sp2 0.122 0.268 0.375
[0.058]** [0.059]*** [0.090]***
Same sex lives 0.011 -0.001 0.002
[0.024] [0.010] [0.010]
Opp. sex, sp1 0.043 0.206 0.155
[0.034] [0.053]*** [0.043]***
Opp. sex, sp2 0.093 0.061 0.1
[0.058] [0.038] [0.044]**
Opp. sex lives 0.041 0.006 0.003
[0.025] [0.010] [0.010]
Health related behavior
Exercises 0.066 0.025 0.03
[0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.008]***
Ever smoked -0.067 -0.005 -0.002
[0.009]*** [0.006] [0.006]
Smokes now -0.093 -0.053 -0.056
[0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.014]***
Ever drinks 0.045 0.021 0.013
[0.010]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]*
# of days drinks 0.005 0.002 0.003
[0.002]** [0.002] [0.002]
# of drinks -0.01 -0.009 -0.007
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]**
Table continues on the next page...
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Actual survival Mean MRH
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Excel./excel. ref. ref. ref.
Excel./good -0.095 -0.063 -0.071
[0.015]*** [0.014]*** [0.017]***
Excel./poor -0.177 -0.118 -0.137
[0.021]*** [0.028]*** [0.034]***
Good/excel. -0.05 -0.05 -0.055
[0.017]*** [0.013]*** [0.015]***
Good/good -0.095 -0.097 -0.113
[0.013]*** [0.017]*** [0.024]***
Good/poor -0.192 -0.17 -0.173
[0.016]*** [0.031]*** [0.038]***
Poor/excel. -0.124 -0.1 -0.108
[0.026]*** [0.031]*** [0.033]***
Poor/good -0.142 -0.139 -0.146
[0.017]*** [0.027]*** [0.033]***
Poor/poor -0.209 -0.237 -0.263
[0.015]*** [0.039]*** [0.054]***
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
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Table 3.18: Average partial effects of surviving from age 75 to 95 in three mod-
els with demographic, personality, personal information and subjective health
variables: actual survival and the mean and MRH models of subjective survival
expectations
Actual survival Mean MRH
Demographics
Education -0.007 0.003 0.003
[0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]***
Female 0.086 0.01 0.024
[0.011]*** [0.003]*** [0.007]***
Black 0.067 0.018 0.053
[0.015]*** [0.005]*** [0.015]***
Hispanic 0.092 -0.016 -0.012
[0.022]*** [0.006]** [0.009]
Cognition and personality, standardized scores
Cognition 0.064 0.004 0.005
[0.007]*** [0.002]** [0.003]*
Vocabulary 0.003 0.001 -0.002
[0.005] [0.001] [0.002]
Depression -0.012 -0.01 -0.019
[0.004]*** [0.002]*** [0.005]***
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Same sex, sp1 0.025 0.041 -0.014
[0.042] [0.019]** [0.026]
Same sex, sp2 0.157 0.105 0.231
[0.080]** [0.026]*** [0.068]***
Same sex lives 0.014 0 0.001
[0.032] [0.004] [0.006]
Opp. sex, sp1 0.056 0.081 0.095
[0.042] [0.022]*** [0.029]***
Opp. sex, sp2 0.12 0.024 0.061
[0.079] [0.015] [0.029]**
Opp. sex lives 0.053 0.002 0.002
[0.032] [0.004] [0.006]
Health related behavior
Exercises 0.086 0.01 0.019
[0.012]*** [0.003]*** [0.006]***
Ever smoked -0.086 -0.002 -0.001
[0.012]*** [0.003] [0.004]
Smokes now -0.121 -0.021 -0.034
[0.015]*** [0.005]*** [0.010]***
Ever drinks 0.059 0.008 0.008
[0.012]*** [0.003]** [0.005]*
# of days drinks 0.007 0.001 0.002
[0.003]** [0.001] [0.001]
# of drinks -0.013 -0.003 -0.004
[0.005]** [0.001]** [0.002]*
Table continues on the next page...
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Actual survival Mean MRH
Parents’ age at death, linear splines with cut-off at own age
Excel./excel. ref. ref. ref.
Excel./good -0.123 -0.025 -0.044
[0.020]*** [0.006]*** [0.013]***
Excel./poor -0.23 -0.046 -0.084
[0.029]*** [0.012]*** [0.025]***
Good/excel. -0.064 -0.02 -0.034
[0.022]*** [0.006]*** [0.011]***
Good/good -0.124 -0.038 -0.069
[0.018]*** [0.008]*** [0.019]***
Good/poor -0.248 -0.067 -0.106
[0.024]*** [0.014]*** [0.029]***
Poor/excel. -0.161 -0.04 -0.066
[0.035]*** [0.013]*** [0.023]***
Poor/good -0.183 -0.055 -0.09
[0.024]*** [0.012]*** [0.025]***
Poor/poor -0.27 -0.093 -0.162
[0.023]*** [0.019]*** [0.042]***
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level
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CHAPTER IV
Stock Market Crash and Expectations of
American Households
4.1 Introduction
The stock market crash of 2008 and the subsequent financial crisis constitute a rare episode
whose scope and implications fall outside the life experience of American households. Whether
and how those events affect people’s expectations is an important question. To the extent
that expectations guide investment behavior, substantial changes in expectations due to the
financial crash can lead to substantial changes in investment. Besides average beliefs of “the
representative household,” the crisis may have an impact on heterogeneity of such beliefs.
This study uses data from the 2008 wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to
study the impact of the crisis on people’s expectations. We estimate the effect of the crash on
the population average of expected returns, the population average of the uncertainty about
returns (subjective standard deviation), and the cross-sectional heterogeneity in expected
returns (an indicator of disagreement). We show estimates from simple reduced-form regres-
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sions on probability answers as well as from a more structural model that focuses on the
parameters of interest and separates survey noise from relevant heterogeneity. The measure-
ment strategy makes use of the fact that the respondents of HRS-2008 answered the survey
during twelve months from February 2008 to February 2009, a time period that includes
the time of the stock market crash in early October. We show that the date of interview is
largely independent of the respondents’ past expectations about the stock market, so even
if the date of interview is non-random, it is unlikely to bias our results.
Our analysis looks at changes in expectations during the HRS sampling period of February
2008 through February 2009. It may be useful to recall some of the important events during
this period. The subprime mortgage crisis began well before 2008, but the Dow Jones peaked
in October 2007 above 14,000. By early 2008, though, the Dow was down to 12,000, and the
rest of the year was characterized by a general decline until the crash of October. March
2008 saw the failed bailout of Bear Sterns and its subsequent sale to JP Morgan, but the rest
of the Spring and the Summer went relatively quietly. On September 15, Lehman Brother
filed for bankruptcy. The financial system was thought to be in severe danger, and it took a
few weeks of uncertainty and heated debates before the U.S. Congress passed the TARP bill
on October 3rd. The Fall of 2008 also witnessed the run-up to the Presidential election on
November 4th, which focused many people’s attention towards economic issues, but it also
led to a natural uncertainty about future economic policy.
Figure 4.1 shows time series of four stock market variables over the course of the HRS
sampling period. We divided the sampling period into four sub-periods on the figure: Febru-
ary to June, July to September, October to November, and December to February 2009. We
shall use these sub-periods throughout our analysis; their definition was based on the stock
market time series we discuss below.
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The first panel shows the level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the VXD annual-
ized volatility index56. After initial ups and downs, the level of the index started a substantial
but gradual decline in June that stopped in August. The stock market crash hit in early
October with a 3000-point drop in the Dow. The stock market experienced large swings
in October and November, and the Dow reached a six-year low of 7500 in late November.
After some recovery and a brief period of stability, the Dow experienced another period of
steady decline in the first months of 2009. During the entire period, volatility showed the
mirror image of the time series in levels, except that its increase started in September, and
it reached its maximum in October and November. The second panel of Figure 4.1 shows
the weekly volume of trade of the shares of the DJIA together with the trend of searches for
the term ’Dow’ on Google57. The latter variable is an indicator for the attention people give
to news about the stock market. The figure shows a strong co-movement of the two time
series: increased attention to stock market news coincided with increased volumes in March
and July of 2008, February of 2009, and, especially, October of 2008. The Google index is
normalized so that its five-year average is one. The maximal 8.8 value in the first week of
October means that almost nine times as many searches were made from the US for the
Dow Jones Industrial Average than in normal times. Looking at the two panels together,
we can see that the volume of trade was the highest at times when the stock market index
was decreasing, when uncertainty was increasing and when people paid a lot of attention to
news about the market.
The main question of this paper is whether and how expectations changed during the
stock market crash in early October 2008 and the following months. We compare post-crash
56The VXD index is derived from prices of options on the DJIA, and it measures the future (30-day)
expected volatility of investors. Details of this index can be found at http://www.cboe.com/micro/vxd/.
57http://www.google.com/trends.
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expectations to those earlier in 2008. It is important to keep in mind that the baseline period
was characterized by early signs of the crisis and a depressed stock market. Nevertheless, the
comparison can shed light on the effect of a large and perhaps qualitatively different event
compared to the more “normal” declining market.
The crash may affect the population average of expected returns for various reasons. If
people are unsure about the parameters of the returns process, they may use recent real-
izations to update their beliefs. In such a case, the crash would have a negative effect on
everyone’s expectations. If, on the other hand, people believe in mean reversion in stock
market prices, the effect may be of the opposite sign. Of course, people may not want to up-
date their beliefs if they don’t learn from the returns. Besides stock prices, the political and
policy news may have also affected people’s expectations about the future of the economy
and the financial sector in general, and the stock market in particular.
Empirical papers about stock market expectations usually find that average expectations
track recent changes in the level of the stock market. When the stock market is increas-
ing, average beliefs become more optimistic and conversely. See, for example, Ke´zdi and
Willis (2008) about American households and Hurd et al. (2011) about Dutch households.
According to Ke´zdi and Willis (2008), it took a five hundred point gain in the Dow Jones
to generate a one percentage point gain in expected yearly returns in 2002. With such a
relationship, expected returns of respondents in November 2008 should be more than five
percentage points lower than expected returns of respondents two or three months earlier.
On the other hand, the financial crisis of 2008 may have affected people’s expectations in
qualitatively different ways than the more gradual changes witnessed in 2002, especially if
people had different views about the condition of the economy in 2002 and in 2008. People
may expect asset prices to change in different ways after large sudden changes than gradual
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trends. This is the conclusion of Calvet et al. (2009b) who, using Swedish data, found that
people tend to invest in well-performing mutual funds but also tend to dispose of winning
individual stocks at the same time.
The effect of the crisis on average uncertainty is more predictably positive. Stock market
risk increased dramatically, as indicated by the trend in volatility on Figure 4.1. Even those
who do not follow the stock market could become more uncertain about the future of the
economy in general and the stock market, in particular, as general uncertainty has been “in
the air” throughout the crisis.
The crisis may also affect the cross-sectional heterogeneity in households’ beliefs. Het-
erogeneity and potential subjectivity of people’s beliefs about future stock market returns
has been the focus of recent developments in finance theory (see Hong and Stein, 2007 for
an overview about disagreement models in finance). Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel
and Pearson (1995) show that public announcements can increase disagreement about the
fundamental value of assets if people interpret the news in different ways (see also Kondor,
2009). As Hong and Stein (2007) observe, this pattern is precisely the opposite of what
one would expect based on a simple rational-expectations model with heterogeneous priors,
where public information should have the effect of reducing disagreement, rather than in-
creasing it. Similar mechanisms may increase disagreement after the stock market crash as
well. Dominitz and Manski (forthcoming), for example, assume that the population is a mix
of people who believe in the random walk hypothesis, who believe in the mean reversion of
stock-prices and who believe in the persistence of trends on the financial markets. When
the crash hit the economy and stock prices fell sharply, people holding these various views
should have interpreted its implications in different ways, and consequently the disagreement
among them should have increased. Indeed, a potential explanation of the trading pattern
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shown in Figure 4.1 is that the increase of disagreement created space for trade as more
optimistic traders wanted to buy and more pessimistic traders wanted to sell. Note that
potential heterogeneity in the effect of the crash implies that the average effect could go
either way.
Our results imply a temporary increase in the population average of expectations right
after the crash. At the same time, average uncertainty increased, perhaps as the result of
increased stock market volatility. Our most robust finding is that cross-sectional heterogene-
ity in expected returns, an indicator of the amount of disagreement, increased substantially
with the stock market crash. The effects are found to be largest among stockholders, those
who follow the stock market and those with higher than average cognitive capacity. The re-
sult on average expectations thus masks a wide distribution of effects of opposing signs. We
also document the co-movement of stock market expectations with ex-post returns, implied
volatility and volume of trade.
Our finding suggests that there is heterogeneity in the cognitive processes (or mental
models) people use to convert public news into personal probability beliefs, in accordance
with some of the disagreement literature we mentioned above. The results on changes in
heterogeneity complement recent empirical investigations that show substantial heterogeneity
in stock market expectations of individual investors (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2004) as well as
households (Calvet et al., 2007, 2009b,a; Dominitz and Manski, 2005; Ke´zdi and Willis, 2008;
Hurd et al., 2011; Gouret and Hollard, 2011). This paper adds new results to this empirical
literature by showing that the stock market crash and the financial crisis had significant
effects on average expectations, average uncertainty, and perhaps most importantly, the
heterogeneity of expectations.
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4.2 Data
We use stock market expectations data from HRS-2008. Before turning to our analysis, it is
helpful to provide some background on the evolution of the HRS stock market expectation
questions.
In 2002, HRS introduced probabilistic expectations questions about returns in the stock
market to the battery of subjective expectation questions that have been asked in HRS since
it began in 1992. One motivation for adding these questions is that expectations about
stock returns are a key component in determining retirement saving and portfolio choice.
In addition, stock market expectations are of methodological interest because the history
of stock returns and their daily realizations are public information, enabling researchers to
investigate how news affects the updating of beliefs without the need to adjust for differences
in private information.
Like other HRS probability questions, stock market expectations are asked as a percent
chance based on a “0” to “100” scale where the respondent is told that: ”0” means that you
think there is absolutely no chance, and ”100” means that you think the event is absolutely
sure to happen.
The instruction goes on to say, For example, no one can ever be sure about tomorrow’s
weather, but if you think that rain is very unlikely tomorrow, you might say that there is a
10 percent chance of rain. If you think there is a very good chance that it will rain tomorrow,
you might say that there is an 80 percent chance of rain.
Beginning in 2002, the HRS introduced a question about stock market expectations that
has been asked in every wave of HRS since 2002. We call this the P0 question. It reads: We
are interested in how well you think the economy will do in the next year. By next year at
this time, what is the percent chance that mutual fund shares invested in blue chip stocks
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like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average will be worth more than they are today?
Like other HRS subjective probability questions, many answers to the HRS stock market
questions are heaped on “50” (Hurd and McGarry, 2002) and, unlike most other probability
questions, a substantial number of people fail to answer the stock expectation questions at all.
A number of researchers have suggested that “50” is an indicator of “epistemic uncertainty”
or imprecise probability beliefs (Fischhoff and Bruine De Bruin, 1999; Lillard and Willis,
2001). Of course, it is also possible that some people who answer “50” mean that the event
in question has a 50 percent chance of occurring or that they think that the probability falls
within some range such as 40-60 percent and give “50” as rounded approximation (Manski
and Molinari, 2010).
Beginning in 2006 the HRS added an“epistemic” follow-up question to several probability
questions, including the P0 question, to help understand the meaning of “50” answers:
Do you think that it is about equally likely that these mutual fund shares will increase in
worth as it is that they will decrease in worth by this time next year, or are you just unsure
about the chances?
We now turn to a discussion of the 2008 data that we use in this paper. In 2008, HRS
continued to ask the “epistemic” follow-up to persons who answered 50 to P0. For those who
did not respond 50 to P0 or, if they answered “50”, indicated that the shares were equally
likely to increase or decrease in value, HRS added a follow-up question:
By next year at this time, what is the chance they will have grown by x percent or more?
(For negative values of x: By next year at this time, what is the chance they will have
declined by -x percent or more?)
where the probability of a gain of x per cent from the set of {+10, +20, +30, +40} or
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a loss of –x percent from the set of {-40, -30, -20, -10} is randomly assigned.58 We denote
the answer to this question as Px+ if the random value of x is positive and as Px− if it is
negative. Note that Px+ denotes the probability that returns would be greater than x, while
Px− denotes the probability that they would be less than -x.
The full sample consists of 17,217 individuals from 11,897 households. We restricted the
sample to those 14,735 persons who participated in the last three waves of HRS (2004, 6, and
8). In 2004, the sample was refreshed by a new, younger cohort. Out of the 14,735 people,
2,850 (˜19 percent) did not answer the P0 question (the majority answered ”I do not know”)
leaving us a sample of 11,885 people. As we indicated earlier, HRS did not ask the Px+
or Px− questions from those who told that they were unsure in response to the “epistemic”
follow-up question (2,005 individuals). Answer to the Px+ or the Px− question is missing for
another 486 individuals, and education was missing for an additional 45 individuals. Putting
all these restrictions together, we ended up with a sample of 9,348 individuals. The average
age is 68 years, and 90 percent of the sample is 55 to 89 years old. We divide the sample into
four sub-samples based on the date of the interview (see Figure 4.1). These subsamples are
very unbalanced in terms of the number of observations. 6285 respondents gave interview
between February and June 2008, 2286 between July and September 2008, 556 in October
and November 2008, and 211 between December 2008 and February 2009.
As we see, there are many missing values in the HRS stock market expectation data.
Out of the 14,735 people asked, only 9,348 (63 percent) gave adequate answers to both
questions. The two main sources of missing values are the ”I do not know” answers to any of
the questions and being ”unsure” after giving a 50 percent answer to P0. In the analysis we
58Randomization of x was not complete in the survey: those who gave 0% for the P0 question were assigned
to get a random x with x < 0 but not x > 0, while those who answered P0 = 100% were assigned to get a
random x with x > 0 but not x < 0.
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shall ignore the missing values. We think that their omission does not invalidate our results
for two reasons. First, people who ”do not know” or are “unsure” might not have meaningful
expectations about the stock market and thus they are not part of the population we would
like to represent. These questions are not easy to answer, and if someone has no stocks
and is sure that she will never have to deal with financial assets, she does not have to form
expectations about the one-year-ahead returns asked in the survey. Second, our goal is to
analyze the changes in expectations after the crash. As long as the crash itself did not
result in an increase or decrease of missing answers, the sample selection problem does not
influence our main results. Analysis of the time series of missing answers reveals that the
stock market crash did not bring about more “don’t know” or “unsure” answers. There is
a small temporary decrease in the fraction of ”don’t know” answers in October, but the
decrease is both quantitatively small and statistically insignificant.
The distribution of P0 answers is shown in the histograms of Figure 4.2. In the left
panel we see the above mentioned heaping at 50. The right panel shows that the heaping
disappears if we only leave in those 50 respondents who think that shares were equally likely
to increase or decrease in value (rather than being unsure). Note that HRS did not ask
the follow-up Px questions from the “unsure” people so later in the analysis we will only use
people from the right panel.
Figure 4.2 also highlights another interesting issue, excessive rounding. Table 4.1 shows
that almost 99 percent of the answers are multiples of 5, and more than 80 percent are
multiples of 10. The fact that people give approximate answers to these probability questions
is not surprising, since it is very hard to compute these numbers more precisely. A careful
analysis, thus, should incorporate this feature of the data.
Table 4.1, however, highlights an even more important problem, that of inconsistent
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answer-pairs to the probability questions. Strongly inconsistent answers are those that con-
tradict the laws of probability: P0 < Px+ or P0+Px− > 100. Zero mass answers are the ones that
imply zero probability of returns between the asked probabilities: P0 = Px+ and P0+Px− = 100.
Nearly 17 percent of the answers are strongly inconsistent, and more than 21 percent imply
zero mass. On top of these problems, Ke´zdi and Willis (2008) document that many HRS
respondents do not give the same answer to the same probability question (say, P0) when
it is asked twice within the survey twenty minutes apart. Analyzing stock market expecta-
tions in another dataset, Gouret and Hollard (2011) show that few people give answers that
imply the same expectations if they are asked in two slightly different ways within the same
survey. Perhaps surprisingly, both Ke´zdi and Willis (2008) and Gouret and Hollard (2011)
find no relationship between personal characteristics and the propensity to give problematic
answers, with the potential exception of income and expectations themselves.
We argue that such answers are due primarily to question-specific survey noise due to
inattention. Survey responses are the results of individual behavior under circumstances
that differ from circumstances when making an actual investment decision. Answers are
given in a matter of seconds and there are practically no incentives to get the answers right.
Therefore, we would be wrong to assume that the survey answers are equivalent to the
probabilities that represent people’s subjective return distribution which forms the basis for
their investment decisions. In section 4 we propose a method to separate survey noise from
relevant heterogeneity in expectations.
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4.3 Descriptive analysis
In this section, we analyze the answers to the probability questions in a direct way. This
should be viewed as preliminary descriptive analysis that cannot estimate the magnitude of
the effect of the stock market crash, for two reasons. First, the probabilities themselves are
not the objects of interest and, second, survey noise can lead to biased estimates (especially
on the heterogeneity of beliefs). At the same time, the descriptive analysis is free of additional
assumptions that we need to make in order to recover more meaningful statistics.
Before the descriptive analysis, it is instructive to discuss how probabilities P0 and Px
are related to the parameters of interest. Standard portfolio choice models include first
and second moments of the (perceived) distribution of future returns as opposed to the
probabilities themselves. With the help of additional distributional assumptions, answers to
two probability questions can help identify the subjective mean and variance of the returns.
Recall that the object of interest is the distribution of the one-year-ahead returns of the stock
market as viewed by the respondent. If we assume that people believe that the distribution
of percentage returns is normal, two points in the subjective distribution identify the entire
distribution and thus both the mean and the variance. Figure 4.3 shows a normal c.d.f. that
is identified by the two points. The figure depicts the case where the mean of returns is 0.07
and standard deviation is 0.15, numbers close to the post-war moments of nominal yearly
returns on the Dow Jones (ending with year 2007). The probability of positive returns is
around 68 per cent (1–0.32), while the probability of returns of at least 20 per cent (0.2) is
around 20 per cent (1–0.80). A respondent with the postwar-pre-2008 distribution in mind
would answer P0 to be 68 per cent and P20 to be 20 per cent.
Using answers to the two probability questions, one can in principle derive the mean (m)
and the standard deviation (sv) of the beliefs of individual i. Intuitively, the mean is identified
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from the level of the answers, while the standard deviation is identified from the distance
between the two answers (larger distance means smaller variance). Formally, we can take
inverse of the appropriate probabilities:
P0i = Φ
(
µi
σi
)
, (4.1)
Px+,i = Φ
(
µi − x/100
σi
)
, (4.2)
Px−,i = Φ
(
x/100− µi
σi
)
, (4.3)
where, P0 is the answer to the probability of positive returns, Px+ is the answer to the
probability of returns at least x per cent, and Pxi is the answer to the probability of losses
of at least x per cent. Note that a mean-preserving spread in uncertainty (svi) pushes the
probabilities towards 0.5, because an increase in svi moves the index towards zero. This is very
much in line with the casual interpretation of a ”fifty-fifty” answer as reflecting ignorance.
Using the example of positive x returns, inverting the probabilities would give this simple
nonlinear but exactly identified system of two equations and two unknowns (µi and σi):
Φ−1 (P0i) =
µi
σi
, (4.4)
Φ−1 (Px+,i) =
µi − x/100
σi
. (4.5)
Unfortunately, survey answers to the probability questions are not suited for such a direct
transformation at the individual level. The excessive rounding and the relatively high fraction
of inconsistent probability answers discussed in the previous section would invalidate such an
analysis. In the next section, we propose a method for modeling both rounding and survey
noise within a structural model. Before that, we present some basic descriptive results in
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this section.
In order to see if the stock market crash brought about changes in expectations about
stock market returns, we estimate simple OLS regressions with crude proxies for the subjec-
tive mean (µi) the subjective standard deviation (σi) and the heterogeneity of expectations.
In each regression, the right-hand side variables include three dummies for the four periods
we focus on: February through June 2008 is the reference category, the first dummy is for
July through September 2008, the second dummy is for October through November 2008,
and the third dummy is for December 2008 through February 2009.
We estimate regressions with the probability answers themselves on the left-hand side in
order to assess the effects on the population average of the level of the return distribution. If
people become more pessimistic on average, we expect their answers to both the P0 and the
Px+ question to drop on average. If the second probability question has a negative threshold,
their answerPx− would go up on average. We therefore run two regressions, one with P0 on
the left-hand side, and one with Px+ or 1 − Px− on the left-hand side. In order to partial
out any threshold-specific factors that may bias answers to the second question, the second
regression includes dummies for the different thresholds. The reference category is x = +10.
In order to see the effect of the crash on the cross-sectional heterogeneity of expectations
(which we call disagreement), we look at regressions in which the left-hand side variables are
the absolute values of the residuals from the previous regressions. If disagreement increases,
the residuals from the previous regression would become more dispersed, and their absolute
value would therefore go up.
The effect of the crash on the population average of subjective uncertainty is approxi-
mated by a regression with the difference in the two probability answers on the left-hand
side. Recall from Figure 4.2 that the difference between P0 and Px+ is inversely related to the
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standard deviation of the subjective distribution. Another way to see the connection is in
terms of the p.d.f.: a larger difference would imply a larger probability mass concentrated on
the support between P0 and Px+, which implies a less dispersed distribution. If the threshold
of the second probability question is negative, the probability mass between P0 and Px− is
given by 1 − (P0 + Px−). In order for an increase in uncertainty to show up with a positive
sign in the regressions, we used the negative of the differences for left-hand side variables:
Px+ − P0 for positive thresholds and [P0 + Px− − 1] for negative thresholds.
Before we turn to the results of the regressions, we address the question of whether the
date of the interview is exogenous to prior stock market expectations. This is our most
important identifying assumption in analyzing the effect of the stock market crash. The
interview date was not randomly assigned. The HRS released the names of all sample
households to its national field staff of interviewers at the beginning of the field period in
February, 2008. Interviews were then completed in a sequence determined by each interviewer
in consultation with regional field supervisors over the entire field period which ended in
February, 2009. Sample members who are hardest to locate, most difficult to schedule and
most reluctant to be interviewed tend to receive interviews relatively late in the field period.
Ultimately, over 90 percent of eligible sample members were interviewed.
In the 2004 and 2006 waves of the survey, HRS collected data on P0 from respondents
in our sample (but there were no second probability questions asked on stock market ex-
pectations). Using these variables we can look at whether the date at which people were
interviewed in 2008 is related to their answers to the P0 questions in previous interviews. We
estimated four regressions with stock market expectation variables from 2004 and 2006 on
the left hand side and interview date in 2008 on the right hand side. The first two regres-
sions have P0 on their left hand side, while the third and fourth regressions have the residuals
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from those regressions (in each pair one is for 2004 and the other is for 2006). According to
the discussion above, these regressions estimate the “effect” of interview date in 2008 on the
average level of expectations prior to 2008 and heterogeneity of those expectations prior to
2008, respectively. The results from these “placebo” regressions are shown in Table 4.2. The
only significant correlation with interview date in HRS 2008 and previous expectations is
in column [2]: those who answered HRS 2008 between October and November gave slightly
higher P0 answers in 2004 on average. At the same time, no such relationship was found in
more recent 2006. Overall, the results suggest that the date of the interview in HRS 2008
was largely exogenous to stock market expectations prior to 2008, a result that is especially
robust in terms of disagreement.
We can now turn to the effects of the interview date in 2008 on expectations in 2008.
Table 4.3 shows the results. The dependent variables in columns [1] and [2] are the probability
answers, our proxies for the population average of the level of the expectations. The results
from the two regressions are very similar. The summer of 2008 brought no changes, and the
average level was similar to the reference period in December 2008 through February 2009
as well. However, October and November 2008 saw a significant, if temporary, increase in
the average level of expectations.
Columns [3] and [4] report the results on the absolute value of the residual from the
previous regressions, which are our proxies for disagreement. The estimates imply that
disagreement stayed constant before October 2008, but it increased significantly after the
crash. Contrary to the average level of expectations, the increase in disagreement lasted to
the end of the sampling period. Column [5] shows the estimates on the difference between the
two probability questions, which proxy the effects on the population average of uncertainty.
Uncertainty seems to have increased already during the summer, and the crash brought
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about a substantially larger increase. Similarly to the average level of expectations, though,
average uncertainty returned to its baseline level in the last period.
The results from these regressions suggest that on average, people became more optimistic
but also more uncertain after the crash, but those increases were temporary. Cross-sectional
heterogeneity in expectations also increased after the crash, and that remained high a few
months later as well. Unfortunately, as we highlighted earlier, these results are not suited
for drawing quantitative conclusions for two reasons: they use crude proxies for the left hand
side variables of true interest, and they do not incorporate the complex survey response
problems shown in the previous section.
4.4 Structural estimation
In the previous section we derived the relation between the probability answers and the first
two central moments of the subjective return distribution under the assumption of normally
distributed returns. Because of rounding and response error, as discussed earlier, these
relations cannot be mechanically applied to the data. We incorporate rounding and survey
noise in our model in two steps.
Assume that when making an investment decision, individual i thinks of one-year ahead
returns as R∗i with mean µi and standard deviation σi. Throughout the analysis, we assume
that R∗i is normally distributed. (Results are robust to alternative distributional assumptions
of Student-t and log-normal as presented in the online Appendix B.) The survey answers
of individual i are, however, based on a noisy version of R∗i that we denote as Rji (where j
denotes the question so that j=0,x+ or x-). The noise is assumed to be additive: the mean
of Rji is µi + vji, where vji is a mean-zero noise variable specific to question and individual.
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The idea behind this assumption is that in a survey situation individuals have little time and
no incentives to retrieve their subjective distribution of stock market returns. As a result,
the subjective distribution they have in mind when answering the questions is likely to be
different from the subjective distribution they would consider in an investment situation.
We allow the noise terms to be different for the two probability questions (P0 and Px) but
correlated across questions: Corr(v0i, vxi) = ρ. The estimation model will allow for estimating
both the variance of the survey noise and the correlation. When estimating the noise variance,
we assume that it is proportional to subjective uncertainty σi. The intuition behind this
assumption is those who have more diffuse expectations are likely to have a harder time
retrieving those expectations. A consequence of this assumption is that V ar[R∗i ]/V ar[Rji] is
constant. That is, this assumption ensures that the signal-to-noise ratio is constant in terms
of perceived stock market returns.
A second feature of our model is that we consider interval responses instead of the reported
probabilities themselves. If the reported probability (Pji) is in a pre-specified interval or ‘bin’
[b1,b2] then the “true” probability (including the noise component vji) is assumed to be in
the same bin but not necessarily the reported probability itself. Because a large fraction of
the answers are multiples of 10 (see section 2), we have defined 10 percentage point wide
bins: [0, 5); [5, 15); ... [95, 100). One consequence of this assumption is that a round answer
can represent any expectation that would lead to probabilities around the particular round
number.
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The two assumptions are combined to
P0i ∈ [b1, b2)⇐⇒ b1 ≤ Φ
(
µi + v0i
σi
)
< b2, (4.6)
Px+,i ∈ [b1, b2)⇐⇒ b1 ≤ Φ
(
µi + vx+,i − x/100
σi
)
< b2, (4.7)
Px−,i ∈ [b1, b2)⇐⇒ b1 ≤ Φ
(
x/100− µi − vx+,i
σi
)
< b2, (4.8)
where, as before, P0 is the probability of positive returns; Px+ is the probability of returns of
at least x per cent; and Px− is the probability of losses of at least x per cent.
Using interval responses is quite common in the literature dealing with subjective prob-
abilities, but the explicit modeling of survey noise and the maximum likelihood approach is
not. For example, Manski and Molinari (2010) argue that, because of rounding, the parame-
ters of interest are only partially identified, and they propose an alternative estimator based
on the theory of partial identification and set estimation. Their conservative strategy re-
sulted in very wide estimated parameter sets, especially on the HRS data, probably because
of excessive rounding. To avoid this problem we have chosen instead to specify the model
fully with distributional assumptions on all the unobserved random variables (see later).
We specify heterogeneity in the subjective mean and variance of returns by equations in
two latent left-hand side variables mi, svi, of the form
µi = αµwi + βµxi + γµzµi + ui, (4.9)
lnσi = ασwi + βσxi + γσzσi. (4.10)
In the equations, w is the vector of date of interview dummies; x is the vector of covariates
such as race, gender, age, education, and cognitive capacity; the z vectors are equation-
254
specific variables. We say more about them later when we discuss identification.
An important issue addressed in this paper is the possibility of increased cross-sectional
heterogeneity in expectations, which may be labeled as disagreement. In order to capture
disagreement, we let unobserved heterogeneity in m vary with the date of the interview.
Variance in u (unobserved heterogeneity in m) measures the heterogeneity of expected returns
among individuals who share the same x and zµ variables. Formally, we let the standard
deviation of u be related to the date of interview dummies (w) and the other covariates (x):
lnStd (ui) = αuwi + βuxi. (4.11)
The last equation is for the standard deviation of the noise, v, which is assumed to be
proportional to σi:
lnStd (vji) = λσi. (4.12)
Equations (4) and (5) describe the parameters of interest as effects on (or correlations with)
the expected value of latent variables (µi, σi), and equation (6) captures the effects on (or
correlations with) the standard deviation of the latent variable mi. These latent variables are
mapped to the probability answers as specified by the interval response model in equations (1)
to (3), which include additive question-specific noise components (v0 and vx), as well. The
model is completed by distributional assumptions on unobservables u and v. We assume
that u, v0 and vx are jointly normally distributed and that unobserved heterogeneity, u, is
independent of survey noise. However, we allow for v0 and vx to be correlated, and we
estimate their correlation. One can argue that the correlation can be different for positive
versus negative thresholds in the second question, and thus we estimate two correlation
coefficients, one for v0 and vx+ and one for v0 and vx−.
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With these elements the model is complete and can be estimated using Maximum Like-
lihood. Before we turn to the results, it is worthwhile to spend some time on identification
issues. For simplicity, assume for a moment that there are no covariates on the right hand
side of (4)-(6). In this unconditional model we would have six parameters to estimate: µ,
σ, Std(u), λ, Corr(v0, vx+) and Corr(v0, vx−). In order to estimate them we need at least six
moments. Interesting moments are E(Pji), V (Pji), E(P0i − Pxi), V (P0i − Pxi) and the fraction
of inconsistent answers. Intuitively E(Pji) and E(P0i−Pxi) help identify E[µi] and E[σi], while
V (Pji), V (P0i − Pxi) and the fraction of inconsistent answers help identify Std(u), λ and the
correlations.
The estimation models include covariates and some exclusion restrictions as well. We use
two instruments for µ (zµ in equation 4) and one for σ (zσ in equation 5). The first instrument
for µ is the average probability that respondents assigned to the possibility of an economic
recession in the near future in the previous two waves, 2004 and 2006, of the survey. The
second instrument is an average score on nine questions about depressive symptoms of the
interviewees in 2004 and 2006, such as feeling lonely or feeling sad, etc. again from the
previous two waves of the survey. The instrument for σ is the fraction of 50 probability
answers in 2004 and 6. The idea behind using this variable is that people who are generally
uncertain tend to give a lot of 50-50 answers to probability questions.59
4.5 Results of the structural model
The main question addressed by our analysis is how structural parameters of stock market
expectations changed through the sample period. Using the model outlined in the previous
59This approach was first suggested by Lillard and Willis (2001) and has also been used by Sahm (2007)
and Pounder (2007).
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section, we estimate changes in the population average of µi (the subjective expected value
of returns), the population average of svi (the subjective standard deviation of returns),
and the population standard deviation of ui (unexplained heterogeneity in the subjective
expected value). We capture the change of expectations in time by dummy variables for the
four periods: February to June 2008 (the reference period, characterized by relatively high
level of stock market indices and low volatility); July to September 2008 (gradual decline,
relatively low but increasing volatility); October to November 2008 (the aftermath of the
stock market crash and subsequently low levels and high volatility); and December 2008 to
February 2009 (low levels with some further decline, and lower volatility). In order to help
interpret the coefficients, all right-hand side variables except the interview date dummies are
normalized to have zero mean. As a consequence, the regression constant shows the expected
value of the left-hand side variable in the reference period (February through June 2008) for
an average respondent in the sample. Note that the mean of the right-hand-side variables
in the reference period is very close to the overall sample mean. As a result, the regression
constant is very close to the actual average response in the reference period. The results are
shown in table 4.4.
The estimates are in line with the reduced-form OLS results of Table 4.3. Average
optimism about stock market returns increased temporarily in October-November: on av-
erage, people seemed to expect a recovery during this period. By December, the average
expectations returned to where they were prior to the crash. Average uncertainty about
stock market returns increased by 11 per cent during the summer, and it increased again
in October-November, by almost an additional 20 per cent. However, average uncertainty
seemed to return to its initial level afterwards. Unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in
expectations increased by 13 per cent in late summer as well, and it increased substantially in
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the fall. By October and November, the cross-sectional standard deviation was more than 50
per cent larger than it was at the beginning of the year. Heterogeneity decreased somewhat
after December, but it remained larger than before the crash.
The coefficients on the other right-hand side variables indicate that women are signifi-
cantly more pessimistic and more uncertain about stock returns; minorities are substantially
more uncertain; older people are less optimistic and less uncertain; more educated people are
less uncertain; and smarter people are more optimistic and less uncertain. Stockholders and
those who follow the stock market are significantly more optimistic, and the latter are also
less uncertain. The results imply that heterogeneity in beliefs is also different in different
groups; those that are characterized by higher uncertainty on average tend to be more diverse
in their beliefs. The sign on the variables that serve for exclusion restrictions are intuitive:
those who were more pessimistic about the economy in the past have lower expectations
on average, and the same is true for those with more depressive symptoms. The fraction
of fifty-fifty probability answers in the past is a strong predictor of uncertainty about stock
market returns.
The last three lines of Table 4.4 contain estimates for the technical parameters. The
ratio of true uncertainty to total variance that includes uncertainty as well as survey noise
(σ2/(σ2 + V (v)) is constant by assumption and is estimated to be 0.645. This implies that
the noise variance is almost as large as true uncertainty. The noise terms are allowed to
be correlated across questions. The correlation is positive when both probability questions
ask about returns higher than a particular threshold value. It is negative when the second
question is about the probability of returns smaller than the predefined values.
At first sight, it is surprising that the population average of expected returns is negative
during the baseline period. Note, however, that male stockholders who follow the stock
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market and have above average cognitive capacity expect substantial positive returns on
average; their average µ of 0.06 is close to the pre-2007 historical mean of 0.07.
The coefficients on the interview date dummies in Table 4.4 show overall changes in the
average level, average uncertainty, and heterogeneity of expectations. It is interesting to see
whether those changes were different in different groups. In order to examine such possi-
bilities, we estimated the model with full interaction using dummy variables that split the
sample into two parts. The first model with interactions distinguishes between stockholders
and non-stockholders. The second model looks at those who follow the stock market versus
those who do not. The third model looks at those whose cognitive capacity is above the
average versus those below average. The coefficient estimates of the three models are in the
online Appendix A. The main results are summarized below with the help of three figures.
We first look at stockholders versus non-stockholders. Stockholders include all those who
owned stocks directly, through mutual funds or in tax-sheltered accounts such as 401(k)
accounts. Since asset holdings are defined at the household level, members of the same
household were assigned the same stockholder status. From an asset pricing point of view,
the effect of the crash on stockholders is more interesting than the effect on other households.
Note that stockholding may be endogenous to the financial crisis. Therefore, we used the
pre-crash stock-holding status from the 2006 wave of HRS. Figure 4.4 shows the results
from the interaction model. The figure shows the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the
population distribution of subjective expected returns (µi) for the four sampling periods.
The distributions are recovered from the empirical distribution of the covariates and the
normal assumption for the unobservables.
The results of Figure 4.4 indicate that stockholders have substantially higher and less
uncertain expectations, consistently with standard portfolio choice models. Note that the
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differences are not captured in full by the interaction of stockholding status with interview
date dummies presented in Table 4.6, as the two groups differ in terms of the covariates as
well (e.g. demographics and education). The median of the expected return distribution
among stockholders is positive throughout the sample period, while the median of the non-
holder distribution is negative. Changes in average µ (and average σ, see the online appendix)
are similar in the two groups, heterogeneity among stockholders reacted to the stock market
crash more in relative terms. In October and November 2008, the estimated inter-quartile
range in expected returns rose from about 35 percentage points to almost 60 percentage
points among stockholders and from around 60 percentage points to slightly more than 80
percentage points among non-stockholders.
Next we look at the results for the better informed versus less informed individuals. HRS
2008 asked how closely the respondent follows the stock market. 8.5 per cent answered “very
closely”, and another 36 per cent answered “somewhat closely.” The rest answered “not at all”
or did not know or refused to answer. We merged the “very closely” and “somewhat closely”
categories and called the subsample “informed respondents.” The rest we call “uninformed
respondents.” Being informed and stockholding are of course correlated, but the correlation
is far from being perfect. 70 per cent of stockholders claim to follow the stock market (and
30 per cent do not), while 30 per cent of non-holders claim to follow the stock market (and 70
per cent do not). Note that, similarly to stockholding status, whether one follows the stock
market is potentially endogenous to the stock market crash. Unfortunately, only HRS 2004
contains the information for our sample, and it is missing there for quite a few individuals.
We decided to use the 2008 measures for the analysis despite its potential endogeneity. The
results are very similar if one uses the 2004 measures instead.
Figure 4.5 shows the results on the quartiles of expected returns in a way similar to the
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previous figure. The results are similar to the stockholder versus non-stockholder compar-
ison, with some qualifications. The two groups differ less in terms of the initial level and
heterogeneity of expectations than stockholders versus non-stockholders. The increase in
the median of the distribution in October and November is more pronounced among the
uninformed respondents, while the increase in the inter-quartile range is only marginally
larger among the informed people. These results show that actual stockholding status is
more strongly related to the effect of the stock market crash on expectations than whether
one follows the stock market.
The third comparison is between those with above average cognitive capacity versus
those with below average cognitive capacity. Cognitive capacity is measured by the principal
component of various measures from HRS 2008. The measures include categories of self-rated
memory, the score on immediate and delayed word recall and serial subtraction of seven from
one hundred, and answers to three computing exercises, one of which is about compound
interest rate. Cognition is correlated with whether one follows the stock market, but the
correlation is not extremely strong (66 per cent of informed respondents are above average
in terms of cognitive scores, compared to 40 per cent of uninformed respondents). Figure 4.6
shows the results again in terms of the estimated quartiles of subjective expected returns.
In terms of the median, the patterns are more similar to what we found for informed versus
uninformed people, while the patterns in terms of the inter-quartile range are closer to the
patterns by stockholding.
The results of the estimates suggest that the effect on the stock market crash on expec-
tations was different in different groups of the population. The most pronounced differences
are found between stockholders and non-stockholders. Differences between informed and
uninformed people or higher cognition versus lower cognition people are similar but weaker.
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They all suggest, however, that disagreement increased more among those who initially
agreed more.
The final question we investigate in this paper is whether the changes brought by the
stock market crash are close to what one would predict by changes in different stock market
indices. We seek to answer two questions. The first question is whether the patterns of
stock market expectations found above are related to the evolution of the stock market. The
second question is whether the link between the stock market indices and expectations broke
after the crash.
We have created three indicators, all based on the Dow Jones index. The first is the
monthly log-return, defined as the log of the average DJIA index from the five days before
the interview minus the same lagged by one month. The second indicator is the average
of the VXD annualized volatility measure from the five days before the interview. The
third measure is the log of the average daily volume of trade of shares in the DJIA index,
again from the five days before the interview. These indicators are defined from the same
data as the series on Figure 4.1, but their exact definition is somewhat different. The first
indicator enters the equation of expected returns (µ), the VDX indicator enters the equation
of uncertainty (σ), and the trading volume indicator enters the equation of disagreement
(Std(u)). The rationale for the last inclusion is that high trading periods might be the ones
when traders disagree about the fundamental price of assets and thus volume patterns might
be able to predict disagreement.
Table 4.5 contains the estimates from two different specifications. Specification [1] is
identical to the specification of Table 4.4 above, except that the stock market indicators are
entered instead of the date of interview dummies. Specification [2] differs from specification
[1] by allowing for an interaction of the stock market indicators with a dummy variable that
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is one if the interview date is after the crash (October 2008 through February 2009) and zero
otherwise. If the relationship between the stock market indicators and expectations are the
same before and after the crash, their coefficients should be stable across the specifications,
and all the interaction terms should be zero.
The results for m and sv are rather clear. They indicate that their relation to the stock
market indicator (monthly returns and volatility, respectively) changed dramatically after the
crash. Coefficients in specification [2] suggest that before the crash, an increase in the DJIA
of 1 per cent was followed by the population average of µ higher by 0.3 percentage points
(i.e. 0.003). This magnitude is broadly in line with previous finings by, for example, Ke´zdi
and Willis (2008). The post-crash relationship is just the opposite; there, the coefficient
implies that the same one per cent increase would be followed by a drop of 0.4 percentage
points (=0.335-0.721). This negative relationship is most likely identified from the fact that
within a one month window from the crash, the monthly log returns indicator was large
and negative, while average expectations were higher than before. Specification [1] shows no
relationship between returns and average expectations, because it shows the mixed results
of a positive relationship between changes in the DJIA and the average level of expectations
in the pre-crash period and the temporary increase in expectations after the crash. The
population average of uncertainty shows a similar pattern; it tracks the volatility index
before the crash in specification [2] closely, but its increase after the crash is smaller than
what the large increase of the VDX would have implied. Again, specification [1] mixes the
two and produces an insignificant estimate.
The results in Table 4.5 are less clear on the association between disagreement and the
volume of trade. Our interpretation of the results is that it was largely similar before and
after the stock market crash. An increase in the volume by one per cent was associated with
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a subsequent increase in unobserved heterogeneity by somewhat over 0.3 per cent before the
crash in both specifications. The post-crash coefficients suggest a reverse association but
also a huge increase in the intercept. Taken literally, they would imply that disagreement
increased by astronomical magnitudes right after the crash, and from there it tracked trading
volume with a negative coefficient. Recall though that trading volume jumped substantially
right after the crash (see Figure 4.1 above), and it decreased considerably and steadily for
most of the following time in our sampling frame. At the same time, disagreement stayed
substantially higher after the crash than before, and it may have even increased in the
immediate aftermath of the crash when volume dropped the most (although we would not
have enough power to detect that). We argue that the post-crash association between volume
and disagreement was dominated by the large increase in both right after the crash (a strong
positive connection), and subsequent movements are of second order importance.
All the results presented in this section are based on the assumption of normally dis-
tributed subjective yearly returns. We checked the sensitivity of our results to this functional
form assumption by considering two alternatives, the Student-t distribution with various de-
grees of freedom and the shifted log-normal distribution. The Student-t has fatter tails than
the normal. It is motivated by the model of Weitzman (2007) who showed that, if agents
have imperfect knowledge about the “true parameters” governing the stochastic process of
stock market returns, and the parameters are evolving over time, then the posterior distri-
bution of subjective returns can be Student-t. The shifted log-normal form is motivated by
finance theory. While the log-normal is practically identical to the normal for small values
of the return, it is quite different for larger values. All of our important results are robust to
these alternative assumptions. The detailed results are available in the online Appendix B.
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4.6 Conclusions and directions for future research
Using survey data on households’ subjective probability beliefs about the one-year-ahead
return on the Dow Jones stock market index, we estimated the effect of the stock market crash
on the population average of expected returns, the population average of the uncertainty
about returns (subjective standard deviation) and heterogeneity in expected returns. We
presented estimates both from reduced-form OLS regressions and a structural model that
can estimate relevant heterogeneity in subjective expectations and incorporates survey noise
at the same time.
We used data from the Health and Retirement Study that was fielded in February 2008
through February 2009. We identified the effect of the crash from the date of the interview,
which we showed to be exogenous to previous stock market expectations. The estimated ef-
fects are qualitatively similar in the reduced form regressions and from the structural model,
and they are robust to the functional form assumption for the distribution of stock market
returns. The results show a temporary increase in the population average of expectations
and uncertainty right after the crash. The effect on cross-sectional heterogeneity is more
significant and longer lasting, which implies substantial long-term increase in disagreement.
Stockholders were found to have more positive, less uncertain and less heterogeneous ex-
pectations than non-stockholders, but the stock market crash led to a larger increase in
disagreement among them than among non-stockholders. We found similar but smaller dif-
ferences between those who follow the stock market and those who don’t, as well as between
those whose cognitive capacity is above the average and those whose cognition is below the
average.
The large positive effect of the crash on disagreement suggests that there is heterogeneity
in the cognitive processes (or mental models) people use to convert public news into personal
265
probability beliefs, in line with the models of Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and
Pearson (1995). The differential effects on stockholders versus non-stockholders, and similar
differences between informed and less informed or by cognitive capacity, may be due to the
fact that those different groups receive different signals or process the signals in very different
ways. These results provide empirical evidence for future research on heterogeneous beliefs
in finance theory.
Another natural question for further research is whether the changes in expectations we
document lead to changes in asset allocation. Data from HRS 2009 and 2010 will allow for
a thorough analysis of the effect of the crisis on the reallocation of household portfolios and
the role of expectations.
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Tables and figures
Figure 4.1: Level and volatility of the DJIA, volume of trade and Google search
for ”Dow’
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The left panel shows the level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (daily closing), and the VXD annualized volatility index.
The right panel shows the weekly volume of trade in billions of dollars and Google search for ”Dow’ from the US in the
sampling period of HRS 2008 (February 2008 through February 2009).
Figure 4.2: Histogram of the P0 answers in the total sample and in the final
sample
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Figure 4.3: Standard normal c.d.f. with P0 and P20 shown
The figure shwos the standard normal c.d.f with µ = 0.07 and σ = 0.15.
Figure 4.4: Cross-sectional distribution of expected returns among stockholders
and non-stockholders
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The figures show the quartiles of the distribution by the date of the interview, estimated from the structural model with interactions.
Detailed results in Table 4.6 in the appendix.
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Figure 4.5: Cross-sectional distribution of expected returns among informed and
uninformed individuals
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The figures show the quartiles of the distribution by the date of the interview, estimated from the structural model with interactions.
Detailed results in Table 4.7 in the Appendix. Informed individuals reported to follow the stock market.
Figure 4.6: Cross-sectional distribution of expected returns by cognition
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The figures show the quartiles of the distribution by the date of the interview, estimated from the structural model with interactions.
Detailed results in Table 4.8 in the Appendix.
269
Table 4.1: Fraction of rounded and inconsistent probability answers. HRS 2008
fraction
Rounding P0 is a muliple of 10 0.806
P0 is 5,25,75 or 95 0.140
P0 is a muliple of 5 0.986
Inconsistency Strongly inconsistent answers* 0.169
Zero mass answers** 0.215
N 9348
* P0 < Px+ or P0 + Px− > 100
** P0 = Px+ or P0 + Px− = 100
Table 4.2: Placebo regression results: OLS estimates with proxies for the level
(columns 1-2) and heterogeneity (columns 3-4) of expectations in 2004 and 2006
as dependent variables, and the time of the interview as right-hand side variables
Dependent variable P0 in 2006 P0 in 2004 |uP0| in 2006 |uP0| in 2004
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Constant 49.376 50.764 20.41 20.607
[0.358]** [0.351]** [0.226]** [0.220]**
Interview in HRS 2008 is 0.728 1.312 -0.432 -0.088
July 08 to September 08 [0.695] [0.680] [0.439] [0.427]
Interview in HRS 2008 is 0.878 2.489 -0.714 0.196
October 08 to November 08 [1.279] [1.247]* [0.809] [0.783]
Interview in HRS 2008 is 3.903 -1.819 1.394 1.235
December 08 to February 09 [1.992] [2.001] [1.260] [1.257]
N 7941 8444 7941 8444
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Sample: HRS 2008
“Px“ is defined as Px+ for positive thresholds and (1− Px−) for negative thresholds.
Table 4.3: OLS regressions with proxies for the level (columns 1-2), heterogeneity
(columns 3-4) and uncertainty (column 5) of expectations.
Dependent Variable P0 Px |uP0| |uPx| Px − P0
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Constant 45.627 64.813 24.485 21.434 -24.532
[0.360]** [0.785]** [0.184]** [0.429]** [0.966]**
July 08 to September 08 -0.142 0.571 -0.39 0.173 1.702
[0.698] [0.628] [0.356] [0.343] [0.773]*
October 08 to November 08 4.922 3.645 1.714 1.762 4.343
[1.254]** [1.128]** [0.640]** [0.617]** [1.389]**
December 08 to February 09 0.041 1.06 2.562 2.331 -0.175
[2.000] [1.799] [1.021]* [0.983]* [2.215]
Dummies for the YES YES YES
’x’ categories
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Sample: HRS 2008
Notes. “Px“ is defined as Px+ for positive thresholds and (1− Px−) for negative thresholds.
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Table 4.4: Date of interview in 2008 and average subjective expected value
of yearly stock returns (m), average subjective standard deviation (sv) and un-
observed cross-sectional heterogeneity in expectations (Std(u)). Results from
structural regressions
µ ln(σ) ln[Std(u)]
Constant -0.088 -0.606 -1.23
[0.006]** [0.023]** [0.079]**
July 08 to September 08 0.001 0.113 0.131
[0.010] [0.037]** [0.047]**
October 08 to November 08 0.062 0.292 0.569
[0.025]* [0.088]** [0.099]**
December 08 to February 09 -0.028 0.019 0.38
[0.033] [0.119] [0.135]**
Female -0.062 0.235 0.146
[0.009]** [0.034]** [0.044]**
Single 0.004 0.04 0.121
[0.010] [0.039] [0.048]*
Black -0.017 0.589 0.56
[0.025] [0.093]** [0.096]**
Hispanic 0.002 0.387 0.332
[0.027] [0.107]** [0.114]**
Age -0.002 -0.005 -0.004
[0.000]** [0.002]** [0.002]
Years of education 0.002 -0.034 -0.031
[0.002] [0.007]** [0.009]**
Above average cognition 0.031 -0.101 -0.198
[0.010]** [0.037]** [0.048]**
Follow the stock market 0.049 -0.129 -0.073
[0.010]** [0.038]** [0.047]
Stockholder 0.072 -0.058 -0.18
[0.010]** [0.038] [0.050]**
P(economic recession) -0.003
2004-2006 average [0.000]**
Depressive symptoms -0.017
2004-2006 average [0.005]**
Ratio of fifty-fifty answers 1.512
2004-2006 average [0.191]**
Log-likelihood -42277
N 9348
Mean(m) -0.085
Mean(sv) 0.616
Mean(Std(u) 0.343
sv2/(sv2+V(v)) 0.645
Rho(v0,vx-) -0.491
Rho(v0,vx+) 0.252
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Reference categories: Interview date March to June, male,
non-Black and non-Hispanic, married
Sample: HRS 2008 271
Table 4.5: The effects of recent returns and volatility of the stock market index
and the daily volume of trade of the shares of the DJIA, before and after the
crash
Specification [1] Specification [2]
µ ln(σ) ln[Std(u)] µ ln(σ) ln[Std(u)]
Constant -0.085 -0.568 -8.955 -0.084 -0.785 -8.454
[0.006]** [0.041]** [2.213]** [0.005]** [0.089]** [2.234]**
Monthly log returns 0.048 0.335
(log of the average of previous 5 days
minus the same one month before) [0.081] [0.104]**
VXD volatility index 0.013 0.977
(average of previous 5 days) [0.151] [0.408]*
Log of volume of trade 0.350 0.327
(average of previous 5 days) [0.097]** [0.099]**
Post-crash dummy -0.007 0.210 19.295
(October 08 to February 09) [0.032] [0.256] [6.101]**
Post-crash dummy interacted with -0.721
monthly log returns [0.257]**
Post-crash dummy interacted with -0.617
VXD volatility index [0.601]
Post-crash dummy interacted with -0.839
log of volume of trade [0.271]**
Other covariates YES YES YES YES YES YES
Instruments YES YES YES YES
Log-likelihood -42301.2 -42268.1
N 9347 9347
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Sample: HRS 2008
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APPENDIX J
Detailed estimates from the models with interactions
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Table 4.6: Stockholders versus non-stockholders. Date of interview in 2008 and
average subjective expected value of yearly stock returns (µ), average subjective
standard deviation (σ) and unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in expecta-
tions (Std(u))
µ ln(σ) ln[Std(u)]
coef interaction with coef interaction with coef interaction with
stockholding stockholding stockholding
Constant -0.091 0.087 -0.597 -0.134 -1.176 -0.229
[0.007]** [0.013]** [0.026]** [0.052]** [0.082]** [0.063]**
July 08 to Sep08 0.008 -0.013 0.135 -0.052 0.158 -0.066
[0.018] [0.022] [0.067]* [0.082] [0.076]* [0.098]
Oct 08 to Nov 08 0.091 -0.031 0.29 -0.066 0.465 0.135
[0.041]* [0.052] [0.155] [0.188] [0.161]** [0.203]
Dec 08 to Feb 09 -0.012 -0.006 -0.113 0.194 0.231 0.251
[0.052] [0.068] [0.173] [0.246] [0.181] [0.268]
Female -0.103 0.05 0.234 0.076 0.157 0.024
[0.016]** [0.019]** [0.059]** [0.073] [0.066]* [0.087]
Single 0.012 -0.017 0.135 -0.169 0.244 -0.232
[0.018] [0.022] [0.062]* [0.081]* [0.070]** [0.096]*
Black 0.015 -0.126 0.539 0.101 0.483 0.276
[0.028] [0.062]* [0.104]** [0.228] [0.107]** [0.241]
Hispanic 0.013 -0.04 0.408 -0.107 0.357 -0.004
[0.035] [0.055] [0.134]** [0.223] [0.139]* [0.242]
Age -0.002 -0.001 -0.011 0.011 -0.012 0.018
[0.001]** [0.001] [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.004]**
Years of education 0.004 -0.001 -0.04 -0.006 -0.033 -0.028
[0.003] [0.004] [0.011]** [0.015] [0.012]** [0.017]
P(economic recession) -0.004 0.001
2004-2006 average [0.000]** [0.000]
Depressive symptoms -0.025 0.007
2004-2006 average [0.008]** [0.010]
Ratio of fifty answers 1.673 -0.42
2004-2006 average [0.249]** [0.261]
Ll -42278.6
N 9348
Mean(µ) -0.083
Mean(σ) 0.622
Mean(Std(u)) 0.355
Var[R∗]/Var[R] 0.652
Rho(v0, vx−) -0.535
Rho(v0, vx+) 0.225
Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Sample: HRS 2008
Stockholders are those who own any stock-market based assets (stocks, mutual funds etc.) either directly or through retirement accounts.
Members of the same households are assigned the same stockholding status. For more details see main text and footnotes to Table 4
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Table 4.7: Informed versus uninformed respondents. Date of interview in 2008
and average subjective expected value of yearly stock returns (µ), average sub-
jective standard deviation (σ) and unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in
expectations (Std(u))
µ ln(σ) ln[Std(u)]
coef interaction with coef interaction with coef interaction with
informed informed informed
Constant -0.085 0.06 -0.588 -0.123 -1.084 -0.087
[0.006]** [0.012]** [0.025]** [0.050]* [0.084]** [0.054]
July 08 to Sep08 0.001 -0.004 0.106 0.005 0.165 -0.079
[0.020] [0.023] [0.072] [0.085] [0.080]* [0.097]
Oct 08 to Nov 08 0.136 -0.108 0.311 -0.08 0.528 -0.047
[0.049]** [0.056] [0.186] [0.210] [0.192]** [0.218]
Dec 08 to Feb 09 0.014 -0.064 -0.114 0.138 -0.101 0.582
[0.054] [0.068] [0.211] [0.256] [0.225] [0.276]*
Female -0.096 0.058 0.166 0.128 0.107 0.081
[0.016]** [0.019]** [0.063]** [0.076] [0.070] [0.086]
Single 0.01 -0.029 0.111 -0.096 0.183 -0.058
[0.018] [0.022] [0.069] [0.084] [0.075]* [0.093]
Black 0.01 -0.077 0.458 0.221 0.461 0.244
[0.032] [0.048] [0.122]** [0.180] [0.124]** [0.184]
Hispanic 0.066 -0.158 0.179 0.347 0.173 0.311
[0.032]* [0.054]** [0.135] [0.211] [0.140] [0.219]
Age -0.003 0.001 -0.011 0.01 -0.01 0.011
[0.001]** [0.001] [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.004]**
Years of education 0.006 0 -0.034 -0.018 -0.026 -0.046
[0.003] [0.004] [0.011]** [0.014] [0.012]* [0.016]**
P(economic recession) -0.003 0
2004-2006 average [0.000]** [0.000]
Depressive symptoms -0.022 0
2004-2006 average [0.008]** [0.010]
Ratio of fifty answers 1.634 -0.537
2004-2006 average [0.252]** [0.230]*
Ll -42300.4
N 9348
Mean(µ) -0.08
Mean(σ) 0.608
Mean(Std(u)) 0.376
Var[R∗]/Var[R] 0.676
Rho(v0, vx−) -0.699
Rho(v0, vx+) 0.138
Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Sample: HRS 2008
Informed are those who claim to follow the stock market at least occasionally. For more details see main text and footnotes to Table 4
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Table 4.8: People with above average cognitive capacity versus people with
below-average cognitive capacity. Date of interview in 2008 and average subjec-
tive expected value of yearly stock returns (µ), average subjective standard de-
viation (σ) and unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity in expectations (Std(u))
µ ln(σ) ln[Std(u)]
coef interaction with coef interaction with coef interaction with
cognition cognition cognition
Constant -0.085 0.029 -0.6 -0.116 -1.175 -0.194
[0.007]** [0.013]* [0.025]** [0.051]* [0.075]** [0.060]**
July 08 to Sep08 -0.03 0.043 0.152 -0.056 0.169 -0.081
[0.019] [0.022] [0.070]* [0.084] [0.079]* [0.099]
Oct 08 to Nov 08 0.078 -0.023 0.286 0.003 0.531 0.037
[0.049] [0.056] [0.185] [0.211] [0.186]** [0.218]
Dec 08 to Feb 09 -0.027 0.005 -0.249 0.405 0.31 0.017
[0.058] [0.070] [0.188] [0.245] [0.191] [0.262]
Female -0.097 0.04 0.2 0.129 0.1 0.155
[0.017]** [0.019]* [0.063]** [0.075] [0.071] [0.088]
Single -0.016 0.013 0.128 -0.105 0.259 -0.189
[0.019] [0.022] [0.069] [0.084] [0.077]** [0.097]
Black 0.011 -0.113 0.485 0.285 0.457 0.336
[0.030] [0.053]* [0.113]** [0.199] [0.115]** [0.208]
Hispanic 0.024 -0.074 0.325 0.134 0.284 0.159
[0.036] [0.054] [0.146]* [0.214] [0.151] [0.228]
Age -0.003 0.001 -0.008 0.005 -0.011 0.01
[0.001]** [0.001] [0.003]** [0.004] [0.003]** [0.004]*
Years of education 0.009 -0.003 -0.046 0.011 -0.037 -0.014
[0.003]** [0.004] [0.011]** [0.014] [0.012]** [0.017]
P(economic recession) -0.003 0
2004-2006 average [0.000]** [0.000]
Depressive symptoms -0.025 0.005
2004-2006 average [0.008]** [0.010]
Ratio of fifty answers 1.408 0.239
2004-2006 average [0.215]** [0.268]
Ll -42319.7
N 9348
Mean(µ) -0.083
Mean(σ) 0.617
Mean(Std(u)) 0.351
Var[R∗]/Var[R] 0.649
Rho(v0, vx−) -0.518
Rho(v0, vx+) 0.235
Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Sample: HRS 2008
Cognitive capacity is measured by a score from memory and numeracy tasks. For more details see main text and footnotes to Table 4
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APPENDIX K
Estimates based on alternative functional form
assumptions
In this appendix we re-estimate our structural models with two alternative specifications
for the return distribution, Student-t with various degrees of freedom and shifted log-normal.
Within the Student-t framework, the relation between the probability answers and the esti-
mated parameters is the following:
P0i = T
(
µi
σi
, df
)
, (4.13)
Px+,i = T
(
µi − x/100
σi
, df
)
, (4.14)
Px−,i = T
(
x/100− µi
σi
, df
)
, (4.15)
where df is the degrees of freedom of the distribution. Note that since the t distribution is
symmetric, µ can still be interpreted as the mean of the subjective distribution, sv will not
be the subjective standard deviation anymore. According to the properties of the Student-t
distribution, the true standard deviation will be
σRi = σi
√
df
df − 2 (4.16)
Under the shifted log-normal assumption returns follow , it can be shown that the prob-
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ability answers are:
P0i = Φ
(
µi
σi
)
, (4.17)
Px+,i = Φ
(
µi − ln (x/100)
σi
)
, (4.18)
Px−,i = Φ
(
ln (x/100)− µi
σi
)
, (4.19)
For small return realizations the normal and the shifted log-normal distributions are very
similar. We, however, have quite high subjective variance, and thus a very large fraction of
the return distribution is in a range where the true distributions are different. An important
difference between the normal and the shifted lognormal model is that they have different
moments. It can be shown that the first two moments of the shifted lognormal distribution
are:
µRi = exp
(
µi +
σ2i
2
)
− 1, (4.20)
σ2Ri =
(
exp
(
σ1i
)− 1) exp (2µi + σ2i ) (4.21)
Because it is skewed, the mean of the distribution will be larger than the estimated µ. The
potential asymmetry of the subjective distribution, thus, can be a reason for having small,
usually negative values for µ.
As we can see, the parameter estimates are very much the same in all specifications,
and the qualitative results do not change. All specifications agree that the crash brought a
moderate increase in uncertainty and a huge increase in disagreement. The normal and the
Student-t models agree that the mean of the subjective distribution was weakly positively
affected by the crash. The log-normal model is also equivalent to the other models if we talk
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about log-returns instead of actual returns. As we saw earlier, actual returns are non-linear
functions of µ and sv, and the moderate increase in sv must have a positive effect on µR.
According to these estimates, the average µR increased after the crash from 16.5 percent to
72.2 percent, and the overall mean is 21.2 percent. This is clearly implausible.
We can also see that the likelihood is the highest in the original normal case and thus
this model fits the data the best. While asymmetric models could explain how the mean of
the subjective distribution can be positive even if the average P0 value is less than 50, we
can see that the log-normal model does not fit the data well. Further investigation is needed
to test for the potential non-normality of the subjective return distribution.
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Table 4.9: Stock returns assumed to be distributed Student-t with 3 degrees of
freedom. Date of interview in 2008 and average subjective expected value of
yearly stock returns (µ), average subjective standard deviation (σ) and unob-
served cross-sectional heterogeneity in expectations (Std(u))
µ ln(σ) ln[Std(u)]
Constant -0.090 -0.871 -1.165
[0.006]** [0.024]** [0.074]**
July 08 to September 08 0.000 0.114 0.122
[0.010] [0.038]** [0.046]**
October 08 to November 08 0.059 0.277 0.552
[0.025]* [0.090]** [0.099]**
December 08 to February 09 -0.027 0.003 0.364
[0.034] [0.122] [0.135]**
Female -0.063 0.248 0.157
[0.009]** [0.035]** [0.043]**
Single 0.004 0.040 0.118
[0.010] [0.040] [0.048]*
Black -0.017 0.592 0.562
[0.026] [0.095]** [0.098]**
Hispanic 0.000 0.383 0.327
[0.027] [0.109]** [0.114]**
Age -0.002 -0.006 -0.004
[0.000]** [0.002]** [0.002]
Years of education 0.001 -0.033 -0.032
[0.002] [0.007]** [0.009]**
Above average cognition 0.031 -0.094 -0.195
[0.010]** [0.038]* [0.047]**
Follow the stock market 0.048 -0.125 -0.075
[0.010]** [0.039]** [0.046]
Stockholder 0.071 -0.047 -0.177
[0.010]** [0.039] [0.049]**
P(economic recession) -0.003
2004-2006 average [0.000]**
Depressive symptoms -0.018
2004-2006 average [0.005]**
Ratio of fifty-fifty answers 1.545
2004-2006 average [0.196]**
Log-likelihood -43091.9
N 9348
Mean(m) -0.087
Mean(sv) 0.818
Mean(Std(u) 0.364
sv2/(sv2+V(v)) 0.763
Rho(v0,vx-) -0.574
Rho(v0,vx+) 0.193
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Reference categories: Interview date March to June, male,
non-Black and non-Hispanic, married
Sample: HRS 2008 280
Table 4.10: Stock returns assumed to be distributed Student-t with 3 degrees
of freedom. Date of interview in 2008 and average subjective expected value
of yearly stock returns (µ), average subjective standard deviation (σ) and unob-
served cross-sectional heterogeneity in expectations (Std(u))
µ ln(σ) ln[Std(u)]
Constant -0.088 -0.678 -1.213
[0.006]** [0.023]** [0.077]**
July 08 to September 08 0.001 0.113 0.128
[0.010] [0.038]** [0.047]**
October 08 to November 08 0.061 0.288 0.565
[0.025]* [0.088]** [0.099]**
December 08 to February 09 -0.028 0.015 0.376
[0.033] [0.120] [0.135]**
Female -0.062 0.239 0.149
[0.009]** [0.034]** [0.043]**
Single 0.004 0.040 0.120
[0.010] [0.039] [0.048]*
Black -0.017 0.590 0.560
[0.025] [0.093]** [0.097]**
Hispanic 0.001 0.386 0.330
[0.027] [0.107]** [0.114]**
Age -0.002 -0.005 -0.004
[0.000]** [0.002]** [0.002]
Years of education 0.002 -0.034 -0.031
[0.002] [0.007]** [0.009]**
Above average cognition 0.031 -0.099 -0.197
[0.010]** [0.038]** [0.048]**
Follow the stock market 0.049 -0.128 -0.073
[0.010]** [0.038]** [0.046]
Stockholder 0.071 -0.055 -0.180
[0.010]** [0.038] [0.049]**
P(economic recession) -0.003
2004-2006 average [0.000]**
Depressive symptoms -0.017
2004-2006 average [0.005]**
Ratio of fifty-fifty answers 1.522
2004-2006 average [0.192]**
Log-likelihood -42425.5
N 9348
Mean(m) -0.085
Mean(sv) 0.641
Mean(Std(u) 0.348
sv2/(sv2+V(v)) 0.663
Rho(v0,vx-) -0.512
Rho(v0,vx+) 0.238
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Reference categories: Interview date March to June, male,
non-Black and non-Hispanic, married
Sample: HRS 2008 281
Table 4.11: Stock returns assumed to be distributed log-normal with parameters
µi and σi. Date of interview in 2008 and average subjective expected value of
yearly stock returns (µ), average subjective standard deviation (σ) and unob-
served cross-sectional heterogeneity in expectations (Std(u))
µ ln(σ) ln[Std(u)]
Constant -0.108 -0.565 -1.185
[0.006]** [0.023]** [0.078]**
July 08 to September 08 0.000 0.098 0.116
[0.010] [0.038]* [0.047]*
October 08 to November 08 0.065 0.296 0.572
[0.026]* [0.093]** [0.103]**
December 08 to February 09 -0.027 0.018 0.379
[0.035] [0.124] [0.139]**
Female -0.067 0.234 0.145
[0.009]** [0.035]** [0.044]**
Single 0.005 0.044 0.127
[0.011] [0.040] [0.049]**
Black -0.013 0.554 0.527
[0.025] [0.092]** [0.094]**
Hispanic 0.005 0.382 0.328
[0.028] [0.109]** [0.115]**
Age -0.002 -0.006 -0.005
[0.000]** [0.002]** [0.002]*
Years of education 0.002 -0.031 -0.029
[0.002] [0.007]** [0.009]**
Above average cognition 0.032 -0.081 -0.179
[0.010]** [0.038]* [0.048]**
Follow the stock market 0.050 -0.101 -0.046
[0.010]** [0.038]** [0.047]
Stockholder 0.074 -0.054 -0.177
[0.010]** [0.039] [0.050]**
P(economic recession) -0.003
2004-2006 average [0.000]**
Depressive symptoms -0.018
2004-2006 average [0.005]**
Ratio of fifty-fifty answers 1.521
2004-2006 average [0.196]**
Log-likelihood -42360.2
N 9348
Mean(m) 0.210
Mean(sv) 9.017
Mean(Std(u) 0.355
sv2/(sv2+V(v)) 0.644
Rho(v0,vx-) -0.484
Rho(v0,vx+) 0.231
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Reference categories: Interview date March to June, male,
non-Black and non-Hispanic, married
Sample: HRS 2008 282
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